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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Authority and Legitimacy1 
 
An entity that is authoritative is sometimes said to have the right to issue 
commands. The concept of authority, however, is both descriptive and normative. Thus, 
it may concern the authority of an entity that says what should be done; or the 
requirement that it be done because it was issued by an appropriate authority. In the latter 
case, the concept contains a claim, more or less explicit, about the right of the authority to 
command. An authority could possess this right only if its authority is justified by a 
standard independent of its command issuing procedure.2 If it is justified in this way, it is 
legitimate – hence authoritative in the normative sense. Consequently, a properly 
normative account of authority seems to entail a duty to obey its commands. 
Not everyone will agree that a duty to obey arises with legitimate authority. For 
example, a doctor may legitimately prescribe medicine; but this fact does not entail a 
duty to obey the doctor’s orders to take it even if it is prudent to do so. That an authority 
is legitimate in this way seems necessary but not sufficient for a duty to obey it. 
However, authority in this case refers to expertise (to which I will refer as 
“authoritativeness”). If Citizen Y has a duty to obey Citizen X then she has a sufficient 
reason to obey even if X is incorrect about what she ought to do. In this case her duty to 
obey is not based upon the expertise of the doctor since the doctor may be wrong. 
                                                 
1 Nothing I say here about authority or legitimacy pretends to be comprehensive. The concepts themselves 
are complex, as are the possible ways of relating them. For evidence of this fact, see Raz’s Authority 
(1990). As the argument develops, it will become clear I am applying them to a particular type of authority. 
2 This requirement is very general. An authority that is “self-justifying” seems to beg the question of 
legitimacy. In Chapter 2, I will address the question directly of whether this standard is moral or non-moral. 
I will argue in favor of the former over the latter view.  
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Consequently, if a duty to obey corresponds with legitimate authority, this duty does not 
arise in response to expertise, but in some other way. A duty to obey the doctor may 
arise, for instance, if one has a duty to preserve oneself.    
 If one asserts that the doctor’s prescriptions should be followed because of some 
relevant, underlying duty, one has apparently asserted a distinctive type of authority —
thus, a distinctive type of reason to obey. In this case, having a duty to do something will 
be sufficient reason to do it, though not always a necessary one. Thus, if one has a duty to 
obey the authoritative medical practitioner on the basis of – e.g. the duty to preserve 
oneself – the conditions that justify one’s obedience seem satisfied. But the duty to obey 
the doctor seems to depend upon other requirements independent of the facts about the 
doctor’s expertise.3 The criteria for legitimate authority are logically independent of the 
command issuing procedure (whatever it is).4 Legitimacy is not conferred in this case 
simply by the substantive features of a de facto power. This includes any antecedent, 
substantive agreements among the members of various types of associations. 
The concept of legitimacy, then, may be understood in two different ways (with 
respect to “internal” justification and with respect to “external” justification). External 
accounts of legitimacy stem from the identification of the moral or epistemic features of a 
particular external command-issuing authority as a basis for legitimacy. Internal accounts 
typically locate the source of legitimacy in duties logically independent of the command 
producing procedure.5   
                                                 
3 I am not claiming here that there are such duties; the example so far is for illustrative purposes only. 
4 To simplify things, then, we may distinguish between the “internal” and “external” command. I will refer 
to the “external” command as having been produced by a “command issuing procedure,” and the “internal” 
command simply as a duty. 
5 One should keep in mind that these definitions are rough at this stage. It may be helpful to keep in mind 
Kant’s distinction between “external” and “internal” sources of authority. I am treating the “external 
command issuer” as substantive here.  
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External and Internal Interpretations of Legitimacy 
 Some political theorists have believed that authority in the “external” sense is 
sufficient for legitimacy. Plato believed it; and so did Rousseau.6 On their view, authority 
derives in particular from moral and epistemic qualities of certain citizens. Plato 
understood these qualities to be manifest in the true philosopher, while Rousseau 
understood them to be in the majority.7 Thus, the belief in the sufficiency of authority 
(qua expertise) for legitimacy is not specifically democratic or undemocratic. To the 
extent that each depends on the substantive correctness of their outcomes, I will refer to 
them as substantive accounts of political legitimacy. The most fundamental question 
about political legitimacy, on this view, concerns which political authority is most 
reliable. Since legitimacy is indexed to reliability, the most reliable procedure would be 
the legitimate one.   
Not all theories of political legitimacy are substantive in this way. Non-
substantive views reject the claim that epistemic authority is sufficient for legitimacy; but 
they do not always reject that it is necessary for legitimacy (or so I will argue).8 As 
suggested above, these theories also relocate the source of authority, redefining what 
justification requires. Non-substantive views accept that the outcome of a political 
procedure has authority, without accepting that its legitimacy flows from the epistemic 
authority of citizens or the substantive correctness of political outcomes. I will identify 
                                                 
6 I hesitate to call Rousseau’s account “external” in this way. The idea of the General Will suggests the 
possibility of an “internal” structure of justification. However, it is difficult to see how outcomes are 
justified to the minority voter given that the minority voter votes contrary to the majority which, Rousseau 
claims, is justified because it is correct. To this extent, Rousseau and Plato seem to disagree largely about 
who the expert is, but not about the role of expertise relative to legitimacy.  
7 Rousseau’s account finds some support in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. 
8 Some views reject that it is even necessary. I will turn explicitly to one such view in Chapter 3.  
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this class of views about legitimacy for which epistemic authority is not sufficient as 
procedural views, and say something about what it means.   
 There are prima facie reasons to think that procedural views are superior to 
substantive ones when it comes to the concept of legitimacy.  First, and most obviously, 
skepticism that political outcomes are categorically correct – even if they are the products 
of expertise – seems well-motivated. Second, the medical analogy suggests the duty to 
obey the doctor does not derive from her authority as, e.g. “reliable disseminator of 
wisdom about cancer treatment,” but from some other obligation — even if it happens 
that the doctor is correct. So for procedural views, the concept of legitimacy is 
fundamental, even prior to the concept of authority. Procedural views explicate the duty 
to obey by appealing to reasons available to — indeed binding on — anyone (e.g. duties 
arising in virtue of reason generally considered). The central question of political 
legitimacy from this point of view, then, is not which authority is the expert. Rather, it is 
which procedure produces legitimate outcomes, independently of their being correct. 
Moreover, it contends that the reasons sustaining an outcome as legitimate are not 
necessarily referred to the reasons for which one initially adopted the procedure (i.e. its 
reliability). Thus, the legitimacy of outcomes must be referred to a procedure independent 
standard.   
 There is a dispute about whether or not this standard is moral, thus whether 
legitimacy must include a moral account of motivation. Theorists on either side of this 
divide can hold that obedience is in some way appropriate to legitimate political 
authority. However, their accounts of obedience will differ. As suggested, this difference 
turns on whether such duties are necessary to the normative account. Those who argue it 
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is, view the failure to obey under certain conditions as a kind of moral failure. Those who 
argue it is not, contend that the fact citizens voluntarily obey can be considered evidence 
that a regime is legitimate. The mere fact of obedience is evidence of legitimacy, while 
the motivations for obedience are viewed as irrelevant. So the non-moral account of the 
“reasons” (here meaning causes) of obedience emphasize the acquisition of knowledge 
about psychological, economic, and sociological relations as part of the calculus of 
widespread (voluntary) acceptance. Deciding whether moral reasons are necessary for 
legitimacy, then, is an important part of any political theory since this judgment shapes its 
overall outlook.  
I contend that legitimacy appeals not simply to facts about voluntary acceptance, 
but to independent moral criteria. A simple example can show why. The reason for 
adopting a “knife-procedure” is to cut. However, one is not justified in cutting Jim even if 
cutting him satisfies the conditions for which the knife was adopted in the first place – its 
cutting capability. Whatever reasons there are to justify the use of the knife seem 
different somehow from those justifying its adoption. The reasons justifying the adoption 
of a knife as a cutting instrument are quite general. Those that might justify turning it on 
Jim are quite a bit more specific. They are introduced when we consider what is cut, or 
even how, when and by whom it is cut. In short, the justification of the outcome depends 
upon moral reasons not necessarily introduced in adopting the procedure. There is no 
particular moral significance to the adoption of a knife-procedure, unless in picking it up 
I have the intention to cut Jim or do, in fact, cut him. Even so, the nature of the 
independent moral standard (i.e. justice) is disputed; and a moral theory of democratic 
legitimacy must negotiate the problems arising from these disputes.  
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Democratic Authority 
A standard procedural view abstracts from the substantive features of outcomes. It 
suggests outcomes are legitimate for reasons that concern the procedure and not their 
substantive quality. So, procedural accounts typically hold that the procedure is 
legitimate if it is fair or if it conforms to background principles of justice. Procedural 
views suggest that the fact an outcome is correct is no more a reason to accept it as 
legitimate as the fact that an outcome is incorrect would be a reason to disobey. This is 
because a procedural view of legitimacy does not typically include epistemic criteria in 
its concept. More typically democracy is understood as occupying a relatively 
subordinate role in the framework of a civil constitution. Call this “limited democracy.” 
The merits of democracy and its products can be evaluated, from this point of view, in 
one of two ways: (1) according to its tendency to produce stability (as argued by 
Schumpeter and Posner); or (2) being constituted by “the conditions of background 
justice” (as argued by Rawls). But the substance of justice is disputed; and even if we 
adopt a view of justice as fairness we have not yet addressed, much less made plausible, 
the capacity of a democratic procedure to track just outcomes. There are reasons to think 
democratic procedures should have this capacity if it makes sense to adopt them at all.  
Citizen Y has a duty to obey Citizen X if X has legitimate authority over Y. If X 
has this authority illegitimately, then Y could not be said to have a duty to obey, even if 
she does so as a matter of fact. How X could be said to have the authority to command Y 
is particularly puzzling in democratic justification. In part, this puzzlement stems from 
the assumption of the principle of equality. If X and Y are equal in some fundamental 
way, granting X authority over Y seems to contradict the principle of equality. An 
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account of political legitimacy aims to determine the criteria necessary for X to have 
legitimate authority over Y. In any ordinary case, however, while obedience to X is not 
predicated on X’s authoritativeness, it would seem equally irresponsible to obey X if X is 
unreliable. Provided this analogy holds, something must be said about the epistemic 
features of democratic procedures if their claim to be obeyed can be plausible. The 
legitimate authority of X over Y seems to arise only if democratic procedures meet 
epistemic criteria which would enable them to track just outcomes.  
 
Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Interpretations of a Democratic Procedure 
 As suggested, epistemic interpretations of democracy are commonly associated 
with a substantive view of authority – the idea that the authority of political outputs rests 
on their substantive correctness. Given the difficulties with the claim that authority (qua 
expertise) is sufficient for legitimacy, however, procedural democracy offers a way to 
establish criteria for democratic legitimacy without appealing to the authority (epistemic 
or otherwise) of an external command producing procedure. I will argue, however, that 
this cannot exclude the requirement that democracy meet epistemic criteria, even as 
understood within the procedural framework.  
Epistemic views of legitimacy suggest, then, that what makes a procedure good is 
its capacity to effectively track just outcomes. This capacity is owing to its epistemic 
character. Thus, even if we understand legitimacy in procedural terms, some account 
must be made of the features of a procedure that indicate its reliability. Outcomes are 
legitimate, then, if they are the result of a reliable democratic procedure.  
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 I have already suggested why it would be wrong-headed to conceive of 
democratic procedures as constitutive of correct outcomes. Some of these reasons are 
moral; but not all of them are. The skeptical thought is that many democratic outcomes 
can be shown to be incorrect by an independent moral standard. Thus, putting any faith in 
the infallibility of democratic procedures (even theoretically) seems misguided. 
Nevertheless, the tendency of a procedure to produce good outcomes – its epistemic 
character – would be a reason that would justify adopting it. But the question arises of 
what democratic procedures are epistemic, if not truth or the good directly?  
The answer to this question depends, I will argue, on the view we take of practical 
reason and its role in political justification. I will propose that only a constructivist 
account of practical reason can accommodate the problems arising from reasonable 
pluralism and lay the groundwork for tracking just outcomes. It does so by tracking the 
reasons for them. This means, on the view I present, that they will track a moral good, 
albeit indirectly. The procedure must be framed, then, to accommodate disagreement 
about this good while not undermining the epistemic benefits of democracy. 
 
Reasonable Pluralism and Epistemic Criteria 
 The foregoing suggests that authoritative democratic procedures would meet both 
moral and epistemic criteria. However, it is not always clear that a procedural view of 
democracy can accommodate both. To see this, consider Rawls’s account of political 
liberalism.9 He writes,  
 
                                                 
9 This view is a type of “contractualism” and related to other types articulated most notably by Scanlon, 
Barry, and others.  
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The political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a diversity of 
opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some 
of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines 
political liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human 
reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions (Rawls 2005, 
4).10 
 
How to understand this statement depends in an important way upon how to understand 
“diversity among reasonable doctrines.” If we understand it as the happy circumstance 
that reasonable doctrines will tend to converge we might hope or even expect that 
reasonable doctrines will value more or less the same things and to the same degree. On 
this view, one assumes that antecedent, substantive agreement about values and their rank 
underwrites political legitimacy. However, according to Rawls, the lack of such 
agreements is indicated by the fact equally reasonable doctrines may be “opposing and 
irreconcilable.” That they are reasonable, then, does not indicate the hope for 
comprehensive convergence. Rather, it indicates the hope for a theory of legitimacy 
despite their lack of convergence (a condition that may be permanent). Consequently, no 
particular moral principle abstracted from any of the possible moral doctrines could be a 
legitimating reason for coercion unless it is acceptable to all other (possible) reasonable 
political participants.11 Since political agents may be distinguished by their 
                                                 
10 One may claim that Rawls unjustifiably slips “reasonable” into his description here. Why, after all, 
should those of some religious or philosophical disposition or other think those of another disposition are 
reasonable when their claims are false and their evidence shaky, or their outlook reprehensible? This matter 
cannot be dealt with fully here. 
11 Indeed, at its most basic level political liberalism may be construed as an argument that the inclusion of 
moral content in questions of political legitimacy and authority is necessary for these reasons. Thus, it must 
defend not only the solution to the problem it poses but the formulation of the problem itself, since it seems 
to arise for doctrines that are morally equal in a certain respect.  
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reasonableness, political liberalism presents a proposal for legitimacy whether there are 
comprehensive moral agreements or not.12  
 A constructivist understanding of practical reason provides a framework within 
which such dilemmas may be resolved. Generally, constructivism says something is good 
if there is a reason to choose it. Disputes about what ought to be done are motivated by 
disagreement about which reasons are better. If something is valuable to the extent there 
are good reasons to choose it, conflicts in value reflect conflicts in practical reason and 
result in different practical judgments (e.g. “X is good” or “Y is good). Reasons 
(understood here as practical evidence) are governed by inferential and non-inferential 
norms. So settling disputes rationally is accomplished largely by reference to these 
norms. However, there may be cases in which value commensuration is not possible, 
hence cases in which the defeasibility conditions of X or Y cannot be determined. Such 
cases reveal an incommensurability of value. I contend that Rawls’s political liberalism is 
built on the possibility of such cases in political deliberation. In these cases, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism may be entered into political deliberation as a governing reason. 
Consequently, A’s knowledge that “X is good” (assuming A has such knowledge) could 
not be a reason for B to defer her judgment. Moreover, it could not be a reason for her to 
accept A’s judgment as legitimate unless it meets moral requirements imposed by 
reasonableness. Reasonable pluralism cannot be rejected (i.e. is a fact of sorts) because it 
is a fact about practical reason as such. The fact of reasonable pluralism is, then, both a 
moral concept and an epistemological constraint on practical judgments and their role in 
political justification. This does not say, in itself, what epistemic criteria democratic 
                                                 
12 This doesn’t entail that Rawls’s procedural view is not supposed to produce substantive, authoritative 
results. It’s just that it’s supposed to do so without appealing to controversial religious, moral or 
philosophical doctrines.  
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procedures must meet in order to produce good outcomes. It does, however, establish a 
moral framework within which such an account must be given. 
From here, I argue that an account of deliberation may be developed according to 
which reasonable pluralism operates as a regulative principle without impinging on the 
conditions for deliberating well since citizens deliberate directly about reasons and only 
indirectly about justice. After all, if liberal principles impede deliberation, they impinge 
on its epistemic benefits and the conditions (e.g. participation) necessary in order to 
realize them. These impediments diminish the legitimacy of democratic procedures.  
However, there is more than one type of theory that may be considered epistemic 
in this way. I have two in mind. One will be referred to as Epistemic Proceduralism; and 
the other as Pragmatic Deliberativism.13 The former view introduces epistemic criteria 
based upon an analysis of the presuppositions of democratic procedures. In particular, it 
claims they are constrained by features of a procedure that could not be reasonably 
rejected, in particular, by “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” Moreover, it counts the fact 
of reasonable pluralism as an epistemic constraint. The other position (which will be 
referred to as Pragmatic Deliberativism) introduces epistemic criteria into democratic 
procedures vis a vis an account of deliberation.  
I will argue that there is a notable methodological difference in these views that 
produces different results in response to democratic legitimacy. This difference centers 
on the order and priority of deliberation in the account of legitimacy. Epistemic 
Proceduralism argues that the criteria for legitimacy may be determined prior to 
                                                 
13 Both Epistemic Proceduralism and Pragamatic Deliberativism are descriptive and technical. The former I 
have taken from David Estlund, in particular, his essay, “Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic 
Dimension of Democratic Authority” (1999). The latter will be used largely to refer to Cheryl Misak’s 
“Peircean pragmatism,” but the name is taken from Democracy After Liberalism (2005, 116). 
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deliberation. Pragmatic Deliberativism suggests that legitimacy flows in some way from 
deliberative acts.  
In addition, I will argue that there is at least one reason to prefer a model of 
legitimacy in which the criteria for legitimacy are established independently of any actual 
deliberative acts. This has to do with its moral force, namely that it explains a duty to 
obey democratic outcomes in a way that seems absent in Pragmatic Deliberativism. An 
important part of the argument turns on whether or not a duty to obey is necessary part of 
the concept of political legitimacy. If it is not, then this would be an argument against my 
view. If it is then how to derive it must be explained. Given moral pluralism, however, 
one might claim that the “necessity” imposed by this type of argument is antithetical to a 
genuinely pluralist conception of democracy. Thus, one might eschew appeals to 
“necessary presuppositions,” and claim that my argument assumes there are such things. 
However, if there is no necessary place from which to begin, there is no reason not to 
make this assumption.  
 
The Strength of Duty 
Having a duty to obey an authority would be a sufficient reason to obey it.14 There 
is reason to think it is not necessary. One may do what the doctor tells one to do, for 
instance, even if one is under no obligation to do it. Predictably, one does so if it is 
prudent with respect to one’s own well-being.15 If one has moral reasons to obey a 
                                                 
14 I will understand legitimacy in terms of reasonable rejection rather than reasonable acceptance largely for 
the reasons Scanlon (1982) cites. “Reasonable acceptance” does not capture the normative force of political 
consensus, letting us confuse political liberalism with theories that demand deep substantive moral 
agreement as a basis for political legitimacy. But, in this case I am arguing, we would miss the force and 
interest of the argument.  
15 In this case, the duty arises on the basis of other duties (e.g. to one’s own well-being).  
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political authority, it must be shown these reasons govern what one should do, even if 
one does not believe it, acknowledge it, and so on.16 In particular, moral reasons would 
serve as motivations to obey even when one disputes the political outcome. Otherwise, 
the acceptability of moral reasons would be contingent on the beliefs one happened to 
have, and one could reasonably reject them on this basis.17 These reasons are overriding 
regardless of one’s specific moral doctrine. This would be true even if these reasons are 
viewed as the consequence of a procedure of construction. It must be shown, then, how 
these reasons serve as reasons to obey independently of one’s beliefs about the 
substantive value of the outcome. 
An obvious question arises about the relative strength of the duty to obey 
legitimate political authority. If the authority of moral reasons were absolute with respect 
to each instance, there would be no apparent justification for civil disobedience. This 
stance would undermine the sort of criticism made against Rousseau since it suggests that 
outcomes must at least be treated as if they are correct, even if they are badly wrong. 
Civil disobedience can correct for the moral errors in outcomes. Thus, it must be 
incorporated into our view. So I will argue for something weaker. These general duties to 
obey can be overridden if outcomes require, for instance, that one do something immoral 
or if they require that one do something to diminish the epistemic quality of the 
outcomes. But this does not mean they allow for disobedience simply because one 
believes the outcome is incorrect. While the proposal leaves room for civil disobedience, 
it suggests that disobedience must be justified on grounds whose merits extend beyond 
                                                 
16 To this extent, I follow Herman’s account of moral judgment (1993) described as not being able to 
except oneself given any number of special circumstances. If one cannot except oneself from the law, one 
cannot reasonably reject the reasons that make it applicable to one’s own case.  
17 In this case, I may not have a reason to obey if, for example, I disagree with the outcome. 
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one’s beliefs, feelings, etc. Reasons for rejecting outcomes must be put in terms that 
others could accept given the norms of political agreement (and disagreement). While the 
norms of practical reason impose certain restrictions upon political deliberation, they do 
not exclusively define the motives or reasons for political action, nor do they make civil 
disobedience impossible. They act only to regulate it in cases where it is warranted.      
 
The Argument 
 
 The outlines of an argument can now be made clear. The general thesis is this: No 
duty to obey democratic outcomes arises unless the procedures of which they are a 
product meet some epistemic criteria. The epistemic features of a procedure enable it to 
track outcomes correct by a procedure-independent moral standard.  
So I will begin with a case of “simple pluralism” in which one acts “politically 
incorrectly” but ostensibly out of a kind of moral or religious conscience. Then I ask what 
would be required in order to justify the use of force against such actors. The general 
answer is that some appeal must be made to reasons that are authoritative, but not 
necessarily reasons that they accept from the point of view of their particular doctrine. On 
this basis, I claim that the relativity of value must be rejected without rejecting the 
possible plurality of moral value. After all, to reject the latter would be, it seems, to reject 
democracy as such. Indeed, legitimate political authority must be justified in asserting a 
duty to obey. Otherwise, it would remain unclear what authority it had with respect to the 
individual moral and religious conscience. The possible plurality of moral value, then, 
will frame the discussion of democratic legitimacy, in particular how to justify a duty to 
obey democratic outcomes given this plurality.  
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The justification of a duty to obey as a part of the concept of democratic 
legitimacy is itself a matter of dispute.18 It is often thought that such duties arise from 
tacit or explicit consent, as if consent were fundamental to the idea of self-rule. I will 
utilize Chapter 1 to show why consent is of limited use even within the procedural 
conception. From here, I will outline available alternatives to consent theory along with 
some of their merits and problems.  
In Chapter 2, I will consider a justification of democratic authority that does not 
depend upon consent, and in fact, proposes to remove questions of moral value from the 
“public table” altogether as a means to articulate a conception of legitimacy. Call this 
account minimalist. Minimalism is positivist regarding value and law. However, it is 
faced with serious internal flaws. To the extent it explains political obedience in terms of 
psychology, sociology, and economics its account of legitimacy (in particular the “duty” 
to obey) is grounded in its positivism. Minimalism, however, makes the mistake of 
supposing that the reasons for adopting a procedure are also reasons that can be employed 
as justifications of democratic outcomes. It cannot for this reason adequately account for 
the legitimacy of political outcomes. For this reason, the appeal to a procedure 
independent moral standard for evaluating political outputs is necessary.  
In Chapter 3, then, I will consider Kant’s persuasive, comprehensive, and 
critically acute view of democratic legitimacy. Unlike the positivist doctrine, Kant’s 
contends that political legitimacy is a moral concept. It contends that the duty to obey 
political outcomes is indeed categorical; and that its nature in this regard is grounded in 
the transcendental principle of publicity. If we assume that Kant’s view is absolutist, it 
can be shown how this stance leads the transcendental view of legitimacy into a problem. 
                                                 
18 Indeed, it is disputed whether or not the concept of legitimacy requires any claim about a duty to obey.  
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The goals of this view are clear enough, viz. the capacity of citizens to utilize their 
practical intelligence in public matters. However, there are cases in which the 
transcendental philosophy seems to place obstacles in the way of these goals. In 
particular, it places obstacles in the way of democratic deliberation and undermine 
legitimacy.19 
In Chapter 4, then, I will turn to a collection of recent work on democratic 
legitimacy and deliberation. It includes relatively recent essays by John Rawls, David 
Estund, Cheryl Misak, and Michael Sandel. By placing these views in conversation with 
each other, I argue that the criteria for legitimacy may be established prior to political 
deliberation, though they inform democratic deliberation in vital ways. However, making 
this argument will require establishing the proper role of deliberation in democracy that is 
not, as Cohen writes, merely a derivative rather than a normative ideal of democracy. To 
these matters I turn in Chapter 5.  
Because individual deliberations may not be a suitable model for democratic 
deliberation, I have endeavored to put a number of thinkers and perspectives in 
conversation with each other. The idea of democratic deliberation in Chapter 5 is 
restricted to its political context. Even though the chapters will proceed in conceptual 
rather than historical order, I have included a substantial amount of relevant historical 
content as a background for present day political theory. Though I argue there are 
differences to be drawn even among epistemic views of democratic legitimacy, if nothing 
else, I hope to make it manifestly clear that any theory of democratic legitimacy must 
                                                 
19 I will not, however, contend that the reading I give here is the correct reading. The goals for the chapter 
are to provide a contrast to the non-moral conception of legitimacy and to undermine an absolutist 
understanding of the duty to obey. The contrast will provide a basis for the development of a Rawlsian 
conception of democratic legitimacy in Chapter 4. An interpretation of Kant’s view of moral reasons that 
seems closer to correct may be found in Herman (1993).  
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include an appeal to epistemic criteria however these more particular disputes are 
ultimately resolved. 
 
 1
CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
POWER, AUTHORITY, AND TRUTH 
 
 
 
1. Political Power and Legitimate Authority 
 As the 21st century commences signs of fanaticism — religious, political, and 
otherwise — abound. Fanaticism often erupts within the enlightened states that claim to 
have overcome it in ideology if not in actuality. In 2004, the filmmaker Theo van Gogh 
was murdered in Amsterdam — historically, the most tolerant of western cities — for his 
criticism of the treatment of women within Islam. More recently, riots have erupted 
worldwide in response to the cartooning of the Islamic prophet, Mohammed.  
The spirit of fanaticism does not belong to a particular religion, politic, or nation. 
Abortion clinics and gay nightclubs have, over a number of years, been bombed in the 
United States. Abortion clinic doctors have been murdered. These events considered 
individually may not indicate a spreading social or political fanaticism; but taken together 
they are at least suggestive of discontent and instability.  It is notable, moreover, that 
these events often occur within political environments in which speech and abortion is 
legally protected, and homosexuality is not (as a matter of practice at least) illegal.1 
Aside from the immediate shock at events like these, they reveal deeper 
dimensions of dispute. In particular, they suggest underlying disputes about which form 
of political authority, if any, is legitimate.2 To this end, Philo’s statement in Hume’s 
                                                 
1 Some states in the US still have anti-sodomy laws. However, such laws are rarely, if ever, enforced. 
2 One might object this fact does not indicate a dispute about political legitimacy. Everyone agrees that 
democratic outcomes are legitimate. However, this does not entail agreement about the nature of that 
authority, and its justification. 
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Dialogues seems both prescient and familiar: “But, where the interests of religion are 
concerned, no morality can be forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The 
sacredness of the cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it” 
(Hume 1980, 84).3 The sacredness of the ends, from the point of view of the zealot, 
justifies the means employed to realize them. Their illegality does little apparently to 
stem this sentiment. Thus, zeal tends to “weaken extremely men’s attachment to the 
natural motives of justice and humanity” (Hume 1980, 84).  
Hume suggests that fanaticism — for political purposes at least — is a condition 
in which “sacred objects” are the determinants of politically authorized action. Practices 
organized around these objects claim the right of legitimate political authority. But a 
legitimate political authority must prescribe political duties for the zealot as for anyone. 
Since political society, commonly understood, is justified in employing coercion and 
sometimes force to achieve its ends, we must be able to show that the political authority 
in question has a right to its authority — that, indeed, what is lawful is prior to what is 
sacred. Otherwise, political authority appears to be only the exercise of power without 
justification — indistinguishable from zeal and not insulated from its effects. In this case, 
we could not identify who the zealot is and is not — thus against whom force may be 
rightly used — without begging the question against the zealot. Without such a 
demonstration, the zealot may be alternately a saint, a freedom fighter, or a martyr 
against an encroaching and illegitimate form of life; hence justified, at least to those she 
believes share her point of view. Consider the zealot, then, as an instance in which 
legitimate authority and its nature is disputed. This dispute depends in some way upon 
                                                 
3 My aim is not simply to address religious fanaticism except insofar as it manifests itself in larger and 
more diverse political communities.  
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one’s view of the correct determinants of authorized public action. The resolution of this 
dispute entails the monopolization of political authority. But solving this problem has 
nothing to do with the question of whether the fanatic can psychologically give due 
weight to democratically produced outcomes. Rather, it has to do with determining why 
she ought. Thus, it is a normative problem – a problem about the justification of political 
authority. It remains a question in political justification whether or not a duty to obey 
arises in correspondence with rightful authority. I address this question in a somewhat 
limited way – arguing only that if there is such a duty the command-issuing procedures 
must meet some criteria of epistemic soundness. This would be true of democratic 
procedures inasmuch as any other. Thus, the task will be to show that democratic 
procedures either possess or may be constructed (by appeal to an ideal conception) to 
possess such features.  
2. The Exclusivity of Legitimate Authority 
A political authority issues commands. If an authority legitimate, then a duty to 
obey its commands arises. To this extent, it must give reasons validated by an 
independent moral or epistemic standard. Legitimate authority has, then, the exclusive 
right to issue political commands. In this way, it has a kind of moral authority.  
Obedience to political authority could be morally required only if the authority in 
question is legitimate. Thus, it is required only if the reasons that determine its legitimacy 
are valid according to a moral standard independent of its assertion of power. Political 
legitimacy, then, does not refer simply to psychological facts or to prudential 
considerations on the part of individuals trying to estimate in particular cases whether 
 4
they should obey or whether obedience is owed. Rather, justification refers to the right of 
a political authority to issue commands, and the corresponding duty to obey them.  
One might ask why the requirement of justification falls on any political power. 
After all, the amassing of power can be accounted for and explained by various 
psychological and economic phenomena. The greatest power commands plain and 
simple. In part, the answer to this question has to do with the exclusivity of legitimate 
political authority. That is, if there is more than one “authority,” there are potentially 
conflicting commands both requiring obedience. A practical question about which one (if 
any) should be obeyed naturally arises. The political authority that should be obeyed is 
the one that is legitimate. The question of legitimacy is generated as a problem of 
practical reason. Its apparent solution assumes the form of an “exclusivity” thesis. The 
exclusivity thesis says that there could be one and only one legitimate authority for the 
purposes of issuing commands to which citizens have duties. Because there are numerous 
views as to which commands procedure produces legitimate commands, there is a need 
for a theory.   
This theory, I claim, must assume that distinguishing between commands that are 
legitimate and those that are illegitimate requires appealing to procedure-independent 
moral standards. Without an appeal to an independent moral standard, it would not be 
clear which authority has the right to issue such commands, thus, why it is legitimate. 
Legitimate authority is unified and monopolistic. The defense of a political authority, 
then, depends upon the quality of the reasons for it, not merely the quantity of the power 
behind it. No rightful authority could be so without a sound justification; and no 
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justification could be sound if it does not appeal to standards independent of the power in 
question. 
Putting the problem in this way also suggests something about the form of 
political outputs. Since they are commands, obedience is required even in cases where 
laws are bad (e.g. unjust).4 The requirement of obedience stems from the form of the 
output, not simply its content. The form of the output commands obedience even when 
the correctness or quality of its content(s) is the subject of dispute, which it frequently is. 
The legitimacy of the outcome depends, then, upon whether it is justified as a 
command—that is, whether it rightfully requires obedience even if there are disputes 
about the correctness or quality of their content. With respect to the range of political 
outputs, we might say that the command is categorical over the range of its outputs.    
3. The Epistemic Element of Political Justification 
A political output as understood here is a distinctive kind of claim about what 
should be done. It is distinctive because it is a command; and as a command it is binding 
on those subject to it, even when they disagree about the correctness of the content of the 
outcome. This is true even in democracy, where citizens are represented as free and 
equal. A typical problem of democracy concerns how to reconcile freedom and equality 
with the command structure of a political authority. Because of the requirements of this 
problem given pluralism (as noted above), it is atypical in democratic theory to suggest 
that the evaluation of the quality of democratic outcomes has much significance with 
respect to democratic legitimacy. A more typical view suggests that outcomes are 
legitimate if the procedures producing them reflect the qualities of freedom and equality. 
                                                 
4 Whether or not this entails that civil disobedience is ever justified will be discussed in some detail in 
Chapter 3.  
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Yet, some philosophers have argued, contrary to the typical view, that the quality of 
political outcomes is relevant to their legitimacy (Cohen 1986; Estlund 1999). 
Democratic legitimacy would, in this case, have what David Estlund has called an 
“epistemic dimension.” As suggested in the Introduction the requirement of an epistemic 
dimension stems from the shortcomings of various types of substantive and procedural 
understands of authority and legitimacy. In the former case, legitimacy does not seem to 
follow from authority without specifying some other set of duties. Procedural conceptions 
of democracy tend to under-emphasize the reliability of the procedure, hence its 
epistemic features. Before examining the possibilities for this type of justification, 
however, I will examine and critique a more typical view—the idea that legitimacy 
derives from the free consent of citizens, and that consent is sufficient for legitimacy. The 
understood significance of consent as part of democratic theory lies in the fact that it 
makes freedom and equality “operational.” That is, if it could be shown that one consents 
to a procedure or to an output, we assume that one validates the output (i.e. the law or 
policy). One could not be said to be enslaved or dominated by outputs or procedures to 
which one freely consents. One is bound, then, by one’s consent regardless of the 
epistemic quality of the outcome.  
4. Self-Rule as Consent 
At least two traditional views suggest that appealing to an epistemic element in 
democracy, as a part of its justification, is implausible. Appealing to an epistemic element 
to justify democracy seems contrary to the most recognizable, and perhaps forceful, 
criticism of it—the one forwarded by Plato.5 In particular, Plato claims, democracy 
                                                 
5 Plato’s conception is epistemic; but he does not believe democracy can muster the resources to produce 
good outcomes.  
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cannot produce true beliefs about what should be done because citizens generally are 
lacking in political wisdom. Individually and collectively, then, they are lacking in 
knowledge about what should be done. However, this claim is not unique to the non-
democrats. The contention that democracy could be morally or epistemically reliable 
does not always fit comfortably with some justifications of democracy—in particular 
those found in the liberal tradition of political justification. This tradition shares with 
Platonism the concern that democracy is beset by severe epistemic deficiencies, and deep 
moral conflict. As a consequence of these deficiencies and internal moral conflicts, 
democracy is liable to tyranny (Mill 1869, Riker 1982).6 Or as Richardson more recently 
suggests, democratic reliability is a “rickety” basis upon which to place a duty to obey 
(2002, 73). Were democratic outputs high in epistemic value, neither characterization 
would make much sense. Thus, one can only assume they share with Plato the claim that 
democratic procedures as such are not epistemically reliable.   
Understanding self-rule as consent is an attractive way to address substantive 
moral disputes, without appealing to the epistemic features of democratic procedures. In 
particular, the appeal to consent shifts the focus away from the disputed outcomes toward 
some other value, like a moral commitment or prudential judgment.  Obedience to 
outcomes, then, is required even if one disputes their correctness. This is because 
obedience depends upon facts about the procedure in relation to consent rather than its 
particular product. This does not explain how democratic outcomes are limited. So within 
consent-based theories, it is standard to limit democratic outcomes within the framework 
of a civil constitution that outlines the moral bounds beyond which legitimate outcomes 
                                                 
6 The present essay does not trade on any claim of being “anti-liberal,” though it does suggest that many 
strategies for justifying consent-based approaches to liberal justification are unsuccessful.  
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may not pass. The civil constitution may attend to justice, even if democracy as such 
cannot.  
Unanimous consent to the civil constitution in which democracy is an article 
authorizes the majority to rule. The idea is this. Since one has authorized the ruler to 
command, one is obliged to obey. Not to obey would be a contradiction of will. Thus, the 
minority is obliged to obey outcomes, even those with which they disagree. If consent is 
genuinely rational, then, we would have to explain upon what the claim to the rationality 
of the procedure is based.7 There are at least two explanations. One of these understands 
consent in terms of prudence; and the other one understands consent to have distinctively 
moral content.  
Consent as Prudence 
In his Second Treatise on Government, Locke claims that in a democracy “the act 
of the majority passes for the act of the whole” (2003, 142). On this view, it is not 
obvious why the rule of some should pass for the rule of all, if consent is required for 
authorization.8 Without consent, it seems the majority would be aligned with power 
instead of right. If democracy means “self-rule” it must be explained how this expression 
could be applied to a political or social minority inasmuch as to the majority.  
                                                 
7 Objections about the general rationality of democratic procedures have been raised. To be rational, a 
procedure must conform to general rules of logic (e.g. transitivity). At least two problems arise from claims 
about the rationality of these procedures: (1) the voter’s paradox (Wolff 1999, 58-67) and (2) the paradox 
of the minority voter (Wollheim 1962, Estlund 1989). Both criticisms focus on the interpretation of 
democratic legitimacy that appeals to the rationality of democratic procedures as ways to explain how 
citizens generally or citizens in a minority determine political outcomes and are, therefore, free. In the case 
of the voter’s paradox, the democratic voting procedures do not (given certain preference orders) meet the 
most minimal requirements of logic (i.e. transitivity). (See Wolff’s account of “transitivity” in the page 
noted above.) It would be not add much to the present thesis to treat both types of problems here. Thus, I 
will assume there is some tenable solution to the general rationality of democratic procedures and continue 
to concentrate on the problem of the minority voter. Even if the first set of problems can be resolved, it is 
not clear that these solutions affect the problem of the minority voter.  
8 Whatever the answer here the appeal is not to unanimous consent about outcomes. 
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 Locke suggests this justification conforms to the justification for the authority of 
any government. Consent is rational if government promotes “their [the people’s] 
comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of 
their properties and a greater security against any that are not of it” (2003, 142). The 
purpose of government is to make the good of citizens possible; and it is rational for 
citizens to consent to be governed provided it does so. Obedience justified by consent 
maximizes equal liberty. Thus, if one gains more by giving up some, one has made a 
good trade.9 That government which cannot secure these conditions cannot be legitimate. 
This is because it cannot secure the reasoned consent of citizens.10 And if it cannot secure 
this consent, it cannot convert the will of the majority into a general will. The will of the 
majority would represent force without justification—hence without reason, and so 
without legitimacy.  
 Of course, the idea of rational consent utilized in this way does not seem to 
suggest that an act of consent has taken place. It represents what it would be to give one’s 
consent as a rational being. And if this is true, it is not clear why one should be obligated 
to obey. It simply outlines what rational beings tend to prefer. It does not seem to show 
why the outputs are commands whose legitimacy is categorical.  
There are cases in which I may withdraw consent. Thus, if I find democracy 
unreliable in furthering the ends of liberty it is not clear that my consent would be 
rational. I may withdraw it just as reasonably and freely as I gave it. In this case, consent 
seems a thin basis for sustained political obedience by democratic minorities. On the 
                                                 
9 This view may be likened to Rawls’s difference principle. Inequalities can be justified if they produce 
greater equality overall.  
10 For this reason, I believe Locke includes rights of rebellion. This distinguishes Locke from Kant who 
includes no such right, even when a legitimate authority has broken the social contract. I will turn to this 
feature of Kant’s account at the end of Chapter 3.  
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prudential view, no one has a reason to remain a democrat when the vote goes against 
one’s own interest. Obedience may be rational, but there is no duty to obey if consent is 
formulated on the basis of prudential judgment.     
Consent as Promise-keeping 
 Kant, like Locke, emphasizes the authorizing power of consent—and so the 
necessity of obedience—when he writes, “the actual principle of being content with 
majority decisions must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract; and this 
itself must be the ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established” (1991, 79). 
The duty to obey on Kant’s interpretation has the form of a promise. In adopting 
democratic procedures, one makes a commitment to accept the outcomes as legitimate 
even in cases where one believes the outcome is wrong. The duty arises from the fact of 
unanimous acceptance of the contract within which democracy is one article. Having 
adopted the procedures (and so their outcomes at least formally), one is bound to obey the 
outcomes. One could not disobey without implicitly withdrawing one’s consent. And one 
could not do that without breaking the promise to obey even in cases where one believes 
the outcome to be incorrect. Consent, in this respect, has the form of a promise and is 
governed by moral norms. Disobedience is wrong because it is a contradiction of the 
universal will irrespective of the quality of the content of democratic outcomes. 
The key to this proposal lies in the fact that democracy is represented as an article 
of a civil constitution. Thus, democracy is authorized to command if and only if it is 
constrained within this framework. The civil constitution is, then, the means by which 
democracy is legitimately actuated and limited. Simple democratic procedures, 
independent of the civil constitution, could not be legitimate. Hence, obedience to their 
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outcomes could not be justified without appealing to justice understood as the object of 
the social contract. 
Within the framework of a civil constitution democracy is justified relative to this 
limited role. The question, however, is why the legitimacy of democratic procedures is 
made to depend on a civil constitution in the first place. The justification for democracy 
within the framework of a civil constitution concerns its capacity to enable “citizens 
voting in periodic elections to remove elected officials when they become discontented 
with the officials’ performance” (Dahl 1989, 154). So democracy is an effective means to 
restrict political power.11  There is no suggestion here that the justification of democratic 
procedures concerns its capacity to indicate the truth about what ought to be done; thus, 
no suggestion that democracy has any epistemic merit apart from its limited role within 
the civil constitution.  
Both characterizations of consent—the prudential and the moral—seem liable to 
the same critique. Allen Buchanan writes, “If consent is really necessary for political 
authority, then there are not and are never likely to be any entities that possess political 
authority” (2002, 699). Since no one really consents, then, there is no authority.12 
Nothing like a full refutation of consent theory needs to be attempted here. It is enough to 
show that consent theories are limited when it comes to the justification of political 
authority. Neither prudence nor the consistency of keeping a promise seems sufficient to 
                                                 
11 One assumes this means that in this narrow way at least, democracy is able to reflect something like a 
popular will (Arrow 1951; Wolff 1998). An underlying supposition of the present essay is that even if the 
general rationality of the procedure—that it does not, for example, violate transitivity—can be worked out, 
it does not resolve the problem of the minority. Thus, most of the work here focuses on the problem the 
minority poses for democratic justification.  
12 Cf. Simmons 1979. 
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establish a duty to obey. In any case, if Buchanan is right, since no one ever really 
consents, there is no duty to obey political authority on the basis of consent alone.  
For all that, it is not necessary to rule out that consent plays some role in political 
justification. Instead, the point is to show that if consent is a meaningful part of political 
justification, its authorizing power cannot be conceived except by reference to duties or 
obligations to which one does not consent but are nonetheless binding.   
5. Reliability as a Component of Legitimacy  
The appeal to consent as a basis for political authority is enabled by a 
longstanding prejudice against the epistemic features of democratic procedures. Within 
the Platonic tradition, the appeal to democratic reliability is blocked by presumed facts 
about public ignorance. The many are not philosophic. Thus, what is required in order to 
rule the city well — knowledge of the Good — is lacking in democracy since it is by 
definition, rule by the many (490e; 557a).13 
Within the liberal tradition, this prejudice against democracy is reflected in the 
limited role to which democracy is assigned. Were it believed that democracy produces 
good outcomes by a procedure independent standard there would be no reason to confine 
it to the role of limiting the power of government. Instead, democracy, so defined, is 
justified if it promotes liberty, stability, and the like. Thus, within the liberal tradition 
democratic procedures are commonly understood as preserving liberty by restricting 
external power.14 On this basis, an epistemic view of democratic procedures and 
legitimacy receives marginal treatment.  
                                                 
13 Cf. Kane (1994, 120-122). Kane gives a vivid and concise account of the entailments of Plato’s criticism 
of democracy.  
14 This view should be distinguished from democracy as a means to further autonomy, which has 
republican sources.  
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Now, suppose that each time I want to know the answer to a question about what 
to do, I consult a “Magic 8 Ball.”15 I ask the 8 Ball a question, turn the 8 Ball over, and it 
provides a response with the form of a command about what I should do. I appeal to this 
method exclusively. The trouble is that it tells me the right thing to do only about 12% of 
the time. It is unreliable. In other words, its outputs do not have typically high epistemic 
value. So I suffer the consequences of doing the wrong thing, commit egregious moral 
offenses against others and so on. I may still continue to defer my will to the 8 Ball.  In 
other words, I may sustain my willing consistently over a large number of cases; 
however, it begins to seem that I do so irrationally, assuming there is a better alternative. 
One will wonder why I continue to do so given the epistemic unreliability, indeed the 
grave moral consequences, of the procedure. Consent seems rational only if the procedure 
is epistemically or morally reliable.  
By contrast, if I have cancer and wish to preserve my health, I go to the oncology 
boffin rather than the local faith healer. My judgment in putting myself in the care of the 
oncologist (e.g. following her instructions) concerns the reliability of the procedure to 
produce the desired outcome. Some of my reasons for submitting to medical authority are 
epistemic. But the epistemic nature of my reasons for submitting to the instructions of the 
doctor or the 8 Ball does not justify obedience in one important way. It does not obligate 
me to obey their instructions. In other words, even if I take the doctor as authoritative, I 
would have the duty to do what the doctor says only if I have other duties (e.g. natural 
duties to preserve my health). Unless there are such duties, it is not clear that I have a 
duty to obey even if I consent to the procedure.  
                                                 
15 “Magic 8 Balls” are toys made popular in the 1970s. There is a window in the 8 Ball. One is supposed to 
ask the question, and turn the 8 Ball over. An “answer” to the question appears on the window.  
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From this point of view, it seems wrong-headed to base political legitimacy — as 
having to do with an obligation to obey — on the epistemic value of its outcomes. On the 
other hand, it seems reasonable to defer to the oncologist in a way it does not seem 
reasonable to defer to the 8 Ball or faith healer. This could only be because the 
authoritativeness of the oncologist derives, in part at least, from her reliability in treating 
cancer. Authoritativeness, unlike legitimate authority, however, does not entail 
obligations to obey unless there are other duties on which to base them. Political 
legitimacy, then, would depend upon these other duties. Since their authority does not 
depend upon consent, consent alone cannot be the basis of political legitimacy. I may 
withdraw consent as easily as I gave it, and on the same epistemic basis. The unreliability 
of the 8 Ball, for example, may be a good reason to withdraw consent to follow its 
commands. This situation seems improved only if it is the case that a failure to consent 
would be wrong according to an independent moral standard.16 On the other hand, it 
seems implausible to think that democratic outcomes can carry much weight over a large 
range of cases among a diverse population if they have no epistemic quality. 
The question is how to account for the duties that make consent operant. In other 
words, if consent is authorizing, it could be so only on the basis of a doctrine that 
specifies these duties and justifies their authority (i.e. something to which I could not be 
said to consent but am obligated in any case). Thus, while it is far from clear that the 
epistemic quality of outcomes alone secures an obligation to obey it is equally uncertain 
whether a theory of democratic legitimacy can dispense with an appeal to reliability. 
                                                 
16 Along the lines suggested above, Buchanan (2002) claims that the justification of obedience depends 
upon a deeper duty, namely a “robust natural duty of justice.”  Obedience is not to the abstract entity of a 
state but to a somewhat less abstract entity of a government composed by others citizens. There are duties 
to obey person, on his account, but not governments (considered abstractly). But this duty derives from 
justice.  
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Whatever else can be said about democratic legitimacy, it is hard to imagine there could 
be a duty to obey the outcomes of random procedures, or procedures that consistently 
produce the wrong outcome. Naturally, there will be concerns about what this proposition 
implies. Before addressing these concerns, I will further define three possible views of a 
democratic procedure in terms of the duty that justifies obedience.  
6. Three Conceptions of a Democratic Procedure 
 Any viable view of democratic legitimacy must observe the distinction between 
legitimate and correct political outcomes. Any acceptable view must be procedural in 
some way. That is, if political legitimacy is framed as a problem about justifying 
obedience, and we assume the categorical form of outputs along with disputes about their 
correctness, we have to assume that political outcomes may be legitimate even when they 
are not correct. Thus, it seems the only plausible theories of legitimacy will be 
procedural. This does not entail that procedural theories necessarily lack a regard for the 
substantive correctness of outcomes. Since, however, these considerations must avoid the 
claim that legitimacy requires correctness, it remains to be seen how this concern should 
be integrated into a procedural conception.   
Several possible causes of political legitimacy may now be distilled and outlined 
in terms of these duties. Distinguishing between them does not entail that they are 
incompatible at every point. It only suggests that they are importantly different.17 In the 
following, I will alternately consider the merits of the duties to fairness, to justice, or to 
truth as causes of procedural political legitimacy. 
                                                 
17 I will discuss a kind of prudential conception of democracy in Chapter 2. It may be traced in part to 
Hobbes but reappears in the positivism of Schumpeter and, more recently, Posner.  
 16
The Duty of Fairness  
 In “Justice as Fairness,” Rawls writes,  
Now if the participants in a practice accept its rules as fair, and so have no 
complaint to lodge against it, there arises a prima facie duty…of the parties to 
each other to act in accordance with the practice when it falls upon them to 
comply” (1999, 60).18 
 
On this view, the outcomes of a procedure are legitimate if fairly produced. If fairness is 
adequate to the legitimacy of the outcome, then, voters have on this view sufficient 
reason to accept the outcome as legitimate. On the other hand, they have reasons to think 
the outcome is illegitimate if the product of a procedure was not produced fairly. 
 There is a dispute about the meaning of “fairness” as applied to political 
procedures. Thus, there may be a dispute about the justification of the outcome, even if 
there is no dispute about its cause—the procedure that produced it. If fairness is marked 
by equality of input (e.g. the “one person, one vote” rule), then, legitimate outcomes 
(assuming a simple voting procedure) could only be those that are fair so far as each 
eligible voter has one and only one vote and, in fact, votes once. Fairness on this account 
is purely a matter of the distribution of political input. It represents a strict and formal 
egalitarianism.  
Some accounts of the democratic procedure, then, are strictly egalitarian with 
respect to the distribution of input and some are not. Non-egalitarian understandings of 
fairness may, instead, peg it to what makes persons unequal (e.g. differentials of 
                                                 
18 This view was stated in a 1962 version of “Justice as Fairness.” I make no claim whether Rawls 
continued to accept it since it is used here only to illustrate such a view.  
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education, wealth, intellectual gifts et. al.) In these cases the fair distribution refers to 
“proportional” distribution given the relevant differentials. 19  
So there is a deeper question about the nature of fairness. Egalitarianism pegs the 
fairness norm to that which makes persons equal. Both models assume that a 
democratically legitimate outcome is legitimate if it is produced by a democratic 
procedure, whether they assume distributive equality or not. Though there may be a de 
facto consensus about the proper view of fairness as strict distributive equality, we cannot 
yet assume a normative consensus as a condition of legitimacy. That is, democracy does 
not apparently require fairness if we mean by this “one person, one vote.” Whether or not 
democratic procedures should be egalitarian and in what degree is, then, a separate 
question and must be defended on separate grounds. If an egalitarian ideal of political 
input adds anything to democratic legitimacy, this argument must appeal to a standard 
independent of the majoritarian procedure as such. Clearly, these considerations are not 
devastating to the interpretation of democratic legitimacy in terms of fairness. Given 
these persistent doubts, however, it does suggest that the strength of the claim depends 
upon the strength of an underlying substantive moral theory. 
The perceived advantage of fairness as the criterion of legitimacy is that it avoids 
“certain philosophical and metaphysical claims” (Rawls 1999, 388). But if the dispute 
about what is fair can only be resolved on the basis of substantive moral argument, it is 
not altogether clear this advantage can be realized. In other words, if the duty of fairness 
depends upon a substantive moral doctrine, then it is to such a doctrine we must look for 
the justification of this duty.  
                                                 
19 Cf. Estlund “Why Not Epistocracy?” (2003). Estlund contends in this essay that the claims the educated 
have superior wisdom is not available as a justification for unequal political authority.  
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The appeal to fairness may be a sufficient justification in particular, relatively 
unproblematic, cases (Estlund 1999; Christiano 2004). The fairness model in these cases 
is unproblematic as an instrument of bureaucratic expedience. But expedience alone does 
not justify a moral authority as such (Richardson 2003). Thus, the appeal to fairness 
seems weak, especially in difficult cases where deeper moral problems may hang in the 
balance. It does not give citizens sufficient reasons to defer to democratic authority unless 
they already accept fairness (described in a particular way) as the basic procedural 
constraints. They may, however, have good reasons, moral and epistemic, to reject it. 
Procedural fairness is, therefore, inadequate to address problems of political legitimacy 
and justify political obedience.  
The Duty of Justice 
 The appeal to procedural fairness and the dispute about the meaning of fairness 
suggests that purely procedural views find roots in deeper substantive moral doctrines.  
We find some effort to establish the moral foundations of democracy in the political 
theories of Rousseau and Kant (among others).20 Rousseau writes,  
Apart from this general contract, the votes of the greatest number always bind the 
rest; and this is a consequence of the contract itself. Yet it may be asked how a 
man can be at once free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How 
can the opposing minority be both free and subjected to laws to which they have 
not consented” (1968, Book IV, Chapter II)?  
 
Both Rousseau and Kant formulate the problem as one of recognizing the moral 
autonomy of individuals given the coercive nature of the external, legislated laws. If one 
is, by nature, free how is coercion justified? Why must one obey laws one has not 
                                                 
20 Though Kant is reputed to have kept a picture of Rousseau on his wall, there are differences between the 
two political theories that will not become clear until later in the essay. 
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authorized oneself? A moral conception for democratic rule suggests that the foundation 
of such rule lies in procedure independent moral principles. 
Consent, on this view, invokes a moral obligation on the part of the political 
subject. We see this when we recognize that “consent” is tacitly a promise. In consenting 
to the procedure, one promises to obey despite the results of the procedure. Thus, the 
norms governing promising may be applied in this way to the adoption of the political 
procedure. Withdrawing one’s promise to obey is tantamount to violating the minimal 
conditions for autonomy—in particular, the consistency of will required by the practice 
of promising.  
There are, in addition, other theories about the nature of selfhood and citizenship. 
In this case, the problem concerns to which substantive doctrine one should turn to 
establish the duty to justice as a basis for political legitimacy. The most obvious answer 
would be “to the true one.” In this case, however, political justification cannot do without 
“certain philosophical and metaphysical claims.” As in the case of fairness, there are 
reasonable disputes about the duty of justice including its relative priority as a political 
value (Sandel 1982; Rawls 1971 and 2005).21  
Duty and Truth 
 Conceiving of a socially complex political procedure as having the tendency to 
produce correct outcomes has fallen into some ignominy both for moral and epistemic 
reasons.22 Morally, it seems possible that it ignores the minority view. Theoretically, the 
                                                 
21 I will discuss in some details Rawls’ attempt in Political Liberalism to put a certain kind of dispute about 
the priority of justice, one he thinks of as philosophically motivated, to rest.  
22 Consider Riker’s Liberalism Against Populism (1982). In contrast, Cohen (1986) argues that Riker 
misconstrues the epistemic dimension of populism. To this extent, the account I give will follow Cohen. 
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worry is that democratic procedures in particular are incapable of generating outcomes of 
high epistemic value.  
An epistemic conception of democracy holds that democratic outcomes are 
legitimate if they are the outcome of a procedure that reliably produces true statements 
about what should be done (Cohen 1986, 34). Thus, an epistemic account of democratic 
procedures is an account of how they might do so.23  
In The Social Contract, Rousseau argues that democratic procedures produce 
correct outcomes. They reveal the General Will, even in cases where the outcomes are 
disputed by the minority. Since the outcomes are correct, they are legitimate. Hence, the 
minority is incorrect about what the General Will is. The minority must be forced to be 
free. 
The distinction between legitimacy and correctness notwithstanding, Rousseau’s 
conception is (as many have noted) dangerous. Ostensibly, on Rousseau’s conception do 
not merely register the judgment of the minority. Since the majority is interpreted as 
being correct, it threatens to dissolve the minority view altogether since the minority view 
does not reflect the General Will.24 As suggested earlier, however, the reliability of the 
doctor places me under no obligation to obey her unless I have other obligations (e.g. to 
preserve health). Rousseau’s claim apparently is that the majority represents the correct 
view while the minority represents the incorrect one. If so, correctness is sufficient for 
authority since the majority view is the view about what is correct for the minority, too. 
This is because the minority consents to be ruled. Thus, they consent to do what the 
                                                 
23 There is a dis-analogy between this notion of duty and the others. That is, it seems to refer only to 
general conditions of agency. Whether or not it depends upon a deeper metaphysical conception of persons 
is an outstanding question.   
24 In Chapter 3, I will argue that a similar problem is raised with Kant’s conception of political authority.  
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General Will requires, though in this case they are wrong about what it is.25 “Individuals 
must be obliged to subordinate their will to reason; the public must be taught to recognize 
what it desires” (Rousseau 1968, 83). Aside from the fact Rousseau’s view is not really a 
procedural view of legitimacy, there are cogent empirical reasons to think that the 
majority is not always right in the way the theory suggests.  
The lynchpin of Rousseau’s claim concerns the appeal to the correctness of 
democratic procedures. On this point, he explicitly challenges the Platonic estimation of 
democracy — asserting what Plato denies. How Rousseau’s claim about democracy is 
understood, depends upon one’s view of democratic voting — in particular, whether one 
interprets it cognitively or not. To interpret voting non-cognitively means that the voting 
inputs are something non-cognitive, such as desires, preferences, et. al. The interpretation 
of the General Will in this case does not refer to what voters believe it to be. This 
interpretation is attractive; but it leads to a problem. If the majority voted for A and the 
minority for B (not-A), and we interpret the result as being correct, then the minority 
must really prefer A. But then it becomes hard to explain why they voted for B if they did 
not really prefer it. On the other hand, that the minority voted for B becomes 
comprehensible if we understand the minority view as a judgment. On the non-cognitive 
interpretation, the minority view disappears. The minority view is incoherent. It is, so to 
speak, a “non-view.” Understood cognitively, however, the judgment of the minority 
cannot be disposed of even if the majority view is correct. Recalling earlier examples, the 
correctness of the democratic output does not secure its legitimacy, hence a duty to obey. 
If the minority judgment does not necessarily change or disappear with the democratic 
                                                 
25 Admittedly, this account is not very nuanced.  
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outcome, the understanding of this duty (if there is one) must be framed according to a 
cognitive interpretation.     
7. The Epistemic Interpretation of Democratic Legitimacy 
 
 “The usual view of voting,” writes David Estlund, “is that it involves favoring one 
of the alternatives over the others” (1989, 143). The usual view of voting is that it is not 
epistemic. This view has a notable consequence for the minority voter in particular. If the 
voter is democratic, she wills that the majority outcome rules. As an individual voter, 
however, she may will the opposite of what the majority wills. Thus, she is put “in the 
incomprehensible position of willing A and not-A” (Estlund 1989, 143). She could not, 
then, “be subject to her own will” even in the minority. Rather, she could not be said to 
have a will at all since the minimal consistency conditions of willing have not been met. 
 Estlund’s view, I take it, is that the non-epistemic interpretation of voting in all its 
variants (i.e. preferring, willing, desiring) makes nonsense of the minority will. This 
result has, of course, a moral dimension since it suggests the minority view is eliminated 
from the political spectrum. Given the non-epistemic interpretation of voting, then, the 
most obvious way to address this moral concern is to impose restrictions upon the 
democratic process. In particular, we might impose “rights,” that are inviolable by any 
political outcome. Thus, even when the minority view is eliminated from the political 
spectrum it may appeal to this body of rights for protection. Rights-based theories of 
democracy seem to grow naturally from the non-epistemic interpretation. The point of 
this essay is to examine whether this interpretation is correct, whether an epistemic one is 
plausible, and if so, what it entails—in particular what it entails for the minority voter.   
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 Democratic procedures may be employed as a decision procedure in groups of 
people who exist in a common spatial and temporal situation and are often associated 
with each other in other particular ways — for example, by history, culture, or profession. 
The particular application of the democratic procedure with which I am concerned here is 
its application in groups who may be associated in the ways described above, but are also 
politically associated. Their political association gives rise to a quantity of power that 
groups or individuals may exercise over each other and may be aggregated or distributed 
in numerous possible ways.26  In democratic associations, it is often thought that those 
over whom the decision has authority would, on reflection, find the decision procedure 
— hence the outcome — to be justified. Its inability to achieve desirable results, at least 
for some, might be a reason to reject it (Dahl 1989, 163).  
To see this, consider the 2004 Presidential election. In this election, George Bush 
won the votes of a majority of American voters. Let us suppose that those who voted for 
him did so because they believed that he was the only acceptable candidate; let us also 
suppose that those who voted for Kerry did so because they believed that he was the only 
acceptable candidate. So those who voted for Kerry believed that Bush would be an 
unacceptable president. On their view, to elect Bush would be to make a kind of mistake, 
perhaps even to commit a grave moral wrong.  Nonetheless, the expectation is that, at the 
end of the election, the minority voters will defer political authority to the majority 
decision. In essence, then, the minority voters must acknowledge the outcome as 
legitimate — and hence authoritative — even though they believe the outcome to be 
                                                 
26 A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999) argues that the norm of this distribution is egalitarian. Thus, a well-
ordered political society aims at a distribution where differences in wealth and so on are justified to the 
extent they benefit the least well off. This principle need not be interpreted as a “strict egalitarianism.” It 
does not seem it could meet these stringent criteria (Estlund 2000).   
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incorrect. In this way, the legitimacy of a democratic outcome seems wholly distinct 
from its correctness. The legitimacy of an outcome can be assessed entirely by reference 
to the character of the procedure that produced it; presumably, the correctness can be 
assessed only by appeal to some moral or epistemic standard independent of the 
democratic procedure. Call this common picture “narrow proceduralism.”27  
While it is true that a democratic outcome can be legitimate without being correct 
(and vice versa), matters are more complex than narrow proceduralism suggests. 
Returning to the example, suppose now there had been a terrorist attack during the course 
of the campaign, and that, as a result, the President issued an executive order calling for a 
state of emergency, ostensibly for reasons of national security. This meant imposing 
media restrictions, turning out the White House press corps – a general blackout of 
information and public debate between the candidates. Despite the general ignorance of 
the electorate about the candidates, their policies and their characters, the election was 
held to “preserve democracy.” Because of the terrorism, the overwhelming majority 
voted to retain Bush as president. In the meantime, a memorandum had been floating 
around suggesting that the President is a member of a secret society with various 
financial and personal relationships to the terrorists responsible for the act. Let us 
stipulate that such relationships would render the President unfit for office (according to 
objective criteria), and would almost certainly end his presidency. As a result of the 
general media blackout, however, voters vote without knowledge of the memorandum. 
Yet it is reasonable to suppose that, had they known about the memorandum, they would 
have voted differently. (In fact, I will stipulate that reliable polling shows as much.) 
                                                 
27 This view of proceduralism is not as specific as David Estlund’s “fair proceduralism” in “Beyond 
Fairness and Deliberation” (1999). Though fair proceduralism would count as a form of narrow 
proceduralism.  
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According to narrow proceduralism, a proper democratic procedure is simply a matter of 
un-coerced fair voting; hence the present case presents no issue regarding the legitimacy 
of the outcome.  That is, on the narrowly proceduralist view, provided the procedure is 
fair (defined here as equality of voters recognized in the vote), the outcome is legitimate 
despite the content of the memorandum. There was no procedural foul we assume; but 
somehow the outcome seems not only wrong, but illegitimate.  
Suppose, however, that some who voted against Bush (members of the minority) 
were aware of the contents of the memorandum. They have, ex hypothesi, procedure 
independent moral knowledge that the election of Bush is an unacceptable outcome.  On 
the narrowly procedural view, they cannot challenge the legitimacy of the outcome since 
it was procedurally fair. It seems though that something has gone wrong; that there has 
been a failure of democracy — one that cannot be addressed within the framework of a 
narrow proceduralism. “Narrow proceduralism” is too narrow. 
8. Problems with the Procedural View 
So “narrow proceduralism” needs to be revised to accommodate a broader 
conception of a proper democratic procedure. It should, after all, be a sign of a sound 
procedure that it characteristically results in good outcomes, or at least avoids the worst.28 
But if we generalize the claim that procedures must produce correct outcomes in order to 
be legitimate, we suggest that the outcome of any democratic election could be 
challenged on substantive moral grounds. There is not agreement, we assume, about what 
is correct. Thus, taking correctness as the basis of legitimacy seems to result in 
                                                 
28 One may be reminded here of Churchill’s famous and ironic quip about democracy as the worst form of 
government, save all the rest. Of course, if he is right, this would make it the best form.  
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instability. The appeal to substantive moral grounds seems too strong. Yet, the appeal to 
“fairness” seems too weak.  
Assuming a distinction between legitimacy and correctness, then, democratic 
authority seems more complex than first imagined. We are frequently lacking in the kinds 
of knowledge (e.g. secret memoranda) that suggest the outcome is wrong. Because of this 
narrow proceduralism is an attractive alternative for interpreting democratic outcomes. 
However, upon discovery of the content of the memorandum, citizens would have good 
reason not to accept the outcome — though it had been fairly produced. Thus, democratic 
procedures narrowly construed do not alone provide a full justification of democratic 
authority. If each voter operates as though she has independent knowledge confirming the 
correctness of the desired outcome, why should she be expected to defer to the political 
power of those elected to rule and what they produce (i.e. law and policy)? Though they 
have political power, it is not clear that they have power legitimately. 29 Not only does it 
become unnecessary to respond with appropriate obedience to political outcomes, one 
may be armed with powerfully good reasons not to do so. 
The scenario indicates, as Dahl suggests, democratic procedures (as any political 
procedure) may produce noxious outcomes. Nevertheless, given the “command structure” 
of legitimate political outputs, the noxious outputs seem to require obedience inasmuch 
as the sound ones (1989, 163). Since not everyone will agree about the correctness of 
specific outcomes, it seems that the legitimacy of democratic outcomes has something to 
                                                 
29 Representation adds another degree of complexity, and in a certain respect, another level of justification 
to the understanding of a democratic procedure. Suppose that 80% of an electorate opposes gay marriage, 
but that a much smaller percentage of those charged with political power share this view. To the extent 
some citizens have charged other citizens with more political power, the former citizens are morally bound 
to the judgments of the latter. Where there is a divergence between the will of the people and that of their 
representatives, it seems as though voting represents the abdication of power to those whose wills, in fact, 
run counter to an electorate. The political outcome desired by citizens is impeded by the means employed 
to produce it. 
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do with the procedure according to which they were produced. However, the procedural 
conception whose defining criterion is fairness seems weak. In any case, it seems to 
depend in some way upon a substantive moral doctrine. The task for a procedural theory 
of democracy is to integrate the procedural and substantive concerns without violating the 
procedural constraint on legitimacy. To conceive of a democratic procedure in this way is 
conceive it as a process “more likely than another to arrive at the right result” (Dahl 
1989, 164). This is the problem of how to think of democratic procedures as reliable. The 
reliability of political procedures would, in this way, be part of the justification of 
obedience—despite the possibility (endemic to any political process) that it will produce 
undesirable outcomes. 
Since the problem of political authority is about the right to command, and in 
democracy it is the majority who commands, democratic outputs have the form of 
practical propositions, “A ought to be done.” Another problem that centers on the 
minority voter arises. If the democratic procedure produces the output “A ought to be 
done,” and the minority voter claims “B ought to be done,” these propositions apparently 
negate each other. Why ought one to think that the majority view is superior, hence 
authoritative, with respect to that of the minority?    
9. A Semantic Solution to the Problem of the Minority Voter 
 
In “A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy” (1962), Richard Wollheim describes 
the paradox in the following way.30 A vote is cast “A ought to be done,” and the result 
(given democratic procedures) is sometimes an outcome, “B ought to be done.” The form 
of the argument is the same as that suggested by Estlund’s variations on the non-
                                                 
30 It is unclear to me whether Wollheim’s representation of this matter as a paradox is quite accurate.  
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epistemic interpretation. In this case, however, we are dealing with beliefs about what 
should be done rather than preferences.  
 At first glance, the epistemic interpretation leads to the same problem as the non-
epistemic interpretation of democratic voting. In voting for A, the minority voter believes 
that A is the correct outcome. As a democrat, however, she believes that the majority 
outcome is correct. Thus, she wills not-A. Apparently, her view is incoherent as in the 
cases of non-epistemic voting. 
Wollheim’s strategy is to show that the two “ought” statements — the one 
represented by the minority voter’s view of the correct outcome and the democratic 
output — are compatible. If they are compatible, there is no paradox; and if there is no 
paradox, the path to a procedural justification of democratic outputs is, at least, open. 
Wollheim claims that the two statements are compatible because they mean different 
things. Call his view, then, a semantic solution to the problem of the minority voter.  
In order to show they have different meanings, Wollheim distinguishes between 
“direct” and “oblique” principles. A principle is direct (DP) if it refers to the morality of 
actions or attitudes like “murder,” “envy,” “benevolence,” et. al. al. A principle is oblique 
(OP) if it refers to the morality of actions, policies, or motives picked out by means of an 
“artificial property” bestowed “as the result of an act of will of some individual or in 
consequence of the corporate action of some institution” (Wollheim 1962, 70). It was 
noted that the conflict arose when the voter apparently subscribed to two “oughts” – the 
“ought” supplied by their particular moral perspective and the ought produced by a 
democratic procedure. In the latter case it is generated by the voter’s commitment to the 
democratic procedure as a method for public decision-making (e.g. for laws, policies, et. 
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al.). Thus, when the latter generates an outcome that contradicts one’s substantive moral 
commitments, democracy seems to require the transference of political authority away 
from the moral commitments of individuals or groups. It is not immediately obvious, 
however, why the democratically produced output should command this authority or how 
it could be justified to those who lose out. 
 Wollheim addresses this difficulty in a rather minimal, and ultimately 
unsatisfactory, way. By claiming that there is nothing fundamentally incompatible about 
the two “oughts,” he can claim there is no reason in principle (even on a cognitive 
interpretation of voting) why a citizen in a democracy cannot hold both direct and oblique 
principles. The argument he gives is “skeptical” and semantic. It is skeptical to the extent 
it does not assume the truth of any particular view. It is semantic to the extent it attributes 
our understanding of the compatibility of the usages of “ought” to the different ways in 
which the meaning of “ought” is determined in each case. That is, what the “ought” in DP 
means is different from what the “ought” in OP means given the distinctive procedures 
by which each one is derived. Since “ought” in its use in DP means something different 
from its use in OP (given the different ways in which they are produced), they are not in 
principle incompatible with each other.31 The procedural difference is cashed out as a 
semantic difference — and therefore not indicative of contradictory truth claims. 
 This may, in fact, be the case. But this much, I believe, is already understood in 
the recognition of the difference between legitimacy and correctness. There are, indeed, 
conflicts between one’s moral evaluations as a free moral agent equal to other free moral 
                                                 
31 I’ll take for granted, for these purposes, the correctness of this account of the meaning of “ought.” So I 
largely ignore the question that arises about Wollheim’s semantic theory: Is the meaning of a statement a 
consequence of the “method” of its derivation? I will address the following question but only within the 
context of democratic procedures. Is the authority of normative statements (“oughts”) conferred by the 
authority of the procedure that produces them? 
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agents and the political evaluations of the majority. Whether or not the two “oughts” are 
in principle compatible seems beside the point if one does not have good reasons to defer 
authority when the outcome is from one’s point of view not justified on substantive moral 
grounds. The semantic argument assumes the normative priority of oblique principles to 
direct principles. Thus, it begs the question of democratic authority.   
The semantic argument does not show why, especially in cases where the moral 
substance of political outcomes really matters, one should believe the outcome is justified 
because of the manner in which it is produced. To do this, it would have to show why the 
democratic procedure is justified, and should be adopted over one’s commitments to 
direct principles (whether one does so or not).   
 Wollheim’s account of the problem of the minority voter is important because he 
frames democratic outcomes as possessing cognitive content — as beliefs about what 
should be done independently of the content of the inputs. When the problem is set this 
way, the question becomes why the democratic output is authoritative with respect to the 
others. Wollheim suggests this is a fact about the procedure. However, it remains unclear 
how to understand the authority of the democratic output as opposed to the minority 
view, unless it is linked somehow to the substance of its outputs — that is, to their 
epistemic quality. Thus, while Wollheim may have successfully shown that there is no 
fundamental incompatibility between democratic outputs and those of other procedures 
with moral authority, why one is obliged to obey the democratically produced output over 
one’s particular moral claim is not yet clear. In other words, the semantic solution might 
reveal the necessary feature of an epistemic interpretation that the claims be compatible. 
However, by itself it does not justify the authority of the one over the other. On the other 
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hand, since procedural interpretations typically do not rely on the epistemic quality of the 
outputs of the procedure, an account of democratic authority in these terms must be 
justified.   
10. Conclusion 
Wollheim’s semantic solution to the problem of the minority voter outlines what 
must be true of any viable democratic theory — that democratic outputs are justified even 
when some voters dispute the correctness of their content. It is meritorious also in 
recognizing democratic outputs as cognitive. It does not show, however, how to justify 
democratic authority given the cognitive view of voting and the epistemic interpretation 
of democratic outputs.   
Estlund’s characterization of the problem of the minority voter is like Wollheim’s 
since it adopts a cognitive view of democratic outputs. In addition, it retains the general 
idea that the problem of the minority voter arises when there is a conflict between what 
the minority voter wills or believes qua democrat and what she wills or believes qua 
individual voter. To establish that there is no contradiction, Estlund appeals to a 
difference between beliefs and desires, rather than direct and oblique principles. Beliefs 
are about what is the case, while desires are about what one would like to be the case. 
Since beliefs and desires are different, the fact that the majority view is authoritative does 
not require that the minority alter her judgment about the correct outcome. In fact, it is 
not possible to predicate the deference of the minority to the majority on belief. “’I 
believe whatever the majority believes’ is no belief at all because it makes the mistake of 
supposing the belief can refer to its content as an object, by description” (Estlund 1989, 
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149). Estlund claims, there can be no such belief. Thus, the outcome can be legitimate 
without being correct, and without requiring epistemic deference.  
Estlund’s view is highly suggestive, however, about the nature of democratic 
authority. Even if the minority is obliged to defer its will to the majority will the fact of 
the contingency of the deference of judgment is significant. In particular, it leaves open 
the possibility that the minority view of the correct outcome is right. Thus, which 
judgment — that of the majority or that of the minority is true — is not a question that 
can be settled simply by appealing to the democratic procedure construed narrowly. So 
democratic procedures are truth seeking, without requiring that the majority view be 
understood as correct. This view, then, is both procedural and epistemic.  
In the following three chapters, I will turn to three distinctive interpretations of 
democracy. Each interpretation is understood to have well worked out views of 
democratic legitimacy. Two of these — the minimalist interpretation and that of Kant —
have metaphysical underpinnings. The former asserts a positivist doctrine about political 
objects while the latter is normative. The third one (that of John Rawls) articulates a 
normative theory of democratic authority without appealing to any particular 
comprehensive doctrine. Each view, however, conceives the legitimacy democratic 
outputs (and their procedures) non-epistemically. I will show that this stance affects their 
various theories of deliberation or adjudication that result in deep problems, and discuss 
the difficulties they introduce into political justification. In the final chapter, I will show 
how the epistemic interpretation of democracy avoids these difficulties.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
WHY MINIMALISM FAILS AS A THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
 
 
 
1. Minimalism as Reasoning about Means 
 
 A deliberative ideal of democracy, as Joshua Cohen writes, is “an association 
whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members” (1999, 67). 
According to Cohen, this means that deliberative democracy is not simply a “derivative 
ideal that can be explained in terms of the values of fairness or equality of respect” (1999, 
67). Nevertheless, there is skepticism about the ideal of deliberative democracy. This 
skepticism is often rooted in the notion that deliberative democracy cannot resolve 
complex moral disputes. That is, disputes among people who disagree fundamentally 
about moral truth and its origins are not likely to be turned by democratic deliberation. 
Much less are they likely to submit their own moral views to the authority of others or to 
a generic political authority. This is because, as some have argued, there is no common 
moral good. This being so, democratic deliberation may produce more disputes – indeed, 
more political instability – rather than less.32   
Writing out of this skeptical temper, Richard Posner claims, “The problem of 
democracy, as of government generally, is to manage conflict among persons who, often 
arguing from incompatible premises, cannot overcome their differences by discussion” 
(2003, 112). Political acts are not, then, tied to deliberative acts and aimed at what David 
Estlund has called, “the impartial application of intelligence to the complex moral 
                                                 
32 For now, I will use the expression “stability” only in its positivistic sense. That is, a regime may be 
considered stable when it is not in danger of being overthrown, citizens accept political outputs more or 
less, and their acceptance is an indication of their legitimacy, et. al.  
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question at hand” (1999, 195). Because there is not really any such thing as “public 
reason” according to the skeptic, political acts should be thought of (and indeed are) 
strategic and negotiative. This is because “deliberation is not effective in bridging 
fundamental disagreements” (Posner 2003, 135). Thus, it is “doubtful that deliberation 
over fundamental political goals and values is feasible” (Posner 2003, 137). 
 Posner’s views echo those of who Joseph Schumpeter who writes that rational 
argument is beside the point of political action “because ultimate values – our 
conceptions of what life and society should be – are beyond the range of mere logic” 
1976, 251). At what, then, does political strategizing and negotiation aim? Posner and 
Schumpeter contend that it aims at achieving stability. Consequently, it would be a kind 
of mistake of instrumental reason to utilize deliberation (and appeal to the norms of 
deliberation) as a means to achieve stability. To this end, a democracy should take 
fundamental questions of value off the table for the sake of political stability. Beyond 
this, it should have nothing to say about the disputes that arise because of differences of 
value. While liberal institutions may act as political arbiters, they cannot act as moral 
ones. The dispute between the deliberative and the non-deliberative democrat, then, 
seems to turn in part on the question of whether democracy could or should resolve 
complex moral disputes over fundamental values.  
One attempt to make the non-deliberative case for democracy is based upon what 
may be called “economic arguments.” These arguments, I claim, fail as justifications of 
democracy. They do so, I will conclude, because of two untenable assumptions. One of 
these assumptions I treat here as internal to the view that the justification for politics is 
instrumental with respect to stability. The first assumption may be stated as follows. 
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(A1) The reasons for which a procedure should be adopted are also the reasons 
that justify the outcome of the procedure.  
 
The other assumption seems to develop in critical response to deliberative conceptions of 
democracy.  
(A2) The purpose of deliberative democracy is to resolve moral disputes.  
 
The trouble with (A1) is as follows. Economic arguments that assert stability is the 
proper political goal contend that (non-deliberative) democracy serves this end better 
than other possible political methods. Of course, there are good reasons to pursue 
stability as a political goal. However, economic arguments for democracy confuse the 
reasons for which a procedure should be adopted with the reasons why the outcomes of 
the procedure are justified. Consequently, if the reason for adopting democratic 
procedures is that they produce stability, one supposes that an outcome of the procedure 
is justified if it produces stability. A simple example, however, shows why this 
assumption must be mistaken.  
The reason for adopting a “knife-procedure” is to cut. However, one is not 
justified in cutting Jim even if cutting him satisfies the conditions for which the knife was 
adopted in the first place – its cutting capability. Whatever reasons there are to justify the 
use of the knife seem different somehow from those justifying its adoption. The reasons 
justifying the adoption of a knife as a cutting instrument are quite general. Those that 
might justify turning it on Jim are quite a bit more specific. They are introduced when we 
consider what is cut, or even how, when and by whom it is cut. In short, the justification 
of the outcome depends upon moral reasons not necessarily introduced in adopting the 
procedure. There is no particular moral significance to the adoption of a knife-procedure, 
unless in picking it up I have the intention to cut Jim or do, in fact, cut him.  
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However, economic arguments take specifically moral reasons off the table as 
relevant to political legitimacy. The justification for this move has to do with the 
instability to which the attempt to justify moral reasons under conditions of pluralism 
supposedly gives quarter. In this light, consider the positivist claim against the 
deliberative democrat. If specifically moral reasons are rooted in certain sets of values, 
and there is a plurality of sets, disputes about what is valuable or the priority of values 
arise. Since there is no way to commensurate these values, there is apparently no way to 
resolve the disputes arising between “moral” reasons. Deliberation, from this point of 
view, does not resolve disagreement, so much as make moral disagreement and its 
irresolvable character more evident. How there could be democratic political life at all 
becomes, from this perspective, a mystery to be contemplated, rather than a state of 
affairs to bring to fruition. Consequently, assuming some type of moral pluralism, moral 
reasons cannot be handled in political reasoning. Strictly speaking, there is no 
“reasoning” to be done about democratic ends, hence not enough convergence for 
deliberative democracy to be viable. 
2. Economic Arguments as Minimalist Arguments 
An economic justification of democracy stands on two premises33:  
(1) There is no common moral good. (Positivist Thesis) 
(2) The democratic procedure is a method for selecting leaders. (Minimalist 
Thesis) 
    
                                                 
33 One might characterize these arguments as prudential. However, I emphasize the argument as more 
specifically “economic” in order to capture claims about democracy relative to capitalist economics in 
particular. I will not discuss capitalist economics in any detail, but I do suggest later in the essay the strong 
analogy supposed in minimalism between capitalist and democratic practices as well as a supposed causal 
relation between capitalism, democracy, and stability. In the end, it is unclear whether the minimalist has a 
right to either claim.   
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Given the truth of (1), on this view, it would be a mistake to aspire to a deliberative 
democracy. It would be a fault simply because there is no common good to be known; 
thus, everyone who claims to know it is mistaken both about their own condition as well 
as the truth about the common good. The idea of a common good – excepting the non-
moral good of stability – would be unrelated to political legitimacy. Democratic 
outcomes are legitimate, on this view, if they are acceptable to citizens in ways 
explainable by psychology, sociology, political science, and so on. To this extent, 
political reasoning is the reasoning of experts, experts whose goal it is to maximize the 
capacity of democracy to produce stability by maximizing de facto acceptability.34   
The economic interpretation of democracy may be construed in two ways. First, 
“economic” is a general expression having to do with the costs of achieving an end 
relative to the effectiveness in achieving it. “Economic” used this way appeals to 
measurements like efficiency in weighing the value of a procedure. Second, “economic” 
may refer to the particular ways in which a political society arranges wealth creation and 
distribution, currency value, ownership, and the like. The minimalist democratic theories 
of Schumpeter and Posner have something to say about both. In the first case, 
minimalism asserts that stability justifies political association and that democracy is the 
most efficient means to that end. In the second case, minimalism suggests that particular 
economic arrangements — particularly capitalist ones — are vital to the development of 
democratic institutions and practices. Political reasoning on this account is about means 
rather than ends; and political wisdom concerns the knowledge required to identify and 
                                                 
34 To this extent minimalism may be considered to belong to the class of political theories that fall under 
“social choice theory.” As Elster writes, it is characteristic of these theories to “share the conception that 
the political process is instrumental rather than an end in itself, and the view that the decision political act is 
private rather than a public action, viz. the individual and secret vote.” Jon Elster (1999, 3). Thus, it might 
be fair to class Riker’s Liberalism Against Populism (1982) as akin to the views of Schumpeter and Posner. 
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implement the economic conditions of democracy. Since these matters are the subject of 
various empirical sciences, and are not generally or widely known, those who manage the 
political system are experts — at least to the extent they have knowledge of the means to 
stability. In this respect at least, the authority entailed by the bureaucratic role is thought 
to be justified. 
Consequently, the participation of the general public in politics is restricted to 
voting, not primarily because they lack knowledge of political ends (since there are none 
to be known) but of political means. I will complete this portion of the argument by 
showing that these political arrangements lead to premises for an argument in which we 
could just as easily conclude that minimalism produces instability. To this extent, 
minimalism is inefficient, and violates its own criteria of legitimacy. This pattern, as I 
will show, is especially evident in its account of democratic leadership (e.g. who 
democratic leaders are, why they are the leaders, their relation to minimal democracy, et. 
al.).  
3. The Positivist Thesis 
Schumpeter and Posner have taken as the singular triumph of minimalism to justify 
democracy without appealing to the “common good,” or other concepts necessary to argue on its 
behalf. Schumpeter writes, “There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good 
that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument” (1975, 
254). Democracy, considered in this way, has no epistemic value. It does not produce true beliefs 
about what should be done.  
Beyond stability, minimalism rejects any idea of a common good as a basis for 
politics. Thus, it takes a step away from the moral justification of democratic procedures. 
First, there is no object (e.g. a General Will) to be known. Second, if there were such an 
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object citizens in general could not know it. Finally, if there were such an object, it would 
not necessarily contribute to stability, hence to political justification. Thus, appealing to it 
to justify democracy would be undesirable. The first question of politics, on this view, 
concerns the conditions for stability, and the rational way to approach this question is 
economically. Minimalism makes somewhat explicit what we may have guessed the two 
other types of liberal justification—that democracy is not cognitive. 
Minimalism stands, as Schumpeter suggests, upon philosophical positivism. 
Positivism is closely associated with empiricism and the verifiability criterion for 
meaning. The verifiability criterion — at least in its more modest form — just says that 
the meaningfulness of a proposition depends upon the possibility of producing evidence 
that indicates the likelihood of its truth. If it is in principle impossible to verify the truth 
of moral statements (“ought” statements roughly speaking), then, such statements are not 
meaningful unless they are simply analytic. In the latter case, however, they make no 
binding moral prescription.  
Schumpeter seems committed to this positivist stance in claiming, “ultimate values—
our conceptions of what life and society should be—are beyond the range of mere logic” 
(1976, 251). That is, when it comes to producing evidence for the truth of moral 
propositions (and political ones) we are at a loss. There are no objective tests for the truth 
of moral claims. Supposing no unifying moral standard one should appeal instead to 
stability. The degree to which various practices and institutions are productive of political 
stability can be measured with psychological and sociological instruments. Even if it 
could show that democracy promotes stability, this does not mean that minimalism 
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adequately justifies democracy. This is because it has not appropriately justified stability 
as the political end.  
4. The Minimalist Thesis 
According to minimalism, a democratic regime is legitimate if it is (along with 
other social and institutional arrangements) widely accepted and uncontroversial.35 One 
need not appeal to the concepts of freedom and publicity (as moral ideals) to establish 
democratic legitimacy, much less to the equality of citizens. Rather, one appeals to the 
broad based, voluntary acceptance of the positive laws, the methods for producing them, 
and the results of social science in determining the conditions (economic or otherwise) 
for political stability. It is an “economic” conception to the extent it aims at the 
production of stability at a minimum of coercion.  
According to the minimalist, the value of democracy lies in its efficiency at producing 
political stability. In particular, democracy optimizes stability with respect to the use of 
coercive power. This capacity is optimal, on this view, under certain economic 
(particularly capitalistic) and institutional conditions. Indeed, democracy conceived as a 
generally deliberative politic may stimulate irresolvable political conflict, and so 
instability under conditions of social pluralism. Democracy (under certain conditions) is 
best at satisfying the human good defined “by reference to human needs and interests” 
(2003, 71). These needs and interests are defined materially in large part – terms that are, 
it should be noted, as neutral as possible. The role of the state is, in part, to arbitrate 
between conflicts in these interests.  
                                                 
35 Schumpeter does not himself use the “pragmatic” with respect to his own theory in any systematic way. 
Posner adopts this term for his own purposes, but distinguishes his view sharply from “deliberative” forms 
of pragmatism (e.g. Dewey). I will also refer to the Schumpeterian model of democracy as “economic.” 
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Minimalist criticism of non-positivist democratic theories (e.g. those rooted in more 
rigorous moral and epistemic principles) suggests they cannot explain why a democracy 
functions well in spite of lower voter turnouts, disinterest in politics, and so on.36 Thus, 
they generate moral criticisms around issues of inequality, lack of voter participations, 
and the like without grasping the fact that a democracy performs well despite this. They 
may even encourage political participation without explaining how disputes will be 
resolved. Again, the positivist doctrine plays a role here in this assessment. Since moral 
disputes have no general and authoritative solutions, a political language that deepens 
them, creates the conditions for deepening social disagreement, hence stability.  
Minimalism, then, disputes the concept of the persons for the sake of which many of 
these moral disputes are raised. Persons, at least considered within the framework of 
political stability, are more or less what can be described by the positive sciences. Thus, 
the minimalist proposes to take persons as they are rather than as they might be. Given 
their flawed assumptions about persons (among other things) traditional liberal theories 
of democracy must be incorrect in a fundamental way; and given their efforts to unify a 
political conception under the head of a single moral conception, they may in fact 
represent some form of theoretical and practical totalitarianism.37 Since democracies do 
not produce or assume common moral objects or the possibility of knowing them, we 
should look to other types of explanation of and justification for them. Schumpeter and 
Posner find this explanation and justification in the stability produced by democracy 
considered as a political method and interpreted economically.  
                                                 
36 Naturally, this proposition begs the question of whether or not they do function well. It seems difficult to 
make any general claim about this matter. Some times and in some ways, they do and some times and in 
other ways they don’t.  
37 As an economist, Schumpeter in particular was motivated by the threats of communism and the 
adaptation of Marxist ideology into democratic political theory.  
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The minimalist contends not only that stronger moral and cognitive requirements fail 
to explain a democracy as it does work. It claims in addition that these requirements, to 
the extent they foster disagreement, may be counter-productive to democratic stability. 
These claims, considered collectively, assume that instability follows rather naturally 
from religious, philosophical, and cultural differences when they are not somehow 
neutralized. Thus, if it can be shown that the “goods” of democracy (e.g. stability) can be 
and are, in fact, produced without appealing to a unifying moral theory, the notion of a 
“moral good” seems irrelevant to democratic theory.  
An apparent advantage of the minimalist interpretation of democracy is that, if 
adopted, certain conceptual problems seem to disappear. In particular, we need not worry 
for the purposes of democracy or liberality about articulating a common conception of 
justice, the self, or how to structure hypothetical situations in order to get the results we 
want. Nor need we worry about the idea of a “common good.” Efforts to articulate 
democracy “philosophically” lead us into a myriad of proposals and disputes that divert 
attention from present practical cultural and social needs and interests. So for political 
reasons at least we might dispense with philosophical armaments like the metaphysics of 
the person, and substitute empirical forms of inquiry. Indeed, one might dispense with 
any normative theory of democracy that claims to have been derived from concepts a 
priori. All we require is a theory of justification that explains democratic authority in 
terms citizens are willing to accept.  
Rather than appealing to concepts whose content is difficult to specify and about 
which disagreement seems interminable, we might treat political input as a market 
phenomenon. In this case, politics represents the possibility for the expression, conflict, 
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and negotiation of interests according to an “economic” model. The efficient political 
system is the one that produces the most stability with the least force.  
To meet the challenges presented by this conception, Schumpeter makes two key 
proposals: 1) The definition of democracy should be restricted to a political method38; 2) 
Democracy (at least in certain formulations) is more efficient than other regimes at 
producing political stability. Democracy as a political method is “that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1976, 269). In this way 
democracy may be distinguished from other political methods. Thus, the theory of voting 
as the aggregation of preferences or interests is restricted to the selection of candidates, 
not of policies. Defined this way the relation between democracy (as a political method) 
and public choice is narrower than broad, controversial “philosophical” theories of 
democracy suggest. Political outcomes are produced by a professional class of elites 
elected democratically whether or not they use democratic processes in the development 
and selection of policies. The constraints upon democracy are institutional. 
On Schumpeter’s view, democratic voting performs a stabilizing function by serving as a 
check upon the power of public officials. Electoral politics, then, is generally democratic in the 
narrow procedural sense. However, matters are more complex in the formulation of social policy 
and the adjudication between preferences and interests (1976, 290). 
 “Democracy,” if by this we mean that the people rule in a literal or direct way, 
ceases to apply. Policies, as types of political output for example, need not be rigorously 
justified to citizens once citizens have selected those responsible for political output. 
                                                 
38 A political method is just “the method a nation uses for arriving at decisions” (1976, 243). One might 
further characterize this view as having to do only with particular types of decisions (e.g. voting). Contrast 
the minimalist view with one that understands politics as an end in itself.  
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Citizens register their approval or disapproval in their vote. Minimalism justifies 
democratic voting if it works to limit power for the ends of political stability. “To 
simplify matters we have restricted the kind of competition for leadership which is to 
define democracy, to competition for a free vote ( 1976, 271). Politics, on this view, is 
Thrasymachean rather than Socratic.  
Consider Thrasymachus’ stance in the Republic with respect to the nature of the 
ruler.  
This, best of men is what I mean: in every city the same thing is just, the 
advantage of the established ruling body. It surely is master; so the man who 
reasons rightly concludes that everywhere justice is the same thing, the advantage 
of the stronger (338e).  
 
From the fact that “the best” rules, according to Thrasymachus, we can conclude that “the 
best” is stronger than others. If the stronger rules, moreover, justice is simply the 
advantage of the stronger. If we accept Thrasymachus’ account of the nature of ruling as 
the advantage of the stronger, and democracy is fundamentally the rule by a majority, 
then, we accept that legitimate outcomes are those produced by the majority qua stronger.  
Thrasymachus’ account, however, has added import. He suggests that the ruler (in the 
case, considered as the majority) will know how to produce its own advantage. 
Nevertheless, he is also constrained to admit that the rulers are fallible. Thus, the rulers 
will often rule in a way not to their own advantage. When they do not rule to their own 
advantage, they are not rulers even by Thrasymachus’ own definition. By what measures, 
then, could one determine whether or not the rulers meet the requirements of their own 
advantage, and thus qualify as rulers?  
Clearly, Schumpeter’s defense of democracy does not refute Plato’s argument 
directly. He does not claim that any citizen can possess the sort of knowledge required to 
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rule. Rather, he claims that there is no common moral good to be known. Thus, political 
justification should not proceed by trying to determine which procedures, strategies, or 
institutions best achieve knowledge of it (1976, 284). A political theory should not, then, 
address the problems of deep moral, religious, and ideological disagreement. It should 
not, in short, aspire to being philosophical. 
Democracy, then, is nothing more or less than a political method that chooses 
between rulers who compete for the vote of the electorate. As an economic argument, 
Schumpeter’s may be considered in two ways: (1) an analogical argument: Given the 
non-cognitive view of voting the actual institutional workings of democracy may be best 
understood by analogy to the competitive features of markets. If we discount the 
possibility of democracy producing “correct outcomes,” we must be able to explain why 
there should be voting at all such that it promotes the ends of democracy (e.g. stability), 
and (2) an efficiency argument: that capitalist economies most efficiently achieve the 
ends of democracy (frequently emphasized by efforts at moral justification) because they 
best set the material conditions for liberty (understood here as “non-interference”). 
It is clear from (2) that the analogy between democracy and capitalism (given the first 
thesis) is meant ultimately as more than an analogy. It is meant to suggest that democratic 
voting is not sufficient to achieve what we usually think of as democratic goals (e.g. 
liberty). Rather, democracies require other institutional instruments to achieve the ends of 
stability and its subsequent benefits. Thus, the Schumpeterian account of democracy is 
not merely descriptive of how democracies in fact operate. It suggests that the 
fundamental political values are non-moral; and that the best way to produce them is 
through competitive voting and economic practices.  
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Along with many other things, then, the economic model of democracy suggests a 
way to engender social stability by inoculating political society from religious, moral and 
ideologically oriented social disputes. On this basis, we may develop the means (in the 
form of interest groups and the like) by which preferences or interests may be manifest in 
institutions, laws, and policies.39 That is, we discover or develop alternate means to 
express political power. And when these expressions are managed according to the 
correct institutional understanding of democracy, the total product should be stability.  
 Preferences and interests, even in voting, are not themselves formed 
independently of “political shaping.” 
Its [the electorate] choice—ideologically glorified into the Call from the People—
does not flow from its initiative but is being shaped, and the shaping of it is an 
essential part of the democratic process. Voters do not decide issues. But neither 
do they pick their members of parliament from the eligible population with a 
perfectly open mind (1976, 282). 
 
Voters play, on this view, a largely passive role with respect to politics. Indeed, the vote 
itself may be understood as a function of the initiative of the candidate and not the voter. 
“The psycho-technics of party management and party advertising, slogans, and marching 
tunes, are not the accessories. They are the essence [my italics] of politics. So is the 
political boss” (1976, 283). 
Minimalism does not assume the interests and preferences of citizens are given or 
that they are uniform. Assuming the “machinery” of politics described above, it would 
seem that Schumpeter’s account of democracy can be identified with Thrasymachus’ 
account of the rulers. The rulers are those who are stronger. They are the ones whose 
strength is evident in victory. But the interests and preferences of citizens diverge and it 
                                                 
39 One of the problems of this view is that such means usually presuppose great differences in substantive 
equality between citizens. 
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is not obvious why — except perhaps for prudential reasons — the ruled (the minority in 
the case of democracy) ought to defer to the rulers. Given these various interests and 
preferences, the need for an adjudicative structure arises. Public political life, then, is 
largely enacted as the negotiation between private interests. This seems to be a natural 
consequence of the positivist commitments of the economic view.40 In the following 
section, I will show how Posner justifies democratic arrangements in which some are put 
in political authority over others through democratic voting. I contend his view is 
internally inconsistent.     
5. Political Authority as Expertise: The Problem of Democratic Leadership41 
Suppose that voting on the non-cognitive model, as I have suggested, loosened the 
checks on political power to such an extent that a democracy is governed by an elite of 
experts and their associates who not only wield power, but have the tools at their disposal 
to conceal the means by which they do so, who benefits most by it, and so on. Such 
persons may have some scientific or adjudicative “expertise.”42 Moreover, this 
institutional function is carried out under the rubric of the negotiation and satisfaction of 
private interests towards the end of creating political stability. However, even if such a 
political society functions with optimal efficiency with respect to stability, it does not 
seem as though its outcomes are necessarily justified. We can see this even if we look at 
relatively modest political outputs like the electoral selection of leaders.  
                                                 
40 Posner gives a detailed account of the structure of “pragmatic adjudication” (2003, 57-96). I will not 
engage this account here since it takes us beyond the scope of his theory of “democracy” per se. 
41 Posner’s theory depends upon a theory of adjudication into which I shall not delve here since the focus 
concerns the role of democracy as “rule by the people” relative to problems of ignorance. However, his 
theory of adjudication suffers from many of the same deficiencies as the theory of democratic. I believe all 
of these difficulties can be traced by to the positivist philosophical doctrine.  
42 I assume that Posner advocates something like this in his defense of “elite democracy.”  
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The non-cognitive interpretation of democratic voting suggests that it is not 
oriented towards selecting the best candidate on objective grounds. Rather, it is the 
expression of preferences. Preferences and interests are rather particular to the voter. 
Voting aggregates these interests in electing a leader. The election of the leader as such 
— whatever institutional form leadership takes – does not necessarily imply the election 
of one who is expert at anything except getting elected. And it may not even imply that. 
According to the minimalist, however, this is not problematic for its theory. 
The Schumpeterian model of democracy, however, narrows the role that voting 
plays to the competition and selection of candidates (not, as he says, policies). It is 
natural to think, then, that voting as a non-cognitive activity would not be sufficient for 
the determination of available options for law and policy and their selection. But why, 
given what Schumpeter refers to as the “essence” of politics, would it even be a sound 
means for selecting winning candidates? Posner addresses this question in a “theory of 
natural leadership.”  
The theory of natural leadership depends upon the premise that “the outstanding 
fact about human beings is their inequality” (2003, 183). To this end, Posner employs the 
Nietzschean metaphor of “wolves and sheep” in characterizing this inequality. “In other 
words, society is composed of wolves and sheep. The wolves are the natural leaders. 
They rise to the top in every society” (2003, 183). It is far from clear this metaphor 
illuminates the premise about inequality in identifying “wolf” with “democratically 
elected leader.”43 If wolves lead at all they lead other wolves, not sheep. They eat sheep. 
                                                 
43 I am not making a point about Nietzsche scholarship. I do not care in this case whether Posner got 
Nietzsche right or not. If Posner is wrong, then anyone characterizing political leadership in this way—
including Nietzsche—is wrong. However, I don’t believe that Posner has read Nietzsche correctly here, and 
this, I think, is so much the better for Nietzsche. 
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If leaders are indeed wolves, their job is not to attend to what is good for everyone, but as 
Thrasymachus suggests, to pursue justice as their own advantage. Thus, the metaphor 
seems misplaced as part of an account of democratic leadership. Furthermore, Posner’s 
account supposes that “the best” should have any interest in politics at all. It is not always 
clear that they do, or that they aspire to “rise to the top” of a political system or by 
political means. 
The heart of the matter according to Posner is this: “The challenge to politics is to 
provide routes to the top that deflect the wolves from resorting to violence, usurpation, 
conquest and oppression to obtain their place in the sun” (2003, 183).44 Following the 
metaphor a little further, we can say that the challenge of a political system is to turn the 
wolves into something more like dogs. It may be that democracy, and Christianity for that 
matter, has been very successful at taming these beasts. However, this claim itself is part 
of the Nietzschean criticism of democracy and Christianity; and in this respect points 
once more to the misapplication of the metaphor. Nonetheless, it does seem to be the case 
that part of democratic justification and practice should include an account of the means 
by which power is transferred between persons and generations with a minimum of 
violence and chaos. Indeed, it may be that democratic societies are better at producing 
stability with a minimum of coercion. But this fact alone does not justify democracy as 
such, much less the legitimacy of democratic outcomes.  
 Setting aside the correctness of the application of the wolf-sheep metaphor to 
democratic politics, there are other features of Posner’s account of leadership that raise 
                                                 
44 We should wonder whether or not this isn’t the goal of any function of civilization and that there is 
nothing special about its being carried out through politics. Following Freud, then, all functions of 
civilization may involve violence, usurpation, and so on, in more sublime forms. Posner utilization of these 
ideas in this context is bizarre to say the least.  
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suspicion. He claims, for example, that politics may be the most important “route to the 
top” since “the natural leaders who have political talents and aspirations are the ones that 
pose the greatest potential danger to civilized society” (2003, 184). This idea is 
reminiscent of the motivations seemingly underlying Plato’s Republic. Why did the 
guardians need to be educated? Simply put, because they were the intellectually and 
physically strongest; and thus the ones who stood in the closest proximity to the 
possibility of political power. When their power is cultivated rightly, according to Plato, 
it is used for the good of everyone not only for themselves and those like them.45  
 Posner has already claimed that democracy is the means by which candidates 
compete for the votes of the electorate. Coupled with the theory of natural leadership, we 
are led to suppose that those from whom voters must choose are in some way “natural 
leaders.” And those who are actually selected are “the best.” However, there is no 
apparent internal relation between voting as the expression of preference and interest and 
the selection of these best. So there is no reason to think that those selected are the best. 
And given limitations on democracy and value, there is no reason to suppose the 
educative measures by which “the best” are reliably selected and trained. The non-
cognitive account of voting as the aggregation of preferences and interests makes the 
selection of candidates appear to be so arbitrary that there would rarely if ever be a good 
reason think that the best has been selected – unless all we mean by “best” is “best at 
getting elected.” One might claim that the pool of competitors is largely representative of 
these best; but this seems to get a no further in the argument. And there are, in fact, too 
many counter-examples to enumerate here.  
                                                 
45 In fact, Plato’s argument may be read as an attempt to lead Athens’ best away from the typical trappings 
of political power. The sense in which they rule the city cannot be taken too literally in any case.  
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6. Complacency and the Restriction of Power: A Conundrum 
Why, if Posner is right, should citizens vote at all where voters are characterized 
as centers of self-interest and are not quite sure which candidates serves their interests? 
Indeed, given the “political machinery,” it does not even seem citizens can be quite sure 
that “their interests” are their own. What is the relation of citizens to “their” political 
practices and institutions? Posner suggests that democracies, in particular capital driven 
democracies, function well, perhaps best, in cases where we expect low voter turnouts, 
little interest in politics and little knowledge of it. In part, this is because its citizens are 
engaged in more fruitful economic pursuits which also contribute to social and political 
stability. Democracy is not, and should not be, demanding in these ways. However, he 
also claims that voting in electoral politics is the primary check on the political and social 
power of the elites. As voter turnouts and political interest diminishes, should we not 
expect the check on the power of democratic leaders to be diminished as well? I am not 
here considering the decision to vote as a reasoned choice about the economic 
expenditure of time and money versus what one really gains on voting day besides the 
possible (and very formal) satisfaction of performing a civic function. I mean that 
Posner’s account of voters as centers of self-interest and voting as the expression of that 
self-interest is suggestive of two trends in the justificatory structure of this theory that 
pull against each other.  
The essence of Posner’s argument justifying democracy may be summed up in 
this way.  
1. The liberal principle of democratic voting is the basic check on political 
power. So it contributes causally to stability and continuity. 
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2. Voting is insignificant in the following ways: a) as an individual act 
with causal efficacy, and b) cognitively insignificant since the epistemic 
value of beliefs about one’s interest is indeterminate.  
 
3. Because of the limited role of politics in a population, most people will 
and should spend their time engaged in more productive pursuits while 
a certain “elite” class concerns itself with policy, strategy, and law. 
 
However, the same features Posner argues justify democracy as a minimal political 
method, suggest otherwise. In particular, Posner apparently regards it as insignificant if 
interest in politics is not widespread — if, for example, people have no reason to vote. 
They may have no reason to vote because of its causal and cognitive insignificance. If 
voting constitutes one of the fundamental checks on political power, decreased political 
interest and input only increases the political power of the ruling elite. In short, its 
fundamental role as a check on power is undermined.  
Indeed, it would seem that a correct understanding of the market model would 
demand a great deal of input. Markets do not function efficiently without it. However, 
minimalism narrows the range of available political inputs, and strips the motivation to 
participate in these. Thus, the minimalist theory of democracy seems to have undermined 
the conditions under which it could function even on its own market model.  
 Posner’s reasons for suggesting that minimizing political engagement is actually 
more productive of stable democratic regimes rests on his claim that more political 
participation, even where regulated by deliberative constraints, creates more conflict 
rather than less. Here Posner assumes that instability follows from disagreement seems to 
be a stretch both on logical and empirical grounds. It is not hard to see why the issue 
arises in the context of interest politics. Where persons as political entities are defined as 
centers of self-interest, there is a greater propensity towards a conflict of interests. In 
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keeping with the economic analogy, we might say that deliberation, at least at a certain 
level of democratic participation, creates alternate currencies with varying standards of 
value. But if the non-cognitive view of democracy is implausible, as I believe it is, we 
need not worry too much about value pluralism given other moral and epistemic 
constraints.  
These features of Posner’s account present us with a puzzle: If a decline in 
political participation is desirable, then there will subsequently be fewer checks on 
political power. However, if there is an increase in political participation, the minimalist 
assumes, there will be greater conflicts of interest and more heated political competition 
that may over the long run promote various kinds of political or social instability. Thus, 
where democratic participation is restricted largely to voting on candidates and not on 
policies, there is an implied threat to stability whether participation rises or falls. So to 
encourage lower participation is to encourage less expression of interests and a 
detachment of citizens from the ruling class. To encourage more participation is to 
encourage conflicts of interest (given pluralism). Encouraging the first options seems to 
invite authoritarianism. Encouraging the second one, invites instability. Posner seems not 
to welcome either result. But having defined voting on candidates as the central activity 
of citizens as centers of self-interest according to the economic analogy, it is difficult to 
see what else we should expect. Either democracy gives way to some authoritarian 
tendency, or it promotes instability to the extent that mushrooming conflicts of interest 
cannot be managed effectively by the political structure.46 
                                                 
46 In fairness, Posner addresses these types of problems in his theory of adjudication which argues on 
behalf of some form of legal realism. These matters stand beyond the scope of the present essay.  
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The justification of democracy, according to Posner and Schumpeter, is 
discovered in its efficiency with respect to stability. However, justifying democracy as an 
instrument for achieving an end and showing why its outcomes are legitimate are two 
different questions. Even if democracy tends to produce stability, this still does not tell us 
why its outputs (including the selection of candidates) are legitimate. To do this, it seems 
that we must appeal to a procedure independent moral standard. However, the positivist 
thrust of minimalism ruled out any such appeal, ruling out other modes of political 
association and input as legitimate.    
7. Deliberative Democracy, Moral Disagreement and Political Input 
One of the apparent motivations for the minimalist theory of democracy is the 
notion that democratic deliberation cannot authoritatively resolve moral disputes – 
disputes that arise because of irresolvable differences in moral value. Given the positivist 
thesis that it cannot is explained by the fact deliberative democracy cannot erect a 
procedure independent moral standard to do this work. Any such standard, then, is either 
flaccid and inefficacious or deceptive. It would privilege some moral account over others 
arbitrarily, threatening stability in so doing. To the extent no such standard exists, 
appealing to it as a way to make democratic outcomes legitimate would be beside the 
point.  
However, as I have tried to point out, the alternative proposed for justifying 
democratic outcomes, does not fair any better.  The reasons for adopting democratic 
procedures (e.g. stability) do not justify democratic outcomes. They do not say why they 
are authoritative; hence why one should obey them even if one might do so as a matter of 
fact. To this extent, the disobedient citizen could not and should not be held accountable 
 55
for her disobedience. I doubt the positivist would, in the interest of political stability, 
accept this consequence. But by what right could she conclude otherwise?  
 The market requires a great deal of input to function properly and stably. The 
trouble with the Positivist Thesis in association with the Minimalist Thesis is that they 
seem to produce circumstances in which political input is reduced. If deliberative 
democracy could increase the available quantity of political input, this would seem to be 
a reason to endorse deliberative democracy as opposed to minimalist democracy.47 This 
does not only mean that more persons may participate in it. It also means that there are 
more ways in which one may participate.  
 But a deliberative conception of democracy requires an appeal to a procedure 
independent moral standard. Consequently, it cannot stand upon the assumptions of 
minimalism or positivism. That is, we must reject both the Positivist Thesis and the 
Minimalist Thesis. In addition, the rejection of positivism means having to distinguish 
between the reasons for adopting a procedure and the reasons that make the outcomes of 
a procedure legitimate. Consequently, we must reject (A1). We may adopt a democratic 
procedure in order to produce stability. But this claim alone actually says nothing about 
what makes the outcomes of the procedure legitimate. What, then, are we to say about 
moral disputation in deliberative democracy?  
 I claimed that the case of the minimal democracy against deliberative democracy 
is built partially upon the assumption that deliberative democracy requires a capacity to 
resolve moral disputation (A2). Thus, one might argue, it requires a value scheme within 
                                                 
47 I am not wholly endorsing a market model here. I am only suggesting that the minimalist has a good 
reason to adopt deliberative democracy if minimalism as such fails to produce appropriate quantities of 
political input.  
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which all moral values, and so all moral goods, can be seen as commensurate with one 
another. But this claim is not obviously true. Consider Rawls’ characterization of 
pluralism in democracy.  
The political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a diversity of 
opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some of 
these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political 
liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at 
work within the background of enduring free institutions (Rawls 2005, 4). 
Notably, Rawls does not contend that there is a general moral scheme according to which 
disputes between moral values may be finally reconciled. Rather, he contends that it is 
within the purview of any reasonable moral doctrine to grasp that there is a diversity of 
reasonable doctrines – doctrines that have good reasons at their disposal to justify their 
views. This recognition provides the basis for the construction of distinctively political 
values without having said much if anything about the possibility of a general resolution 
of moral value. I do not aim at a complete defense of Rawls’ view here. I aim only to 
show that there are cases in which political legitimacy is a defensible moral ideal without 
supposing the possibility of a final commensuration of value. Moreover, in such cases, 
the motivation may be akin to that of the positivist – skepticism about this possibility at 
least when applied in political theory.  
 Consequently, supposing a common moral good does not put the burden on a 
theory of deliberative democracy to show how it will authoritatively and finally resolve 
moral disputes under conditions of pluralism. A deliberative view must simply propose 
terms in which the outcomes of the political process are authoritative because they are 
legitimate. But their legitimacy depends neither upon their being in each case correct; nor 
upon general acceptance (in the positivist sense). 
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Though a deliberative framework for democracy invites a new set of problems, it 
frames the problem of democratic justification correctly at least. The alternative is not 
really between a minimalist and a moral theory of democracy. Rather, the alternative is 
between a moral theory of democratic legitimacy and the possibility that there is no 
general justification for democratic outcomes at all.48  
8. Conclusion 
According to minimalism, the justification of democracy concerns it capacity to 
limit power and moderate political rivalry for the end of stability. Thus, it does not 
conceive of these restrictions as necessarily moral. If the foregoing argument is correct, 
however, minimalism is self-defeating. The very lack of interest or competence for 
politics it believes to be a sign of political health, is the instrument by which the check on 
power democracy is meant to be is undermined. Thus, its account of political input is 
fraught with difficulties imposed by its own standard of success.  
The larger point here is that if the end of politics is understood to be stability, 
there is no principled reason to adopt democratic procedures over any others. Schumpeter 
and Posner, of course, both reject this contention. They claim, instead, that the principles 
are economic rather than moral. So democracy is justified on the basis of its efficiency 
with respect to stability. However, the argument above shows that one may, given the 
terms of minimalism, just as reasonably expect inefficiency.  
The real problem, I think, lies in defining the end of politics in terms of stability. 
Even if stability is worthy political goal – and it is – it says nothing about what justifies 
democratic outcomes. This conclusion, while limited in scope, has one important 
                                                 
48 For an account of the anarchical view see Robert Paul Wolff (1998).  
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entailment. However we reconstruct the economic justification of democracy it cannot be 
done without appealing to some moral or epistemic standard that cannot be reduced to 
stability.49 For this, however, we need a philosophy; and that philosophy cannot be 
positivist.50 
One way or the other, a minimalist justification of democracy could not be rightly 
motivated by the claim that deliberative democracy implausibly resolves or supposes a 
resolution to moral disputation, for this is does not do. Other conceptions (like 
deliberative ones) promise only a moral answer to what makes political outcomes 
legitimate under the assumption that such disputes exist and that they are or that they 
seem intractable. This is not a liability of at least some deliberative views, but one of their 
strengths. In the Chapters to follow, I will articulate several efforts to integrate 
deliberation as part of the conception of democratic legitimacy along with the difficulties 
that arise from it.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 It is useful to consider Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1999) in this regard—in particular, his utilization of 
game theory to secure moral premises as a framework for political questions of distribution, deliberation, 
et. al. 
50 One might, in this vein, consider the force of Sandel’s criticism of “the procedural republic” in 
Democracy’s Discontent and the minimization of philosophy relative to politics. While I do not agree with 
all of his conclusions about how such a philosophy might look, I certainly do agree with the difficulty of 
articulating it. Michael Sandel (1996).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
 
 
 
1. Political Justification and Transcendental Philosophy 
 
 Unlike minimalism, Kant’s theory of political legitimacy is viewed through the 
prism of distinctively moral concepts. In addition, this theory is couched within a 
philosophical view called “transcendental idealism” – the point of which is, in part, to 
define the subject of moral action. Articulating Kant’s political theory, then, is no simple 
or straightforward task. This is because doing it well seems to require an account of the 
broader outlines of his moral and theoretical philosophy. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I 
will sketch these outlines of the moral and theoretical philosophy to see how the political 
theory is developed from them.  
In particular, I articulate a fairly standard interpretation of Kant’s political 
philosophy. I draw the consequence that the transcendental conception of the legitimacy 
commits one to a form of absolutism that generates substantively immoral results in 
moral and political deliberation. In particular, the transcendental justification of the 
prohibition on rebellion and “counter-resistance” seems to stand in the way of the 
development of fully legitimate political institutions, including the development of their 
deliberative capacities. I should make clear, however, that my intentions here are largely 
pragmatic. I do not claim that the reading of Kant given is the best or the correct reading 
of Kant’s moral and political philosophy. However, it does seem in important ways the 
kind of reading endorsed by recent philosophers like Robert Paul Wolff (1998) as well as 
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the kind of reading supposed by Thomist critics (Macintyre 1984), civic republicans 
(Sandel 1982), and pragmatists (Misak 2000).     
 These critics find similar problems cropping up in the work of John Rawls (both 
in A Theoyr of Justice and Political Liberalism. Since Rawls himself viewed the later 
work as correcting for inadequately addressing democratic legitimacy in the earlier work, 
I will emphasis the latter. The argument developed against Kant’s transcendental 
justification of political legitimacy is that its attention to the “internal” and moral 
conditions of legitimacy requires insufficient attention to the features of political 
procedures that make its outcomes reliably good. In particular, these criticisms suggest 
that the views of Rawls and Kant both diminish the conditions necessary for the 
participation of citizens in democratic deliberation. Consequently, they fail to adequately 
motivate participation and the deliberative features of democracy that secure the 
conditions under which it could produce reliably good (and legitimate) outcomes. Thus, I 
view this chapter as showing how these criticisms are generated in the effort to see later 
how they may be dispelled.  
2. The Hypothetical Nature of Reasonable Acceptance 
A political authority issues commands. If these commands are properly justified, 
one would arguably have a duty to obey them. If this justification is linked somehow to 
the nature of reason itself, then the failure to perform this duty violates one’s dignity as a 
rational being. The right of this authority stems from the quality of its justifying reasons. 
Otherwise, the command could not be recognizably legitimate and its authority binding 
on every rational being.  
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This view is reflected in Kant’s claim, “the actual principle of being content with 
majority decisions must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract” (1991, 
79). So liberal justifications of political authority typically assumes the qualifying reasons 
cannot appeal to democracy without begging the question. In particular, democracy does 
not produce reasons that everyone could accept. Democracy is justified, rather, only to 
the extent that it is embodied in a contract whose terms are accepted unanimously.51 This 
claim outlines a criterion for the acceptance or rejection of majority rule. Insofar as this 
acceptance must be unanimous, the criterion is a demanding one. 
 As suggested in previous chapters, “acceptance” is ambiguous. In Chapter 2, I 
noted that positivists treat “acceptance” as descriptive of a psychological condition that 
can — given the right techniques — be produced in citizens. In Chapter 1, I suggested 
that Hume also seems to accept a view of “acceptance” as a psychologically descriptive 
term. Two distinct problems arise for this view. First, since the psychological description 
imposes no necessity, whether or not a principle would be accepted unanimously would 
turn out to depend on contingencies that make unanimous acceptance seem impossible. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if there were unanimous acceptance on these 
grounds, the fact of acceptance alone does not validate the principles. According to Kant, 
however, the principle of being content with majority decisions must be accepted. Now, 
the question concerns showing what is required in order that being content with majority 
decisions as a principle is different from what is required to produce acceptance of 
outcomes and that they be accepted for the right reasons. Otherwise, it is far from clear 
                                                 
51 There are variants (e.g. unanimously accepted, or would be unanimously acceptable or accepted) trying 
to get at the content of Kant’s claim. The first instance is clearly descriptive, thus incorrect. In any case, it 
blocked by the general criticism of consent as de facto—which could be no normative basis for political 
authority. 
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that the account of political authority would have been properly justified. The question, 
then, is how unanimous acceptance may operate as a normative criterion.  
There are, of course, a number of questions that arise: Are there terms in which it 
is possible to accept contentment with majority decisions as a principle? What does it 
mean to embody this acceptance in a contract? I assume that acceptance, in particular any 
sort of acceptance that could be unanimous, would have to be acceptance with 
sufficiently good reasons. So I assume acceptance is rational or reasonable in some way. 
Indeed, it would be the case that the principle could not be reasonably rejected. If the 
principle of contentment with majority decisions is justified, then it could not be 
reasonably rejected either.  
It seems there are all kinds of good reasons to reject democratic outcomes, not the 
least of which may be their low epistemic value in the eyes of their various beholders. 
Thus, whatever is meant by a “good reason” on Kant’s view cannot be a principle 
validated merely by subjective determinations. The output is a legitimate command if one 
could not reasonably reject it; and one could not reasonably reject it, if one is 
contractually bound.52 Since the content of democratic outcomes (as that of any political 
outcome I suppose) is often disputed, the content of these outcomes cannot be the locus 
of “good reason.” This understanding of the principle of contentment, then, has features 
that refer to the form of the outcome. In particular, this form has a moral nature. Breaking 
the contract is akin to breaking a promise. So the social contract in which one is content 
with democratic outcomes has distinctively moral features, not simply prudential ones. 
 The virtue of the transcendental approach compared to the prudential one is 
discovered in its determination of the necessary conditions for the acceptance of 
                                                 
52 A little more about the special nature of this contract will be introduced later.  
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democratic outcomes. In neither case, however, is legitimacy thought to depend upon the 
epistemic value of the outcomes; and I assume this is because neither case gives much 
weight to that possibility.53 In explicating this approach, then, some study must be made 
of this necessity and its moral nature.  
Notice that, if successful, this account of democratic legitimacy (and implicitly 
democratic authority) may be carried out without any reference to the quality of its 
outcomes. Democracy is a limited but necessary feature within the framework of the civil 
constitution; and its underpinnings are moral and metaphysical. These premises present 
challenges to political justification. 
3. Reason and the Moral Dimension of Persons 
 In order to define the political dimension of persons as Kant understands it, it will 
be useful (and, I think, interpretively correct) to define first the moral dimension of 
persons. Not surprisingly, morals and politics intersect in the transcendental interpretation 
of reason. I will look first at the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, and then at the 
Critique of Practical Reason in order to spell out these features. 
 Kant’s aim in the Grounding is to establish the correct method for determining 
not what one’s duties are, but whether or not one is obligated (i.e. commanded) in 
particular cases to satisfy a duty. He names this method the Categorical Imperative. The 
Categorical Imperative results in no ordinary piece of legislation. Its products are: (1) 
universally binding, (2) issued in the form of commands, (3) representative of one’s 
duties (i.e. are necessary). 
Frequently, we act in a way that suggests obedience to law without considering 
the source of its authority, or we assume that the source of the authority of the law lies in 
                                                 
53 Again, doing so seems to lead beyond a procedural framework, a move I too will try to avoid. 
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some feature external of our own thoughts and will (e.g. biblical authority as the “word of 
God”). Just as frequently, perhaps, we make little distinction between our thought and 
external authority. We think that it is simply enough to follow the laws. To respond to 
law in this way is to act merely in “accord with duty” on Kant’s view. To act merely in 
accord with duty is to follow a law in a law-like way without any internal reason or 
motivation for doing so. The right response to law — the response that preserves 
autonomy — requires something more than this. The proper response to law requires 
distinguishing between what is internal and what is external to thought – what can and 
cannot be captured in reason’s reflection upon itself.54 In understanding what more it 
requires, we can understand the special nature of the Categorical Imperative, and the 
special nature of its moral authority with respect to us.  
Kant is determined to show that morality requires something more than our 
natural and contingent obedience to our inclinations. These inclinations include not only 
various biological necessities. They also include inclinations and sentiments formed 
through our particular and various kinds of moral training. Given this training, we do not 
exercise full agency. We behave; and these behaviors are cultivated by a variety of 
coercive techniques and influences. In other words, the explanation of our behaving one 
way over the other is given by the external influences on us: e.g. the possibility of reward 
or punishment, our various biologically and culturally based affectations, emotions, 
sentiments, and the like. The correct understanding of moral action must, on Kant’s view, 
be understood in terms of a theory of motivation according to which the nature of one’s 
will, intentions, and actions is determined by reference to the moral law which is 
                                                 
54 This problem itself opens many interesting and puzzling methodological questions that I will not address 
here.  
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“internal” to all rational being. In this respect, subjects are not the subjects of desire but 
of reason properly understood. This means that the moral view he wishes to articulate is 
rooted in a distinctive conception of the human will (or more generally, the will of 
rational beings).   
Our will is not only the power to determine a course of action and enact it, but the 
power to intend even in cases where one’s intentions are frustrated or the objects of one’s 
actions are unmet. If we consider the will as part of a causal process, then we are only 
considering it externally. In other words, we are considering it relative the various things 
that influence us to act in one way as opposed to another. (Behavioral science, for 
example, is concerned with the will as an object of influence.) Considered this way, the 
will is either a non-rational phenomenon or its relation to rationality is only instrumental. 
If this is the case, then the value of an action is determined by that action relative to its 
object (e.g. happiness, pleasure, knowledge, etc.). Success is the realization of the object 
considered in this case as “external.” Value, under these circumstances, is determined 
externally, not as an internal principle of will. The will, then, is not motivated to realize 
the object according to its own autonomy or freedom. It is persuaded or coerced by some 
principle external to itself. Thus, its imperatives are hypothetical. The freedom of the 
will, then, requires that the motive for an action (its principle) be somehow internal to the 
will itself. One’s responsibility for one’s intentions and actions depends upon the state of 
one’s will. A will that acts under the sole influence of external circumstances cannot be 
an autonomous will. To this extent, it is morally blameworthy as a will. The problem that 
the Grounding must solve is determining what the internal principle of the will is such 
that it is autonomous, free, and rational. We may rephrase the question this way: What 
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kind of principle would the will choose independently of any external influence – for 
reasons that are properly internal? The answer is that the will must make a principle of 
itself. To this extent, it must be consistent with itself. 
The principle that the will would choose as the principle of its action, then, is a 
principle that admits of no contradictions. Otherwise, the will could not act as will. Self-
consistency is a necessary, if minimal, requirement for law. One’s relation (as a will) to 
the law ought to be conceived as a rational relation. Something could be law-like if one 
would be inclined to choose it in a regular patterned way for reasons independent of the 
law as such. But if a law is to be “internal,” and not merely coercive externally, it must in 
a sense be one that would be chosen. A law is internal because one would choose it for 
no other reason than its being good. To will such a law is to express a good will. Thus, 
the rational will legislates the laws it follows. Such a will would be self-legislating and, 
in this respect, autonomous.  
When one’s actions merely accord with duty, then, there could be no rational 
relation to law or duty because it could not be chosen for its own sake. One merely 
behaves in a way we are inclined to by one’s natures, or given earlier moral training. To 
act out of duty is to act out of respect for the law, and in the light of a rational relation to 
it. This means further that reason is not merely a tool or instrument for the will to fulfill 
its external desires. Rather, reason is constitutive of the will itself. There are no wills that 
are not rational wills.   
Consider Kant’s own example of the shopkeeper (1785, 10). Clearly the 
shopkeeper could take advantage of the young customer, and probably no one would find 
out. However, in the ordinary situation she probably would not. It would not correspond 
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to the conventions of shop-keeping to do so for a variety of reasons. In fact, it may be 
imprudent, eventually cutting into the shopkeeper’s profits as time passes and customers 
become aware of her lack of trustworthiness. The key question though is how, for the 
purposes of moral valuation, to draw the line between the probability that the shopkeeper 
will merely act in accord with duty, and the possibility that the shopkeeper could act out 
of duty. Is it the customer who knows whether the shopkeeper acts in accord with or out 
of duty? Clearly, this cannot be the case. The concept “acting out of duty” does not admit 
to being described from an external point of view. But if this is true in what sense are 
duties objectively understood? It does not admit to being described as an object. We ask, 
then, “What is the source of moral valuation?” Who determines whether or not the 
shopkeeper’s action merit moral praise, indifference, or chastening? This question is the 
same as “Who or what could know the intentions underlying the shopkeeper’s actions?” 
Clearly, it isn’t the shopkeeper qua shopkeeper — as a psychological subject of the 
community or a particular personality. Rather, it is the shopkeeper as a rational being, 
capable of surveying its own intentions. Considered in this manner, acting out of duty 
seems morally equivalent to acting in accord with duty insofar as it fulfills certain 
conventional moral requirements of the community. The determination of moral value 
properly speaking is a judgment issuing from a rational being qua rational being. And 
this is just to point to the internality of the moral self, and of moral valuation generally.   
A variety of naturalisms suggest that the moral attributes and obligations of 
persons are determined in some respect by various kinds of facts. Depending upon the 
form of naturalism in question, however, just what is meant by “fact,” and how “facts” 
are or come to be is a matter of debate. A sophisticated pragmatism will try to show how 
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“facts” are determined intersubjectively, in various historical, community practices with 
other persons. For it, there are no practice-independent moral facts, much less non-
relational features of persons. A fact is not only a function of how things stand. It is also a 
function of what type of community we belong to or find our identities in.55 Not 
surprisingly, then, what is “true” is either irrelevant, unknowable, or itself a construction 
of the self-image of the community – not something independent of that image or those 
images.  
Moral obligations arise within communities as a function of the shared and 
learned understandings of one’s role as parent, child, husband, wife, lover, or other 
designated social role. Moral obligation finds its source in phenomenally relevant 
matters, and in our natural animal affections or disaffections for others. In playing and 
maintaining these roles we understand something like necessity – the “moral obligations” 
that derive simply from matters of fact. Moral obligation, if we may call it that, is 
understood as being part of a certain community – as a person of influence, and as one 
who can be influenced in relation to other persons. It is to understand one’s self as 
existing necessarily within complex sets of social relations – relations upon which one’s 
individuality itself may be considered derivative. It is not to understand one’s self as an 
autonomous rational being, but instead as a dependent rational being.56  
4. Moral Reasoning and Transcendental Reason 
 At this point, we may further specify Kant’s interpretation of reason – the 
interpretation on which the notion of a “rational being” seems to hang. The interpretation 
                                                 
55 The one notable exception among “pragmatisms” might be found in Peirce though the notion of the way 
things are plays a regulative role in Peirce’s conception of inquiry. 
56 Cf. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (2001). Democracy as an ethos seems to refer itself to this 
theory of selfhood. 
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of reason is most conspicuously presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. The stated goal 
of the Critique is to demonstrate the possibility of meaningful judgments and 
transcendental normative value that are both synthetic and a priori. In other words, it 
aims to demonstrate the possibility of a form of knowing not given in experience, but one 
that is nevertheless a necessary condition for the possibility of experience in general – 
including the possibility of “moral experience.” 
 Kant’s intent is clear enough here. The specification of reason, if we are not to say 
that it derives from solely empirical sources, or if we are not to say that reason is 
instrumental (along with what both assertions seem to entail regarding freedom), suggests 
that we give an account of reason consistent with, if not wholly part of, the nature of 
freedom itself. The explanation behind this claim is complex. I will briefly review it, 
before turning back to the account of reason specifically.  
One of the stories told concerning freedom takes the efficacy of scientific inquiry 
and mechanism for granted. What is a unit within the system of nature cannot count as 
self-determining since its characteristic action may always be caused by something else, 
not itself. To be free means to be self-determining or autonomous in the way suggested 
above. So to suggest that “reason” is itself caused as any other thing in nature might be is 
to suggest that reason is lacking in autonomy, and so in freedom. The Critique must 
reveal first, then, the autonomous nature of reason – autonomous in the sense of its 
transcendental independence from nature and so independent of our efforts to transform 
reason into a “natural object.” Its existence as a condition for the possibility of experience 
– scientific, moral, or otherwise – is meant to do just this.57  
                                                 
57 Does this imply that the determinants of reason are “non-natural?” -- That reason itself is uncaused by 
any antecedent, and thus could never be itself be formulated as an object in the form of material 
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 In order to demonstrate the nature of reason, Kant believes it necessary to show 
what the objects of reason in its non-empirical employment are. These objects are both 
empirical and ideal, concerning the transcendental employment of reason. The ideal 
objects of reason (God, freedom, and immortality) are the ideas of reason in its full 
understanding of itself. That is, they are not known by its empirical employment, but only 
as conditions of the possibility of any empirical employment when reason understands 
itself as an object. “The transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, none other than 
the concept of the totality of conditions for any given conditioned” (1787, B 379). Each 
transcendental idea represents the totality of synthesis of conditions for the possibility of 
experience, though no idea designates a “thing” qua substance.  
 The question from the point of view of the theory of reason is whether or not 
reason in its nature represents a prior synthesis of the totality of conditions – as a 
condition for the possibility of experience as we do, in fact, have it. Furthermore, if 
consciousness is an intrinsic part of personhood, what is its nature of consciousness? And 
if it is an element of any possible experience (and knowledge), then, what is its structure 
– and so the structure of experience in general? Is knowledge that is both synthetic and a 
priori possible? I do not intend a complete response to these questions or an 
interpretation of Kant’s complete thought on these matters. I intend only to show how 
they are responsive to his consideration of the transcendental principle of publicity, and 
how this creates some ambiguity in transcendental philosophy about political obedience. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
implication. This question pertains a) to the question of freedom, and b) to the question whether or not a 
roughly Kantian interpretation of reason is compatible with a generally naturalistic, Darwinian world-view.  
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5. The Possibility of Objectivity 
 In the section above, I tried to explain briefly aspects of the theoretical 
underpinnings of Kant’s moral and political theory. It includes these features: 1) a 
subjectivist interpretation of reason as the seat of the transcendental subject; 2) an 
account of objectivity that precludes knowledge of “the world” as it is in itself, but claims 
to be regulative of inquiry nonetheless; 3) the claim that the Idea of freedom is a 
necessary postulate of reason given its asymmetry with respect to phenomena. Thus, the 
interpretation of reason, and the objective necessity of the Idea of freedom is so far only 
subjective. The Ideas are not representative of any existent; and they possess no direct 
relation to phenomena or their understanding. It is unclear, then, even in what capacity 
they serve as conditions for the possibility of experience, much less correctness in the 
application of the categories to phenomena. From this account, there arises an apparent 
inconsistency between the claims regarding the objectivity of the Ideas of pure reason 
(i.e. the possibility that they are not simply subjectively necessary, but objectively true). 
In short, their role as the guarantors of correctness is mysterious. Thus, the normative role 
of the Ideas (in particular the value of freedom) may rightly be questioned.   
 Kant himself is conscious of the shortcomings of his theory of freedom accounted 
for in the context of determining the limits and structure of reason from a purely 
theoretical point of view. In part, I believe this is because the inquiry is aimed at the 
determination of the total synthesis of conditions for the possibility of experience. Given 
this orientation of the first critique, from this point of view, this total synthesis as a 
condition for the possibility of the total system of nature has only been subjectively 
considered. He refers to the particular difficulty of the determination of the principle of 
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reason as a subjective determination in transcendental philosophy in the preface of his 
Critique of Practical Reason. “Speculative reason could only exhibit this concept (of 
freedom) problematically as not impossible to thought” (1785, 14). And further on,  
I omit to mention that universal assent does not prove the objective validity of a 
judgment (i.e. its validity as a cognition), and although this universal assent 
should accidentally happen, it could furnish no proof of agreement with the 
object; on the contrary it is the objective validity which alone constitutes the basis 
of a necessary universal assent (1781, 23). 
 
Thus, Kant defines the nature of the proof that the second Critique is meant to undertake. 
He does not construe this proof as “inter-subjective,” since the grounds of inter-
subjective agreement and consent do not necessarily conform to freedom. Relations 
between persons, constituted as they are within particular religious and social traditions, 
habituation, et. al. (in general construed as psychological relations) are notoriously 
coercive. Sometimes this coercion is innocuous, sometimes for mutual benefit, 
sometimes detrimental. Freedom, as a non-coercive relation, cannot be construed 
psychologically. The objective proof requires, then, grounds that are objective and 
demonstrable independently of a particular mind or community of thought. 
Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is concerned, is a merely 
subjective principle of assent, which, however, is objectively valid for a reason 
equally pure but practical, and this principle, by means of the concept of freedom, 
assures objective reality and authority to the ideas of God and Immortality (1785, 
15). 
  
The Critique of Pure Reason is incomplete precisely because of its inability to provide 
any objective justification for the principle of reason. The Critique of Practical Reason 
is, in one respect, the completion of the first Critique. Kant aims in that work to 
demonstrate that pure reason is in and of itself practical, and acts as a giver of law as an 
internal principle of the will. Only such a critique, on his view, could show how such a 
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law could be rational, objective, internal, and ultimately binding upon rational beings 
including human beings – despite their being subject to “pathological determinations.” 
 The task, then, is twofold: 1) to show what practical rule may be derived from 
reason itself, and is in fact constitutive of reason though not merely analytic; 2) to show 
why that rule is law-like, and unconditionally binding upon rational being. To show the 
latter is to show the conditions under which desire is subsumable under a rational 
principle. If this latter task is not accomplished, then showing the objectivity of the 
principle of reason does not disqualify the subjective validity of individual desire and 
inclination. It does not show why the submission of such desires to reason is necessary 
and obligatory.  
6. The Objectivity of Freedom 
  While it is the rational being that is the subject of freedom, freedom itself 
designates an objective principle. Freedom is an idea we “possess” qua rational being 
without possibly having acquired that Idea from experience, since it represents the total 
synthesis of the conditions for the possibility of experience. Its sources, if they are not 
merely adventitious, lie in pure reason. This proposition leads us back to the original 
question, however. Why should we think that the concept of freedom is not merely a 
subjective principle?  
 Kant writes, “In this inquiry, criticism may and must begin with pure practical 
laws and their reality. But instead of intuition [as in the case of the first critique] it takes 
as their foundation the conception of their existence in the intelligible world, namely, the 
concept of freedom” (1785, 63). How are we to understand the “reality” and ultimately 
the objectivity of pure practical laws if not through intuition? Given the distinction 
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between phenomena and noumena, should we understand the causality of freedom in the 
physical world?  
 We learned from the first critique that the objectivity of freedom consists 
primarily in its relation to the series of conditions taken in their totality. That is, from the 
subjective point of view (the point of view that requires the fulfillment of the totality of 
conditions as a requirement of reason and the possibility of phenomenal causation), the 
concept of freedom is necessary. For finite rational beings, the concept of freedom is then 
subjective as conditions required for the possibility of our experience. But given the 
account in the first critique that includes material and categorical conditions, the 
necessity (and ultimately regulative nature) of the Idea remains mysterious. And where 
we have placed the regulative role of the Ideas in question, we may be inclined to reduce 
Kant’s understanding of inquiry either to a type of coherency theory or a type of 
verificationism. Given his insistence upon the objectivity and the necessity of the Ideas, I 
don’t think either position represents his self-understanding. Insofar as the Ideas are Ideas 
of Pure Reason, and are not “given” in experience, they seem to represent Reason’s self-
understanding. These conditions, insofar as they are generated through reason’s reflection 
upon itself, are objective and necessary insofar as they represent the final and total 
conditions in the series of conditions – the unconditioned. As such, however, they are not 
objects within the scope of possible understanding. Instead, they are objects in the sense 
of making understanding possible. The hope of freedom is fulfilled in the possibility of 
reason. The Ideas are, more simply put, the final and ultimate conditions of inquiry. They 
suggest what inquiry is for, and finally how it is possible. In the practical realm 
(including the political), inquiry is for freedom as the fulfillment of the final causes – 
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including the causes of action. They are the final conditions into the inquiry into 
experience insofar as they represent the conditions for the possibility of inquiry itself. 
They represent the possibility of self-criticism. Thus, they cannot be represented in 
inquiry and are in this (non-psychological) sense foundational. The moral law, then, 
formulated through reason, determined from the perspective of reason (considered in 
terms of the fulfillment of its conditions) is given by reason itself from the point of view 
of its completeness – the fulfillment of its conditions objectively considered where reason 
is the content of its own inquiry.  
The concept of Freedom (and God and Immortality) does not simply represent the 
final conditions of the inquiry into experience. It is a condition of the possibility of the 
moral law, where we understand such a law to be formulated in its completeness. 
Nevertheless, freedom remains the central concept of moral philosophy. It bears most 
directly upon issues of control and the possibility of self-determination and legislation 
(i.e. autonomy) in action. Freedom (as of  the moral law) is enacted by the moral agent. 
What this means is that the moral agent freely adheres to the moral law – obeys it without 
coercion but vis a vis the autonomy of a rational being.  
The form of reason that is unconditioned is moral in an absolute sense. This form 
of reason does not concern knowledge of objects directly – that is, knowledge of objects 
insofar as we suppose them to have material content. Rather, their objectivity consists in 
their necessity as the completion of the series of conditions for a system of nature. That 
is, they are objective requirements for the completion of the structure of reason. The 
structure of reason can be finally interpreted then as the total synthesis of the conditions 
for the possibility of experience. Freedom represents this total synthesis as the object of 
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inquiry from the point of view of subjective systematicity, and as an objective necessity 
for fulfilling all of the conditions of the possibility of inquiry.  
7. The Moral Law and Desire 
 Kant’s interpretation of reason has consequences for the determination of the 
relation between the moral law and desire—for the possibility of subsuming the latter 
under the former. This possibility lies in the doing of “theory.”  
A collection of rules, even of practical rules, is termed a theory if the rules 
concerned are envisaged as principles of a fairly general nature, and if they are 
abstracted from numerous conditions which, nonetheless necessarily influence 
their practical application (1792, 61).  
 
If the subsuming of desire under the universal law cannot be accomplished, Kant suggests 
that one reason for this failure is the fact “that there is not enough theory” (1792, 61).  
Clearly, the claim to the objectivity of what the Idea of freedom “represents” is 
hollow unless desire (e.g. as orientated towards happiness) can be subsumed under the 
moral law— in which case we could assert, the assertion about which Kant complains, 
that something may be “true in theory, but not in practice.” Otherwise, we may very well 
be able to conceive of a transcendental order of reasons, but we would not be able to 
explain in what way they are obligating to rational beings. To be a rational being means 
to act according to reasons. To act “freely” (ideally speaking) means to act on the basis of 
reasons as principles that (a) have no further explanation, reason, or ground, and (b) that 
are reasons supplied internally, that is, to one’s self by one’s self. And Kant seems to 
believe that the concept of freedom is implied by the concept of rational being, insofar as 
such beings aim at the completion of the conditions for the possibility of their rationality. 
So Kant does not reject persons as being, empirically, centers of desire. He only rejects 
the claim that the series of conditions for this possibility itself have been fulfilled by this 
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conception. Thus, desire is regulated by reason (transcendentally speaking) insofar as 
reason aims at the fulfillment of its own conditions. There is one sense in which reason 
considered transcendentally represents the maximization of desire vis a vis its restriction. 
Consider again this passage from the Critique of Pure Reason.  
The unity of reason is the unity of system; and this systematic unity does not 
serve objectively as a maxim that extends its application to all possible empirical 
knowledge of objects. Nevertheless, since the systematic connection which reason 
can give to the empirical employment of the understanding not only furthers its 
extension, but also guarantees its correctness [my italics], the principle of such 
systematic unity is so far also objective, but in an indeterminate manner 
(principium vagum) (1781, A679/B707). 
 
Phenomenally speaking we can supply ourselves with all sorts of reasons for committing 
to an action. Such reasons, insofar as they are desire-based, we might call “internal.” And 
insofar as they are orientated towards the good, or towards happiness, we can complete a 
chain of reasoning that shows how at least with a high degree of probability (given 
experience) the action to which we are committed will be productive of their objective. 
We might appropriately call this type of justification “internal,” at least insofar as the 
reasons we give are produced by our own phenomenal experience which, we might 
assume (with good reason), more reliably achieves its objectives with more experience, 
study, and effort. However, there is a point beyond which phenomenal reason cannot 
“see.”  
Kant does not deny the phenomenal aspect of reason. But he does argue that the 
restriction of reason to phenomenality represents a debasement of reason, and so the 
debasement of the person. He seems to identify our phenomenal reasons for doing this or 
that as “coercive” in some sense. On the instrumental understanding of reason, reason is 
guided ultimately by the non-rational. What is rational is conditioned by the “irrational.” 
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Reason is derivative. Thus, in some sense, we (as instrumentally rational beings) do not 
choose our ends. Kant does not deny that we act according to phenomenal reasons. He 
only denies that we act as determinately moral beings where we employ reason 
exclusively instrumentally, however necessary that it might be to do. If it is true that 
desire (from the phenomenal point of view) is geared in this way (as inclination), then, 
Kant must be able (1) to show that there is a different order of reasons accessible by 
persons, and (2) that these reasons are prior to phenomenal ones in considerations of the 
rational foundation and regulation of action.  
Kant seems to believe (1) that Reason itself is a source of reasons that are 
primarily moral in nature, and (2) that actions are ascribable to persons as moral agents, 
and not merely as things that behave, insofar as they have reasons for acting that are not 
fully reducible to external considerations. Actions, then, may conform to inclination (vis 
a vis natural desire), or to duty (vis a vis the moral content of reason considered only 
when it reflects upon itself – reasons unconditioned by any further reason). These reasons 
are pure principles of action. And to the extent that one’s actions conform to them, Kant 
claims, one acts freely. More importantly, perhaps, he believes that he has demonstrated 
the manner in which a transcendental cause can be a cause nonetheless, vis a vis the 
practical power of reason to produce principles that are synthetic and a priori.  
The power to produce such principles, of course, can (if it is a possible power at 
all) only guarantee the correctness of the principles. It cannot guarantee that what they 
command will be, or can be fulfilled empirically speaking. All sorts of accidents, 
eventualities, and circumstances thwart our best intentions. Kant does not deny this fact. 
However, he does not seek to analyze the particular circumstances that “govern” our 
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intent from the point of view of its “reliability.” Reliability requires the analysis of 
circumstances external to the nature of the thing. Since these circumstances are not 
analyzable in any general way, he magnifies “intention” as the key indicator of the nature 
of one’s will from the purely moral point of view. The moral question is whether or not 
intention corresponds with duty.   
There are two questions we may ask here: (1) given the empirical force of 
inclination, the ostensible clarity of the reasons derivable from experience, and the 
tendency of such principles to become stable over time with experience, why should we 
suppose that the types of reasons derived from pure reason are (a) more powerful than 
reasons derivable from inclination, or (b) preferable to reasons derivable from 
inclination? In other words, what is the justification of pure reason’s claim to regulate 
desire, and how is it possible that it does so? We can it seems accept the rightness of a 
principle without accepting its causal efficacy in practical experience. The idea of pure 
principles that are “practical in-themselves” seems like a sheer contradiction. (2) If the 
key moral concept regarding adherence to duty is so internal as to be conceived as 
“intention,” then how are we to conceive of intention as public? Is morality, strictly 
speaking, private? Kant’s own example of the shopkeeper and young client suggests it is 
private to the extent that “intentions” are private and “observable” only by the agent. This 
is because only the agent can know whether or not the act as such is ascribable to her 
(1785, 121). One’s rationalizations of one’s acts cannot  
...protect him from the blame and reproach which he casts upon himself. This is 
also the ground of repentance for a long past action at every recollection of it; a 
painful feeling produced by them moral sentiment, and which is practically void 
in so far as it cannot serve to do what has been undone (1785, 121).  
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Concerning the moral evaluation of an action, everything seems to depend upon the 
transparency of one’s conscience with respect to one’s actions. And that transparency 
depends upon the possibility that the agent can occupy the seat of the lawgiver. To act out 
of duty means to privilege the form of ascribing actions to one’s self as necessary vis a 
vis the concept of duty. To be able to ascribe an action to one’s self means to be able to 
be responsible for an action. To act out of inclination means to privilege what Kant 
considers the contingent relations of sensibility to the understanding. Only moral work of 
extreme subtlety could ascribe actions to persons, if at all, since the relationship to the 
agent can be weakened or strengthened by any number of means external to the agent or 
the act itself. However, given the internal nature of judgment of moral worth, we are 
faced with two options: 1) the possibility of moral valuation lies in the hands of the 
individual conscience alone, or 2) the possibility of the public evaluation of intent, and so 
of moral value, requires further conditions that are unavoidably empirical – including 
features that are historical and belonging to custom. Since one of Kant’s fundamental 
claims is that moral evaluation is not dependent upon any empirical features of 
experience (but on transcendental principles only), it is hard to imagine that he would 
wish for the second of these alternatives. The interpretation of an action would always be 
mediate; that is, it would always be given from one’s own understanding of the 
correlations between signs, gestures, and behavior. And these correlations can be sensibly 
described within the empirical sciences. On this view, the moral value of an action or 
ultimately a practice (even one’s own) is not transparent to or interpretable by conscience 
except through sets of historically constituted languages, traditions and signs. If we take 
this view, however, it is difficult to see how criticism could get a hold at all. Where we 
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aim at theoretically constructing the possibility of moral criticism we are threatened by a 
kind of moral solipsism. On the other hand, following Kant’s thesis, we have yet to 
determine the objective nature of the moral law. Though Kant’s moral philosophy seems 
to require an interpretation of the law that does not depend upon the self-reflective 
psychological subject as a member of a particular community, it is difficult to see how 
this interpretation takes shape except within it.  
8. Moral Justifications and Politics 
 Kant’s political writings were produced largely during his later life. There is some 
sense to this given the fact that they are direct results of his critiques of theoretical and 
practical reason. The first two critiques attempt (a) to interpret reason as the total 
synthesis of the conditions for the possibility of experience, and (b) to show that this 
synthesis is not merely subjective since it (vis a vis the transcendental ideas) also 
constitutes the conditions for the possibility of inquiry as such. If the project is successful 
on both counts, then it seems possible to derive from reason general ethical principles 
that are universally binding upon rational beings, regardless of their differentiating 
sensible features. We thus understand the character of the beings to which we apply 
moral judgments concerning actions because we understand the nature of the relation 
between the person and action as one of freedom and responsibility. The system of 
relations between persons then, as free and equal, must then be a system of laws. These 
laws constitute the proper realm of politics, and aim (on a moral basis given in the nature 
of persons themselves) to regulate relations between them. As centers of reason, persons 
are fundamentally moral agents. A political order is primarily justified insofar as it 
recognizes the inviolable moral nature of the person. Thus, principles of governance must 
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aim to meet the requirements of all individuals as distinctively moral agents. Political   
allegiance is rooted primarily, then, in reasoned consent, since it is through reasoned 
consent that persons recognize the equal moral weight of the other. Given the way Kant 
interprets reason and its internal relation with freedom, this could only mean that the 
most fundamental political agreements and form of consent are a priori.  
 Given Kant’s claims concerning the nature of morality (specifically as defined in 
the Groundwork), wouldn’t it be more natural to think that (private) morality and (public) 
politics are actually at odds with each other? (In fact, I take it that some version of this 
view remains influential in the contemporary understanding of their relation.) There is a 
sense in which morality is an utterly “internal” undertaking. While one’s will and its 
nature is sometimes revealed in action, and is therefore submitted to public judgment, this 
is not always the case. Thus, morality requires unique relation of the moral agent to 
herself as self-critic. Why, then, should we think the uniquely private nature of morality 
and the uniquely public nature of politics can be reconciled? Given the account of 
morality, how can a system of external laws be consistent with autonomy? And why 
should politics in fact be shaped by transcendental morals? There is an apparent antinomy 
between morals and politics that parallels the antinomy between reason and will. 
 Inasmuch as Kant is a transcendental idealist, he claims also to be an empirical 
realist. Thus, I assume he believes the transcendental concept of freedom is as effective at 
regulating and correcting political experience in the empirical realm inasmuch as it is 
effective at regulating and correcting scientific understanding. Kant understands the 
principles of right in terms of the moral precepts defined above, in particular freedom. 
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The hope of freedom is fulfilled in the possibility of reason. And the possibility of reason 
is accounted for transcendentally.  
 If Kant’s understanding of the moral restrictions upon politics is correct, then, the 
primary task of politics is the institution of laws consistent with the freedom of persons. It 
is through law that morality and politics can be made consistent with each other.  
But the whole concept of an external right is derived entirely from the concept of 
freedom in the mutual external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to 
do with the end which all men have by nature (i.e. the aim of achieving 
happiness) or with the recognized means of attaining this end (1792, 73).  
 
The concept of right presupposes the moral conception outlined above. It is the 
“restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of 
everyone else” (1792, 73). Thus, “public right is the distinctive quality of the external 
laws which makes this constant harmony possible” (1792, 73). Since public right 
concerns the external law, and is naturally coercive, the problem of reconciling morals 
and politics may be translated into the problem of harmonizing the external law with the 
concept of freedom, transcendentally considered. The means to achieve this harmony is 
the idea of a civil constitution and its suppositions, the harmonization of reasonable 
acceptance and obligation vis a vis the rational will. Law (considered externally) is not 
justified primarily according to its instrumental value as calibrated with happiness. It is 
justified on the basis of the reasonable acceptance of free, moral agents.  
 Given the moral conception I have tried to define, we should understand the 
notion of reasonable acceptance as proper to an autonomous subject, not subjects of 
inclination. Reasonable acceptance given according to inclination is coerced by 
sensibility, whereas assent from the transcendental point of view is free. The effort to 
justify a political order grounded in the rational faculty of persons considered as free, 
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then, is given as a particular kind of moral justification based upon a distinctive 
interpretation of reason. The idea of consent-based law, then, must be articulated a priori, 
since an empirical articulation suggests coercion, influence and inclination; and therefore 
no internal (and necessary) relation of obligation between the moral subject and the 
external law.  
 Inasmuch as it is not the business of moral duties to promote a particular 
conception of happiness, it is not the business of political organization to be concerned 
with the promotion of one view of happiness over another – theses about which (Kant 
supposes) there is, or perhaps can be, no substantive agreement. Thus, political 
association can and ought only to address that which concerns lawfulness – that which 
can hold valid for any subject. “No general valid principle of legislation can be based on 
happiness” (1792, 80). Thus, everyone is free to “seek his own happiness in whatever 
way he thinks best, so long as he does not violate the lawful freedom and rights of his 
fellow subjects at large” (1792, 80). External laws harmonize free subjects with others 
under the head of a formal political organization not by observing the possibility of 
common ends empirically considered, but by revealing those duties to which all rational 
beings are obliged. This “harmonization” involves, of course, coercion. I have tried to 
account briefly for what Kant considers to be the “internal” moral law. What, then, is the 
justification for the “external law?” And if this is the realm of politics, how does it 
harmonize with the moral law?  
 Kant claims that the external law is the justifiable means of coercion since it is 
ultimately grounded in “an infallible a priori standard, which is the idea of an original 
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contract” (1792, 80). The coercive nature of the external laws is justified on “contractual 
grounds.” What, then, is the nature of this contract?58  
Spelling out the “terms” of this contract relative to Kant’s moral theory is 
complex, but important. This idea underwrites the notion of reasonable acceptance, and 
links it to the necessity and obligation of obedience to the law or more precisely to the 
procedures of which it is the product. Clearly, the contract is not empirical in nature. That 
is, it is not a contract of actual agreement between rational persons, though it is 
suggestive of one manner of relating to others publicly. Moreover, it is not a contract that 
is based upon the various “external” ends and interests of persons. Yet, it is binding 
absolutely upon rational beings. Law, both the internal, moral law and the external, 
coercive law (insofar as it is grounded in the former), is not something that one (qua 
rational being) can simply opt out of. We have established that for Kant, the fact of 
reason and thought (and possibly speech, narrowly considered at least) carries moral 
content that is not empirical in nature. The claim to exclude oneself from the obligation 
of law is a claim to make an exception to the law in one’s own case. One cannot make 
this claim without presupposing the law. Thus, one engages in a sort of performative 
contradiction. The law, democratically produced, is the law to which every rational will 
freely consents insofar as they accept unanimously the procedure that produced it. The 
obligation to obey, on Kant’s account, takes the form of a promise to obey given consent. 
                                                 
58 The idea of a social contract can arguably be traced to Socrates’s use of it there to justify to Crito his 
willingness to remain in prison despite his claim to be innocent of corrupting the youth and worshipping 
foreign gods. The more appropriate historical predecessor to Kant’s contract theory is likely Rousseau. 
Rousseau’s epistemic justification will be discussed in the final chapters on this essay. 
 86
In this way it is governed by the moral norms governing the making and keeping of 
promises.59  
But in what manner is the external law “grounded” in laws a priori? This question 
returns us to the cluster of relationships between law and desire, the “external law” and 
the “internal law,” legality and morality. Kant specifies this a priori ground this way.  
It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical 
reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they 
could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each 
subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the 
general will. This is the test of the rightfulness of every public law. For if the law 
is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it. . .it is unjust (1792, 79).  
 
The operative mode here, once again, is “possibility.” Just laws do not require actual 
consent of all citizens directly, which would after all be difficult to garner. Just laws 
require “possible consent.” However, the judgment of what could gain possible consent is 
not warranted by polls or any direct consultation with the public. Rather, it rests with the 
judgment of the legislator. The legislator assumes a special role in law making since she 
is meant to make a judgment concerning universal possible consent, and since the 
consequence of that judgment is obedience on the part of subjects. It’s worth noting that 
Kant does not claim the legislator’s judgment to be infallible. He claims only that the 
standards of public judgment a priori – the civil constitution -- are infallible. However, 
given a) the possibility of fallible judgment in universal legislation, and b) the difficulty 
                                                 
59 This means that if we can show the democratic procedure itself is irrational, then, there would be reasons 
for rational beings to reject it as a method of law-making. The rationality of the democratic procedure has 
been explored by Arrow (1951), and Wolff (1998). In general, the voter’s paradox suggests that in the case 
of some preference orderings, the democratic procedure violates logical rules like transitivity. Thus, it 
could only be adopted by rational beings as a political method given certain restrictions. There is 
disagreement about what these restrictions should be and whether or not any of them adequately rationalize 
the procedure such that it should be adopted by rational beings. I will argue later that even if this problem 
can be resolved, its solution leaves the paradox of the minority voter unresolved. This paradox strikes me as 
more deeply problematic for democracy; hence, the attention I have tried to pay to dissent in its lesser and 
greater extremes.  
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already cited of interpreting the moral standard as moral solipsism, should we be 
heartened over Kant’s claim that obedience is nevertheless necessary? In other words, by 
showing the conceptual descent from the first critique to the political writings, I have 
attempted to demonstrate the effects of this persistent problem of establishing the 
objectivity of the Ideas of Pure Reason. Where we cannot establish that objectivity, Kant 
appears to be making a consistency argument, and the objective validity of the principle 
would be undermined. This interpretation has repercussions for his moral and political 
theories. It has been noted by many others that absolute adherence to the supreme 
principle of morality leads, it seems, to results that are morally repugnant by more 
objective criteria. This is not only true for acts like lying; it is also true for the political 
acts of rebellion and revolution, what Kant sometimes characterizes as “counter-
resistance” against the sovereign or against the ruler. Given the possible counter-
examples to the theory, the problem of obedience once again raises its head. If there is no 
sound justification of “counter-resistance” democratic procedures, the transcendental 
justification of political legitimacy may remain an impediment to the development of 
democracy and deliberative political practices. 
9. Reason and Political Obedience  
Given his moral philosophy, one would think that Kant’s theory of political 
legitimacy would have said more about the construction of political procedures to which 
rational beings owe their obedience, and not so much about the absolute duty of 
obedience under any circumstance.  
The political subject as a subject of rights is a subject of will. If the political 
subject is to be ruled by itself, it must be subject only to its own will; and being subject 
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only to its own will entails meeting consistency conditions upon willing. That is, the 
political subject is not obliged to obey laws that it did not will, at least indirectly; or laws 
that are inconsistent with themselves. Willing must be consistent with itself as a condition 
for obedience. This explains Kant’s concern for a comprehensive moral theory as a basis 
for political justification. Since politics requires obedience to political outcomes (external 
laws), it is unclear how to justify obedience without such a theory. It is unclear in what 
the right of the state consists if it is not consistent with the moral nature of willing.    
Laws are reasons for coercion. These reasons are justified if they are the product 
of a procedure whose adoption is justified. So the principle authorizing these procedures 
must be justified on procedure independent grounds. On Kant’s view, the basic condition 
for their justification depends upon their authorization by those subject to them. 
Otherwise, it would not be clear how laws (directly or indirectly) are a function of the 
will of citizens, and so consistent with it. As I suggested earlier, consent (understood here 
as willing) is not sufficient to establish political authority independent of features of law-
producing procedures. If they are not rational or if they fail objectively in some other 
respect, they could not be the sorts of thing adopted by rational beings. On the other 
hand, if we cannot explain how the minority in such a procedure wills the outcome they 
do not endorse, will or desire based theories of democratic legitimacy face serious 
challenges.  
Recall the liberal criterion of democratic legitimacy, “the actual principle of being 
content with majority decisions must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a 
contract; and this itself must be the ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is 
established” (1792, 79). This claim appears to address the consistency conditions on 
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willing without explaining or justifying the adoption of democratic procedures in the first 
place. In other words, the suggestion seems to be that once the procedure has been 
embodied in the form of a contract by the force of reasonable acceptance, the members of 
the consensus may not renege on their self-determination to abide by the outcomes even 
when they believe they are wrong. To do so would mean violating the consistency 
conditions of willing. The adoption of democratic procedures, on this view, has the form 
of a promise. The duty of obedience is, in this regard, especially strong. It is so strong 
Kant claims, “even if the power of the state or its agent, the head of state, has violated the 
original contract by authorizing the government to act tyrannically, and has thereby, in 
the eyes of the subject, forfeited the right to legislate, the subject is still not entitled to 
offer counter-resistance” (1792, 81). Though this claim concerns the state, it seems 
analogous to the puzzle of presented regarding the minority voter. The minority voter, we 
recall, is not entitled to counter-resistance having consented to the original contract. 
Having assented to the contract, “the people, under an existing civil constitution, has no 
longer any right to judge how the constitution should be administered” (1792, 81). If this 
analogy holds, the minority apparently forfeits its judgment insofar as it cannot 
reasonably reject the contract. Thus, the puzzle of the minority voter would arise. The 
moral consequence seems to be that the minority view is incoherent, and thus, eliminated. 
Wolff (1998) in particular notes that this view seems incoherent. It seems to pull against 
the autonomy for which the civil constitution was established in the first place. One could 
not subscribe both to Kant’s moral philosophy rooted in autonomy and to his political 
philosophy which justifies obedience under any circumstance.  
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On the other hand, there is no actual instance of consent that would justify the 
outcomes on the basis of the requirements of promise-keeping. Thus, the consistency 
argument alone which supposes an initial commitment does not capture the normative 
force of “reasonable acceptance.” If there is a duty to obey democratic outcomes 
(categorically), something must be said about the epistemic features of democratic 
procedures – or so I will argue in Chapter 4.  
10. Conclusion 
 Given the conclusion noted above concerning the moral justification of political 
procedures, one might have reason to think Kant’s concern for a comprehensive moral 
theory is misplaced. Without such a theory, however, it is unclear how to sustain the 
absolute duty of obedience—particularly in cases where laws are bad or there are deep 
moral disputes between majorities and minorities. The reasons given above suggest 
Kant’s effort to base the justification of democracy upon a comprehensive and 
comprehensive moral theory may be misguided or unnecessary. 
 From this position, I turn to Rawls’s political liberalism. Political liberalism is 
guided by the thought that a comprehensive moral theory as a basis for political 
justification is not necessary. However, it abstains (in idea at least) from making claims 
concerning entities or objects that do or do not exist. To this extent, it resists the appeal to 
minimalism and the transcendental conception.60 In particular, political liberalism 
distinguishes itself as an account of what can or cannot be reasonably rejected. On this 
view, both minimalist and transcendental metaphysics can be reasonably rejected, albeit 
                                                 
60 Some civic republicans (Sandel 1982) and some communitarians (MacIntyre 1984) challenge the view of 
selfhood upon which a liberal justification seems to depend. They do not seem to be claiming simply that it 
is unnecessary to political justification. Rather, they claim it is false.  
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for different reasons. Therefore, they do not serve as a suitable basis for the civil 
constitution.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE DUTY TO OBEY 
 
 
 
1. Democracy without Truth 
 
A comprehensive moral theory, according to John Rawls, is a theory of “what is 
of value in human life, and the ideas of personal character, as well as ideas of friendship 
and of familial and associational relationships …” (2005, 13). Kant’s theory as articulated 
above as well as the minimalist doctrine articulated in Chapter 2 may, on Rawls’ view, 
count equally as comprehensive doctrines.61  
As suggested, it is sometimes thought that such a comprehensive doctrine could 
form the basis for democratic legitimacy. However, as products of the free operation of 
reason, the various doctrines to which citizens subscribe may be respectively supportable 
by good reasons, a consistent and determinant scheme of values, etc. The fact these 
doctrines may be reasonable, yet irreconcilable, introduces the central problem of 
legitimacy to which political liberalism proposes a solution. How is it possible to justify a 
duty to obey democratic outputs under conditions in which moral doctrines may be 
reasonable, but incommensurable with each other?62 
About pluralism in democracy, Rawls writes,  
The political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a diversity of 
opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some 
                                                 
61 This is less clear in the latter case since it proposes to take discussion of the issues and the values they 
assume off the public table. The problem with minimalism, however, is that it rests on a positive theory of 
value, which can be reasonably rejected. 
62 I will understand “commensurable goods” here to be the ordinal ordering of goods or ends. If these goods 
can be so ordered, they are commensurable. If they cannot, they are not commensurable; or at least, their 
commensuration is, as political liberalism seems to claim, not always necessary for rational agreement.  
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of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines 
political liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human 
reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions (2005, 4).  
 
Rawls calls this state “reasonable pluralism.”63 Given certain facts about reason in free 
societies, one could reasonably expect this plurality to be a permanent feature of 
democracy. On Rawls’ view, the fact of reasonable pluralism offers a solution to a central 
problem of democratic legitimacy described above. 
The subtlety of Rawls’ account of political legitimacy lies partially in the fact that 
it does not reject either transcendental subjectivity or the minimalist doctrine described as 
possibly true (whatever their actual status with respect to the truth is). So if one wishes to 
argue the point, Rawls can grant it from within the view he espouses. He does declare, 
however, that these doctrines along with any other comprehensive moral doctrine could 
not be a suitable basis for democratic legitimacy. But he must be able to show that 
legitimacy is possible, then, without appealing simply to any particular comprehensive 
moral doctrine – including that of Kant. In fact, for a particular moral reason (viz., the 
fact of oppression), he claims this is necessarily the case if such a conception can be 
justified at all.   
The key difference between Rawls’ view of justification and the appeal to a 
comprehensive moral theory, then, does not lie in whether or not the comprehensive 
moral doctrine is true. The difference is a moral one that derives from the “fact of 
oppression.” The fact of oppression arises when one reasonable comprehensive doctrine 
is illegitimately privileged over another one. Thus, Rawls speculates, “A society united 
                                                 
63 I will understand the idea of “reasonableness” here to indicate the equality of these doctrines from the 
point of view of reason. I do not understand their reasonableness to refer to a point of “agreement,” tacit or 
explicit. Thus, Krasnoff (1998) seems correct in suggesting that reasonable pluralism as employed in 
Rawls’s political liberalism is not simply a sociological doctrine, but indicates a conflict internal to reason 
as such.    
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on a reasonable form of utilitarianism, or on the reasonable liberalisms of Kant or Mill, 
would likewise require the sanctions of state power to remain so” (2005, 37). In this case, 
some citizens would be coerced on the basis of principles they could reasonably reject 
given their reasonable moral doctrine. They would not, as liberalism insists they must, be 
treated equally in their freedom.  
The appeal to particular comprehensive moral doctrines as the basis for a political 
consensus would apparently require the oppression of otherwise reasonable views. 
Consequently, Rawls concludes that the political conception must be framed in a way 
acceptable to any reasonable citizen, from within any reasonable doctrine. At stake, as 
discovered in Chapter 3, is the establishment of a public sphere rooted in and developed 
according to reason and independent of particular moral, religious, or philosophical 
doctrines.64 Rawls’ claim, in brief, is that establishing such a sphere is possible among 
otherwise incommensurable doctrines if there is a set of political principles with 
normative weight that cannot be reasonably rejected. Rawls believes there is such a set. 
From such principles a duty to obey would arise even when political outputs are contrary 
to one of the reasonable doctrines in question. This duty would not arise from the fact of 
“agreement,” tacit or explicit, but from the fact they could not be reasonably rejected.     
Political liberalism takes its view of political legitimacy as morally distinctive 
since it accounts for the fact of oppression in a way other doctrines do not. A political 
framework (as opposed to one that appeals to a comprehensive doctrine) is narrowed to 
address only the “basic structure” of “society’s main political, social, and economic 
                                                 
64 Apparently, then, Rawls view “the political” as autonomous roughly the way that Kant views “the 
ethical” as autonomous. The comparison is limited by the fact Rawls claims it is necessary to construct 
only political values. Whether moral values generally considered is not a question within the scope of 
political liberalism (Rawls 2005, 125). 
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institutions” (2005, 11). This strategy is a reflection of the effort to “apply the principle 
of toleration to philosophy itself” (2005, 14). A condition of its success seems to lie in its 
capacity to remain neutral between comprehensive doctrines in the sense that its 
justification does not include premises reasonably contestable by citizens. 
Objections qua Muslim, Christian, or other specifiable moral and religious 
doctrine could not offer a reasonable basis of rejection. A theory of legitimacy based on 
any one of these comprehensive views would illegitimately privilege it, hence violating 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. Presumably, this is because it makes the justification 
unavailable – hence unpublicized – as reasons for those who are not Christian, Muslim, 
et. al. These reasons could not, then, obligate them since there would be no point of view 
from which they could recognize this obligation as such. It would not be a public view of 
reason. If political justification cannot build a public view of reason on the basis of any 
particular comprehensive doctrine, it would seem that reasonableness (not truth) must be 
sufficient for political justification.65 The sufficiency of reasonableness may, then, be 
formulated as the liberal acceptance criterion:  
Liberal Acceptance Criterion: A principle or doctrine is admissible into 
political justification if it is acceptable to reasonable citizens (qua reasonable 
citizen), and their reasonable acceptance is all that is required.66  
 
Reasonableness, on this view, is sufficient for legitimacy. Truth is not necessary. If it 
were necessary, it would apparently violate what the fact of oppression demands vis a vis 
freedom and equality. This problem threatens the coherence of political liberalism since, 
as I have already suggested, it is committed to the sufficiency of the reasonable.  
                                                 
65 I am not claiming this has been sufficiently demonstrated. At this point, I am only outlining the direction 
of the thought. 
66 The acceptance criterion as stated here should be understood as a formalization of Kant’s conception of 
the legitimacy criterion in Chapter 3.  
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In this chapter, I will discuss the role of the liberal acceptance criterion in 
justifying the duty to obey democratic outcomes, that is, in democratic legitimacy. This 
discussion will require distinguishing the politically liberal view from other forms of 
liberalism. Largely, this distinction turns on the possibility of formulating Rawls’ 
position as a kind of constructivism, namely political constructivism. In this way, we may 
see how the moral and regulative features of politics are constituted.67  
2. Political versus Moral Constructivism68 
I propose here to view the problem of pluralism as defined by Rawls as a problem 
of the commensuration of moral and political goods. Rawls’ approach to the problem is 
constructivist.69 However, Rawls proposes to use the constructivist approach in a limited 
way (viz., only for political values not moral ones generally).70 Moral constructivism 
would implicate political liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine and place perhaps 
insurmountable obstacles to its internal coherence relative to the fact of oppression.  
According to constructivism generally something is good if there is a reason to 
choose it.71 A non-constructivist view claims instead that one has a reason to choose 
something if it is good. Consequently one has a moral reason if the thing is morally good. 
In the latter case, inquiry is oriented by the project of determining whether the thing is 
                                                 
67 For some evidence of Rawls’ resistance to the thought see Political Liberalism (2005, 150). Here Rawls 
writes that “We try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any particular religious, philosophical or 
moral view, or its associated theory of truth and the status of values.” He does not seem to add the 
requirement that citizens committed to political liberalism are ipso facto committed to its being true.  
68 I make no pretense of having a well worked out and sophisticated view of practical reason here. The 
point is simply to indicate as briefly as possible the very general direction of Rawls’s considerations about 
pluralism in democracy.  
69 I am relying on a conventional definition here; but do not mean to indicate that constructivism is 
necessarily incompatible with some realist views.  
70 This claim itself is controversial to the extent it assumes the possibility of identifying a political domain 
that is autonomous of the moral one. I am not aiming at a general criticism here. Some have argued, 
however, that maintaining the distinction between the special domain of the political and the moral 
generally moral creates a situation in which the utilitarian, for example, must decide between being a 
utilitarian or being unreasonable. In either, political liberalism eliminates pluralism (Talisse 2005, 60).  
71 This does not entail that one’s choice makes it good. I will discuss this crucial point later in the chapter.  
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good. It is, in this regard, quite clearly a realist view of morality. Constructivist inquiry, 
on the other hand, is oriented according to the determination of whether one has a moral 
reason to choose something.72  
Disagreements about what is good, and the ordering of goods, are possible in 
either case. The source of disagreement in the non-constructive case may first arise over 
the identification of the good, its nature, et. al. Disagreements in this case are resolvable 
if the various goods proposed are commensurate with each other. If not, they are 
potentially irresolvable. Constructivist disagreement does not seem to follow this pattern. 
One’s judgment about the good is first a judgment about whether one has a reason to 
choose X. The goodness of X derives from the quality of one’s reasons, not the other way 
around. So if I have promised to change your tire, and promises have an overriding value, 
I have an overriding reason to change your tire, even if it prevents me from playing 
basketball as I had suggested to others I would. On the constructivist view, then, 
disagreement is first about the reasons there are to choose something.73 If some of these 
reasons cannot be rejected one has an obligation to do what they require. Consequently, if 
I have a duty to obey I have a sufficient reason to obey even if it prevents me from 
performing some other task that would be pleasing.74 
I assume political constructivism operates in a similar fashion. However, it 
narrows the determination of political ends to the question of whether or not there are 
reasons to choose a political good. The reason for choosing it will be a political one. 
                                                 
72 In this regard, political constructivism may be aligned with ethical internalism, despite its distinctively 
narrow application.  
73 Granted, this characterization is an oversimplification. I am only trying to show how political 
constructivism fits generally within a certain outlook.  
74 Of course, this will raise a problem about conflicts between duties; but answering these questions will 
fall beyond the scope of the present inquiry.  
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However, given the normative requirements on these reasons, its being political does not 
mean that it is “negotiative,” “strategic,” or the like. According to Rawls, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism – arising as it does in democratic societies – seems to operate as a 
reason in a particular way. It operates as a regulative reason (i.e. a norm of political 
reasoning). It is regulative insofar as it places constraints on political discourse. Thus, it 
serves to limit or restrict the kinds of reasons available to democratic justification. But 
the fact of reasonable pluralism is not simply a “cultural” phenomenon. Rather, it is a fact 
of reason, and indicates a conflict that arises from its free use.  
From the constructivist point of view, then, political justification does not require 
a general commensuration of moral goods in order to determine the priority of political 
goods. Reasons that are assigned priority are so assigned in relation to facts about 
democracy in relation to facts about reason. If the fact of reasonable pluralism cannot be 
reasonably rejected, reasonableness is determinant of the political good. On the question 
of the second order commensurability of goods, political liberalism is mute. On the 
question of their first order commensurability, it says that the answer to this question is 
regulated by the political value of reasonableness – in particular the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. Something is good, then, if “we” have a reason to choose it.75        
 It is important to understand the difference between these approaches for current 
purposes because of the different ways each understands the role of truth and defines the 
role of the reasonable in political justification. According to Rawls, “Reasonableness is 
                                                 
75 The problem of reasonable pluralism, as understood here, is whether or not there is anything that we do 
or should collectively choose given reasonable pluralism. The constructivist response is not to assert a 
substantive account what is good, hence what we ought to choose. Rather, it says that X is good if we have 
a reason to choose it. Yet it still must explain obligation (viz., what cannot be reasonably rejected) 
assuming plural accounts of value. The way to understand the fact of reasonable pluralism, then, is as a 
regulative principle not a substantive one. In this chapter and in what follows, I will try to explain this role 
more fully, in particular whether or not it is simply or moral constraint or also imbues democratic 
procedures with any epistemic value.   
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its standard of correctness, and given its political aims, it need not go beyond that” (2005, 
127). The duty to obey democratic outcomes arises in response to reasonableness 
understood as a political value under conditions of reasonable pluralism. Given the free 
operation of reason — at least as a normative idea — it would be unreasonable to reject 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. I suggested in Chapter 3 that it is imperative not to 
understand this “agreement” as either being a point of explicit or tacit consent, or as a 
psychological fact. If we understand reasonableness as a normative expression, it would 
be both necessary and sufficient to justify a duty to obey under conditions of reasonable 
pluralism.  
 Even so, Rawls’ view is not without problems. One problem is whether or not 
political liberalism is constructivist about truth inasmuch as it is constructivist about 
political values. Utilizing the work of David Estlund, I will show why political liberalism 
cannot be committed to a constructivist view of truth even it is committed to a 
constructivist view of political value. From this point of view, we will be in a position to 
define the meaning of an epistemic conception of democracy, and perhaps to evaluate 
alternate accounts of the role that epistemic values play in democratic procedures. First, 
however, I will show how a criticism of Rawls’ political constructivism might be 
developed by appealing to the work of Michael Sandel.  
3. Political Constructivism and Truth 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls asks, “how is it possible for there to exist over time 
a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who still remain profoundly divided by 
reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” (2005, 47)? Rawls makes clear 
in the political version of liberalism his belief that A Theory of Justice left something out. 
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In particular, it was not sufficiently attentive to the problem of the stability of the 
conception of justice in light of reasonable pluralism. As Brian Barry writes, “everything 
distinctive about Political Liberalism stems from a concern with the stability of justice” 
(1995, 875). The problem of establishing a political consensus that is normative is 
motivated primarily by the concern for the stability (viz., the acceptability) of the 
conception, not a concern for its truth. If however, acceptability cannot be construed in 
purely psychological or social terms, it must be a normative concept irreducible to 
empirical determinations.76 The question, then, is how to make it possible to accept a 
public conception of justice in light of a plurality of reasonable moral and religious 
doctrines, and perhaps incommensurate schemes of the good, if the principles in question 
are not in some way taken as true.  
From this perspective, we can see the distinctiveness of Rawls’ proposal. The 
Kantian and Schumpeterian views suppose standards of value that may be reasonably 
rejected insofar as they are derived from opposing and irreconcilable doctrines. In 
Chapter 2, I outlined one possible objection to the positivist political doctrine. To see 
how Kantian transcendentalism might be reasonably rejected consider Sandel’s criticism.  
Sandel writes that, according to Kant, one is free as the subject of experience if 
“one is independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what 
reason must always attribute to itself)” (1785, 120). The basis of the moral law, he 
continues, “is to be found in the subject, not the object of practical reason, a subject 
capable of an autonomous will” (Sandel 1982, 6). This subject, being given prior to its 
ends, is the subject of right and may choose freely among its possible ends. Thus, the 
                                                 
76 Consequently, “stability” for the political liberal cannot be the empirical concept that it is for the 
minimalist like Posner or Schumpeter. This concern drives, for the political liberal the distinction between 
the political and the moral.  
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right is prior to the good. Sandel believes that the question of the correctness of the 
Kantian view can be determined, and possibly challenged, by answering this question: 
“How do we know that there is any such subject, identifiable apart from and prior to the 
object it seeks” (1982, 7)? On Sandel’s view, the Kantian point of view mischaracterizes 
the nature and sources of social, political and moral thought and life. Rather than 
considering them as objects for a transcendental subject, they should be conceived along 
with the subject as having a history, embraced by a tradition, and instantiated in a 
community. Now, the point here is not to determine whether Sandel’s criticism hits the 
mark. Rather, the point is to suggest what Rawls might mean when he claims that 
comprehensive moral theories subject to reasonable objection do not serve as a suitable 
basis for political justification.77 If we cannot assume that these distinctive views are 
reconcilable in a single conception, or one is necessarily defeated at the hands of the 
other, we may be led to think that these doctrines are “opposing and irreconcilable.” 
This is not an unhappy result for a political liberalism. But it is because of this 
result that political liberalism does not assume any particular substantive doctrine of 
value upon which to ground the status of persons as free and equal. Doing so would 
require importing controversial premises (e.g. of the sort identified by Kant or Sandel) 
into the political consensus, hence, illegitimately privileging one substantive doctrine 
over another. But as I have suggested, this move does not merely violate fairness. It 
violates a certain moral principle definitive of moral and political reasoning. Thus, 
political liberalism interprets the acceptance criterion to mean that citizens justify it from 
within their own moral doctrines. “Since we assume each citizen to affirm some such 
                                                 
77 Of course, Sandel’s criticism of Kant is meant to show ultimately that Rawls’s Theory of Justice may be 
challenged as harboring similar assumptions. 
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view, we hope to make it possible for all to accept the political conception as true or 
reasonable from the standpoint of their own comprehensive doctrine” (2005, 150). As 
noted earlier, Rawls claims the doctrine has the capacity to do this if it is reasonable. A 
doctrine is reasonable if it can generate the fact of reasonable pluralism out of its own set 
of practical reasons whatever they are. As indicated, this claim makes more sense if we 
think of it in light of the conflict internal to reason than as an “external,” “cultural” 
problem. 
The consequence of this claim is that “Persons are reasonable [recognize each 
other as free and equal] in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to 
propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them 
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so” (2005, 49). Apparently, 
then, their accounts of the fact of reasonable pluralism make it possible to discern a 
difference between the political and the generally moral in the way Kant suggests one 
might discern the difference between public and private. This claim stimulates Sandel to 
further criticism. The public/private distinction can lead one to identify the “private self” 
as the contingent self of tradition – the self that does not choose its own objects or 
projects but to whom they are given in some way. The “public self,” on the other hand, is 
the subject of pure reason unburdened by the contingencies of tradition and community. 
It represents a type of autonomy not possessed by the “private self.”  
Notice that if the political conception is justified from within the various 
reasonable doctrines it is not obvious that Rawls depends on the sorts of Kantian claims 
Sandel attributes to his view. In other words, political liberalism is not so obviously 
committed to the Kantian view of selfhood attributed to it by Sandel. If this is so, Rawls’ 
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claims about freedom and equality must not ultimately be grounded in the way Sandel 
suggests. Sandel’s general criticism seems to revolve around the idea that if Rawls’ 
claims are grounded on transcendental subjectivity, it depends upon the kind of 
controversial metaphysics it aims to avoid. On the other hand, if it is not grounded in this 
way, a question may still arise about its justification. Political liberalism, formulated 
either way, would be in jeopardy as a normative theory.  
Linking Rawls’ view to Kant’s, Sandel claims that each supposes, “So long as 
they are not unjust, our conceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply 
in virtue of our having chosen them. We are ‘self-originating sources of valid claims’” 
(1998, 177). Sandel’s suggestion, it seems, is that constructivism about the good in Kant 
and in Rawls necessarily entails constructivism about truth. These claims are valid, 
Sandel contends, because they are chosen by the autonomous subject. This leads to a 
certain kind of internal problem for political liberalism. If political liberalism does not 
admit truth (in the form of a standard independent of choice) into its justificatory scheme, 
there could be no independent grounds on which to validate its claims. If it does, on the 
other hand, the “political” sphere could not be “free standing” of the more generally 
moral sphere. It represents an implicit claim about the good and its truth without a 
scheme of justification that could properly be called epistemic. Sandel writes, “Practical 
reason finds its advantage over theoretical reason precisely in this voluntarist faculty, in 
its capacity to generate practical precepts directly, without recourse to cognition” (1998, 
176). Consequently, “there is no need for these precepts ‘to wait upon intuitions in order 
to acquire a meaning. This occurs for the noteworthy reason that they themselves produce 
the reality of that to which they refer’” (Sandel 1998, 176). The most obvious way to 
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reject Sandel’s criticism would be to show that political liberalism depends on a standard 
independent of choice without being itself a comprehensive moral doctrine. One step in 
this direction is showing that a constructivist view of political value does not entail a 
constructivist view of truth. So it is not committed to a doctrine of truth, even if it is 
committed to the truth of political liberalism. Indeed, the internal coherence of political 
liberalism, insofar as it claims to construct only political value, seems to depend on this 
claim. From here we can show that Rawls must himself maintain this view without 
sacrificing the essentials of political liberalism.  
4. Truth and the Sufficiency of the Reasonable  
In “The Insularity of the Reasonable,” (1998) Estlund offers a corrective for 
political liberalism. It is a corrective some political liberals will not want to accept.78 
Doing so requires an appeal to truth. Some theorists, then, will believe this move violates 
the “epistemic abstinence” attributed to Rawls’ view.79 Estlund is sensitive, however, to 
the moral demand of political liberalism to maintain a framework that is freestanding 
from comprehensive moral doctrines while addressing critics like Sandel and more 
traditional liberal theorists (i.e. those who view liberalism as unproblematically rooted in 
a substantive, comprehensive moral theory). While Estlund contends, then, that 
something must be said about truth, he agrees that it cannot be too much.  
The problem noted above is that political liberalism suggests justification is 
possible without appealing to a criterion stronger than reasonable acceptance. In 
particular, Estlund’s corrective says that political liberalism must be committed to the 
                                                 
78 Some theorists have raised more general objections to the very idea of political liberalism. See Barry 
(1994); Wenar (1995); Scoccia (2005). 
79 This expression was taken from Raz’s essay of the same name Joseph Raz, ‘Facing Diversity: The Case 
of Epistemic Abstinence’ (1994). 
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truth of the claim that reasonableness is sufficient for political justification. In this way, 
he points to what political liberals must justify without simply saying that it is justified 
because it is “what reasonable persons accept.” In this case, it would be the sort of “self-
validating” scheme to which Sandel objects, and which raises questions about the 
grounds of its own legitimacy. Estlund denies, however, political liberalism is committed 
to any particular metaphysical thesis or substantive moral doctrine. Thus, Estlund’s view 
aims to retain the fundamental idea of political liberalism while taking issue with Rawls’ 
formulation of it.  
What can be said about truth in political liberalism can be stated in a modification 
of the liberal acceptance criterion.  
Modified Acceptance Criterion (MAC): With the exception of this doctrine, no 
doctrine is admissible or excluded as a premise in political justification on 
grounds of its truth or falsity, but is admissible just when and because it is 
acceptable to all reasonable citizens (and no one else’s acceptance matters). The 
present doctrine must be both acceptable to all reasonable citizens and true [my 
italics] (Estlund 1998, 266).  
 
To be committed to the truth of political liberalism is essentially to believe that the 
acceptance criterion cannot be reasonably rejected. In addition, Estlund seems to agree 
that the political consensus is not possible if it includes controversial theses justified only 
by particular comprehensive moral doctrines. Acceptability to reasonable citizens is 
sufficient for political justification.80 
 Estlund diverges from Rawls’s account (or at least clarifies it), by adding that this 
proposal — that reasonableness is sufficient for political justification — must be 
acceptable and true (i.e. independent of acceptability). So in one small but important way, 
truth must be admitted necessarily to political justification. Strictly speaking, however, 
                                                 
80 Rawls’s principle of toleration limits inquiry as a means for expanding toleration in political justification 
in the way that Kant’s transcendental philosophy limits reason to make room for faith. 
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the necessity of the truth predicate arises as a methodological requirement supposing the 
acceptance requirement must meet its own requirement. Thus, Rawls cannot maintain the 
political conception if in justifying it by one’s own doctrine, one may take it as true, or as 
reasonable (2005, 151). If truth is not necessary, the plurality of doctrines is left intact 
without explaining the normative force of the public conception of justice. Truth must be 
a necessary feature in order to establish an independent standard for the evaluation of 
political principles and claims. The question naturally arises whether this claim 
introduces the kinds of controversial premises that the political liberal hopes to avoid. In 
other words, one will wonder whether the truth predicate entails the admission in political 
liberalism that it tacitly, but illegitimately, privileges itself as a substantive moral 
doctrine. Estlund’s response is negative. But in order to avoid the difficulty, the truth of 
MAC should only be considered in a minimal sense: (for any statement P) “P” is true, if 
and only if P. Therefore, MAC is true, if and only if MAC. If the truth of MAC is a 
requirement for its justification, the minimal sense of truth does not make it true. It 
simply identifies what must be shown or justified — that reasonable acceptance is 
sufficient for political liberalism. And it is the whole point of minimalism to avoid talk 
about truth makers. Since political goodness is understood in relation to the reasons that 
citizens may actually have, and we start from the idea of a plurality of irreconcilable but 
reasonable moral doctrines, there are potentially a number of views about these truth-
makers. The problem of justification as an internalist doctrine is addressed by appealing 
to the substance of the various moral doctrines.  
Estlund amplifies his claim to this effect in the following way: “So anyone who 
can accept that murder is wrong accepts that ‘murder is wrong’ is true in the minimal 
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sense needed by political liberalism…” (1998, 270). MAC can be understood as true in 
the minimal sense if citizens accept the principle roughly in the way they understand the 
principle “murder is wrong” is true. Their acceptance of the wrongness of murder and 
their belief it is true that “murder is wrong” is possible regardless of the religious or 
moral doctrine to which citizens subscribe. So the consensus about the wrongness of 
murder holds even in the face of pluralism. Thus, one can say with some right that its 
being true is a reason to accept it; but not that it is true because one accepts it. More 
importantly, one may do so without appealing to anything more than one’s own 
reasonable moral doctrine as a source of justification. Citizens with distinct doctrines 
may accept that murder is wrong and believe that it is true without being committed to 
the same reasons in each case. They may, in addition, dispute the cases to which the 
principle is applied. However, accepting the principle as true forms the background for 
these kinds of deliberation. Kantians and utilitarians, if political liberalism is right, may 
both believe MAC is justified from within their comprehensive doctrines. The fact they 
each believe it is despite their distinctive doctrines lends epistemic force and quality to it, 
not just the weight of numbers. The extension of the consensus — following the kind of 
consensus about murder being wrong – would be very wide indeed, despite relative 
differences in the supporting justifications. The acceptance criterion, then, can be taken 
as true independent of citizens’ acceptance of it; and indeed, if Estlund is correct, this 
must be the case if political liberalism is to be a coherent normative theory.  
So far, I have confined the essay to a discussion of Rawls’ view of a public 
conception of reason assuming the existence of reasonable but incommensurable 
doctrines. Rawls does not proceed by showing how different modes of valuing may be 
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commensurate under a single head. Instead, he takes this commensuration to be at least in 
some cases impossible, unlikely, or unnecessary in order to formulate a public conception 
of justice. If Estlund is right, Rawls’ theory is coherent only if it is consistent with a view 
in which one can be constructivist about political value but not about truth. That is, not 
everything can be constructed. However, the fact of reasonable pluralism plays the role of 
regulating political inference given the plurality of reasons in democratic societies. 
Having set out the idea of political constructivism, and given some sense to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, we may see how this view informs the view of democracy within 
political liberalism.  
5. Democracy in Political Liberalism 
The set of principles that could not be reasonably rejected by reasonable citizens, 
grounds what Rawls refers to as an “overlapping consensus.” An “overlapping 
consensus” of citizens would consist of “all the reasonable opposing religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable 
body of adherents in a more or less constitutional regime…”(2005, 15). An interpretation 
of democracy is seen most clearly at earlier stages in its development. Rawls suggests 
that there are two stages in this development. The first stage ends in “constitutional 
consensus.” The constitutional consensus “establishes democratic electoral procedures 
for moderating political rivalry within society” (2005, 158). The constitutional consensus 
provides a framework within which “political groups must enter the public forum of 
political discussion and appeal to other groups who do not share their comprehensive 
doctrine” (2005, 165). In accepting a democratic constitution, one accepts the principle of 
majority rule (2005, 164). Rawls does not claim here that democratic procedures should 
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be adopted because they tend to “get things right.” Thus, within the constitutional 
consensus, democracy is not interpreted epistemically. Rather, it is instrumental for 
producing stability and civility. Conceived within the politically liberal framework the 
reason for adopting democratic procedures is the moderation of political rivalry.  
In keeping with liberal tradition, Rawls adopts a view of democracy (in this 
context at least) as limited. It is limited insofar as it is an article of, and constrained by, a 
civil constitution (Dahl 1989). However, the reason for adopting democratic procedures 
could not also be the reason for accepting democratic outcomes with which one does not 
agree. Since the reasons for adopting a procedure do not justify its outcomes, the 
justification of democratic outcomes must ultimately stem from the overlapping 
consensus and the public conception of justice. As suggested in Chapter 2, stability and 
civility tell us nothing about a duty to obey these procedures (or their outcomes 
categorically).81  The reason for adopting democratic procedures could not also be — as 
it seems to be for the minimalist — the justification for obedience.82  
If it is true that political liberalism conceives of democratic procedures non-
epistemically, it is not surprising that it would generate the idea of legitimacy out of its 
concept of justice. In fact, this would make a great deal of sense. Without the appeal to 
justice, democratic procedures generate disagreement instead of agreement without any 
means to resolve it. Since non-epistemic criteria are sufficient for legitimacy, according 
to political liberalism, democratic outcomes are legitimate if they are the product of a 
procedure that is just.  
                                                 
81 Strictly speaking, the minimalist offers no justification for obedience — just a cocktail of sociological, 
psychological, and economic theses explaining why it sometimes occurs.  
82 Of course, this is why Schumpeter seems to appeal to democracy as a political method only, and 
relatively unrelated to the making of difficult social decisions.  
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One way to understand the meaning of this claim is discovered in Cheryl Misak’s 
Truth, Politics, Morality (2000). There she claims that democratic legitimacy as 
conceived within political liberalism is shaped by “that upon which we can all agree” 
(Misak 2000, 28). Her point, however, is critical. Political liberalism, she claims, relies 
on a substantive view of the good. She adds, however, that Rawls’ idea of public reason, 
insofar as it shaped by the public conception of justice, rejects the notion that any other 
comprehensive views ought to have, so to speak, a seat at the public table. The trouble is 
that the politically liberal conception of justice claims to have been evacuated of any 
substance – the substantive views of the good citizens actually hold. So it may be that the 
public conception of justice represents a view for everyone that could be acceptable to no 
one. In this case, political liberalism would fail at achieving the goal that fundamentally 
motivated it – achieving a stable political conception of justice. Such a conception seems 
unworkable. Indeed, it seems to strip the political sphere of the participation that would 
render democratic outcomes legitimate. Consequently, Misak is suspicious that political 
liberalism does not conceal, in fact, a substantive moral doctrine – illegitimately 
privileging itself. Her criticism, then, is not simply about the internal coherence of 
political liberalism. It is moral criticism.  
The implication is that in order to be efficacious political liberalism must conceal 
the fact that it is just another comprehensive view — hence, illegitimately assigning itself 
a privileged status by denying that it is or possesses a comprehensive conception of the 
good.83 “In light of this problem, we might conclude that Rawls should retract his claim 
that public reason should exclude appeals to the good” (Misak 2000, 28). Misak’s point is 
not just about the internal structure of political liberalism. Following Sandel, she claims, 
                                                 
83 There may be a favorable comparison between Misak and Sandel on this point. 
 111
“The idea that the citizen should bracket her beliefs about the good seems both unrealistic 
and undesirable” (Misak 2000, 28). It is unrealistic, I assume, because citizens are 
politically motivated by their various views of the good but not by the fact that there are 
various views of the good. So according to Sandel and Misak, the fact there are various 
views of the good (even reasonable ones) is vacuous when it comes to motivating 
democratic participation.  
Consequently, the idea that citizens should bracket their beliefs is undesirable. 
Public, political life becomes a barren landscape since no one in fact occupies such a 
position. The public square stands relatively empty. As indicated in Chapter 2, this 
vacuity may produce stability but at the expense of democratic legitimacy. Democracy, 
then, demands more robust and general political participation; and a theory of democracy 
demands the norms that will justify it. Liberalism, on this view, runs into problems 
generated by the lack of political participation introduced for the minimalist justification 
of democracy in Chapter 2.84 Thus, political liberalism represents for Misak “a kind of 
quashing of moral and political debate as we know it” (2000, 28). Now it is not obvious 
why political debate as we know it is preferable to or better than political debate as 
prescribed within political liberalism. So without further argument this particular claim 
begs the question against political liberalism.  
More important, however, is Misak’s contention that political liberalism bases 
political debate upon that to which we all agree. In both the present and the preceding 
chapters, I claimed that whatever Kant and Rawls mean by expressions like “agreement,” 
“consent,” et. al., it could not indicate something to which we all agree and so consent, 
                                                 
84 This is one way to understand the criticism of Kant raised at the end of Chapter 3. The theory of 
democracy aspires to the public use of reason but undermines the conditions that would make it possible. 
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tacitly or explicitly. If it did, of course, the critiques of Misak and Sandel would be much 
stronger. Political liberalism, in this case would be a doctrine as any other doctrine, and 
perhaps stacking the deck in its favor.  
So we must see whether there is after all an interpretation of “reasonable 
agreement” that does not run into this difficulty. If agreement means here something 
more like “under the authority of ‘principles’ one could not reasonably reject,” then the 
sense in which Misak suggests liberal deliberation is constrained by principles to which 
we all agree seems trivial — or, in any case, does not address the actual argument. I will 
understand the notion of being under some authority in this way as correspondent in some 
way with a duty to obey. In this event, one might counter that the locution “principles one 
could not reasonably reject” introduces the idea of a positive set of doctrines, suggesting 
again that the duty is generated from the fact of explicit or tacit agreement. This criticism 
will have to be met.  
One clue has been provided already in the idea that “reasonableness” reflects a 
view of reason on which conflict is internal to it. This statement by itself hardly amounts 
to a doctrine. If this is so, then it is the case that any effort at reason-giving must be 
sensitive to contrary reasons, evidence and such. To fail to be sensitive in this way is to 
fail to acknowledge the internal conflicts of one’s own effort to give reasons. This view is 
available to any first-order reasonable doctrine to the extent one may offer any 
justification of it at all.   
The Rawlsian conception of “reasonableness” is not, according to Misak, an 
epistemological idea. “Reasonableness is tied, that is, to the ideas of equality, fairness, 
and cooperation. A person is reasonable if she is prepared to propose principles of fair 
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terms of cooperation and abide by them” (Misak 2000, 24). A proper view of 
reasonableness, according to Misak, would be epistemic. So the point of Misak’s critique 
of political liberalism is to establish the basis for an “epistemic” conception of 
democratic procedures. Misak argues that an epistemic conception of democracy can be 
developed through a Peircean conception of inquiry. Political liberalism, from this 
perspective, may not seem like an epistemic view of democracy since it is not aimed at 
truth but at justice; and it would morally objectionable since it eliminates various views 
of the good from public deliberation while tacitly elevating itself as the framework for 
public deliberation.85 As suggested above, Rawls provides fodder for this view in 
claiming that the virtues of democracy lie in the stability and civility that are its products, 
at least at the stage of constitutional consensus. If Misak’s claims are true, moreover, 
political liberalism would seem to fall into a predicament similar to the one discovered in 
Kant’s view (assuming a particular interpretation of the latter).86 In particular, the kind of 
freedom promised by political liberalism would be rendered meaningless from the public 
point of view. But the question is not only about what Rawls does or not say or write. 
Rather, it is about the meaning of political liberalism on this point and whether an 
epistemic view of democracy can be derived from it or thought as compatible with it. To 
see how this is possible I will turn to Estlund’s conception of democratic procedures, 
“Epistemic Proceduralism.” As we will see, Estlund’s understanding of the role of the 
epistemic in democracy is importantly different from that of the pragmatist. Whether or 
                                                 
85 This claim sounds strange. Sandel’s criticism is somewhat illuminating here. Justice as an object is 
distinct from truth since it seems to be derived directly from practical precepts to preserve autonomy rather 
than from a particular moral tradition, et. al.  
86 Recall here that in Chapter 3, I claimed that Kant’s absolutism about obedience seemed to set conditions 
under which public debate and dissent were rendered benign.  
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not these views are compatible and in what ways is not an argument I will undertake 
here.  
 The sort of criticism against political liberalism lodged by Sandel and Misak may 
be summed up this way. “Not egoists, but strangers, sometimes benevolent, make for 
citizens of the deontological republic; justice finds it occasion because we cannot know 
each other, or our ends, well enough to govern by the common good alone” (Sandel 1998, 
183). So he concludes, “we are submerged in a circumstance that ceases to be ours” 
(Sandel 1998, 183). For all of this rhapsodizing about the alienation of the public sphere, 
the introduction of what citizens believe about the good into it remains problematic. 
Misak prizes an epistemic conception of democracy because this reintroduction must be 
regulated in some way. If we begin with beliefs citizens actually have, and compel their 
public participation, the analysis of belief, indeed epistemology generally, may play a 
role more central to politics that Rawls’ political liberalism suggests. However, in the 
remainder of this chapter, this view will be weighed only against the revisions to political 
liberalism proposed by Estlund and the view of democracy he develops within a 
framework where the central idea of political liberalism is maintained excepting 
constructivism about truth.  
7. Two Epistemic Conceptions of Democratic Legitimacy 
An epistemic justification of democratic outcomes suggests, as Estlund writes, 
there is a duty to obey, “only if the agent’s judgment meets some epistemic criteria” 
(1999, 197).  But according to Estlund the necessity of these criteria should be 
understood within a procedural framework. So, S incurs a duty to obey procedure D, if 
that procedure has property E. However, the “property” in question is not simply that of 
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fairness. In addition, it is not conferred by an antecedent, substantive view of justice. 
Nevertheless, the features of the procedure that justify a duty to obey may still be 
considered epistemic. Estlund calls this view “epistemic proceduralism.” Stating this 
view is one thing, explaining it another, and justifying it yet another. So I will tackle 
these tasks in this order. 
Any epistemic view of democracy will begin with the idea that, as Estlund writes, 
“Votes are usually thought to be without cognitive content altogether. The received view 
of voting is that it is an expression of preference, the manifestation of a disposition to 
favor or choose one policy over another” (Estlund 1993, 73). So it may make sense to 
adopt democratic procedures as constitutional articles for purely instrumental reasons. 
But as I have suggested, these reasons alone do not produce an understanding of the 
categorical legitimacy of their outcomes.  
On the received view of democratic voting it is natural to suppose that underlying 
democracy is a plurality of interests and preferences. Democratic procedures aggregate 
these interests and preferences; and the majority rule dictates which preferences 
legitimately represent the public. But the question is how to justify a duty to obey given 
differences of preference. An aggregative model of democratic voting might, then, look 
something like this. 
(A) 
(1) X prefers A and that A be enacted.  
(2) Y prefers not-A, and that not-A be enacted.  
(3) If more Xs prefer A than Ys prefers not-A, then the preference of Xs takes 
precedence to that of Ys. 
 116
Of course, what these premises leave out is a justification for why X should represent the 
public determination, hence why Y, though she is in the minority, has a duty to obey.  
There is an implicit suggestion here that the preference of X takes precedence because of 
its greater quantity. But the appeal to quantity remains a description of what X prefers, 
rather than a justification, and so (as widely recognized) is insufficient for legitimacy.  
 We may be led to think that some other principle (e.g. fairness) justifies the 
procedure; and as a consequence, its outputs. So if the procedure is conducted fairly a 
duty arises.87 The value added to the procedure or its outputs on the basis of fairness is 
little more than the equal recognition of different desires or preferences. But there is 
nothing authoritative added about the value of such preferences or desires. If one turns to 
the content of claims about justice as a source of justification, one is then confronted with 
the problem of assigning priority to one view or the other. But the substance of justice is 
disputed. We must ask whether there is any basis for one of these views to be privileged 
above any other.  
Whatever the response to this question, it should be clear that once the necessity 
of the concept of justice is introduced we can no longer assume the aggregative model of 
democratic procedures. This is because we must consider their outcomes as justified by a 
procedure independent moral standard (e.g. justice). However, if these standards are 
formulated in terms of justice, there is (again, given reasonable pluralism) a problem 
about determining which view has priority. The incommensurability thesis introduced 
earlier assumes that everyone has some view of justice, but these views differ (in 
substance and the priority assigned to justice). Consider this view in terms of a non-
aggregative model of democratic procedures. 
                                                 
87 Rawls seems to have believed this at one point. See “Justice as Fairness” (1962).  
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(B) 
(1) X prefers that A be done, because X believes that A is just (or good). 
(2) Y prefers that not-A be done, because Y believes that not-A is just (or good). 
There may be grounds to privilege one preference over the other one, if for instance (a) 
one of their beliefs about justice is true, (b) it is known by someone which one, and (c) 
there is a consensus of reasonable persons about which one it is. Political liberalism 
suggests that (a) and (b) may well be the case. But a democratic procedure cannot assume 
(c). This being so, the fact of reasonable pluralism arises, even if we grant (a) and (b). 
Thus, political liberalism does not necessarily deny there is some truth about justice, or 
that some one knows it. It denies only that “the truth about justice” could be entered 
legitimately into political justification without attending to the constraints imposed by 
reasonable pluralism.  
The cognitive model of democratic procedures does not suggest there is no truth 
about justice. Nor does it suggest that no one knows it. In fact, both X and Y indicate at 
least they believe they know what justice is in voting as they do. And there is no reason 
to rule out the possibility that one of them may be correct. If we think of the underlying 
dispute about justice in substantive terms, we might reach the conclusion that a duty of X 
to obey Y or vice versa would arise, only if one of these views is substantively correct. 
Consider the additions of (C3) and (C 4) below. 
 (C)  
(1) X desires that A be done because she believes it is just (or good). 
(2) Y desires not-A be done because she believes it is just (or good). 
(3) A is just (or good). 
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(4) X knows A is just (or good).  
Assuming that X and Y both desire the good, and that A is good; it seems that what Y 
really desires is A. Therefore, if X desires A, and A is good (i.e. correct), Y should desire 
A even if she does not. The significant addition here is the contention that X knows what 
the good is. If democratic procedures are construed along the lines of a correctness theory 
(where we might understand X as the majority), what Y believes to be good drops out as 
significant. Her deference to X is justified on the basis of X’s knowledge of what is good. 
However, in this case, we have exited the procedural view. We have done so because we 
have made the deference of Y to X rely on X’s claim to know what the good is; thus on 
the claim that X, in this case, is the expert.  
 However, Y voting as she did seems to mean that she also believes X is not the 
expert. Believing this, she could incur no duty to obey X based upon X’s expertise. It 
would nullify her vote. Not only would this be a contradiction, we would exit the 
procedural framework which assumes the knowers are not sufficiently known (Estlund 
1993, 71). So even if the majority correctly grasps the truth about justice, the duty to 
obey could not arise from that fact so long as one is committed to the procedural (indeed 
a constructivist) framework. 
The claim “A is good” (C3) does not seem, then, to have a place in the 
formulation of legitimate democratic outcomes unless it is viewed through the constraint 
of reasonable pluralism and political constructivism generally. The claim “X knows A is 
just (or good)” (C4) does have a place. However, its role is clear only when contrasted 
with Y’s view. That is, we cannot include it as part of the procedure without recognizing 
that it is disputed. The reason is not that A is not or may not be good. It could be. In 
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addition, someone may know that it is good. It is just that it is not known who it is. Thus, 
who knows what it is can be reasonably disputed. I understand this claim to be reasonable 
constraint on knowledge claims. The dispute about the “know-ability” of knowers gives 
rise to the fact of reasonable pluralism. But on this reading, the origin of this fact is 
neither metaphysical nor skeptical. In this regard, we may view it as an epistemic 
constraint without being skeptical about the good or its “know-ability.” Now we have to 
see how this view of the role of epistemological premises in democratic procedures 
influences the justification of the duty to obey.  
The fact of reasonable pluralism is meant to serve as a guide to what cannot be 
reasonably rejected — hence to the justification of a duty to obey under conditions of 
pluralism. However, if it can be reasonably rejected, it cannot perform this service. As 
suggested, we may understand the fact of reasonable pluralism as a political reason with 
normative weight (qua inferential norms) within the scope of the “basic structure.” This 
is seen most clearly when it is understood as a product of the fact of oppression. Misak 
and Sandel suggest the fact of reasonable pluralism (as a principle with normative 
political bearing) can be reasonably rejected on epistemological and moral grounds.88 
However, on the reading above, the fact of reasonable pluralism may be understood as an 
epistemological premise. Doing so would add the epistemic criteria required to justify a 
duty to obey democratic outputs without illegitimately privileging any substantive view 
of justice.      
The duty to obey does not arise directly from a restriction it places on knowers. 
Rather, it arises because of the restrictions placed on political outputs. These outputs may 
or may not be correct. Moreover, they may or may not be known to be correct. Whatever 
                                                 
88 I will discuss these arguments in more detail in the next chapter in the context of democratic deliberation. 
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the case, their correctness does not provide a reason to obey. If this is so, their 
incorrectness does not provide a reason to disobey. Thus, the truth of the output is not a 
sufficient reason to sacrifice one’s own judgment when one is in the minority. One could 
not reasonably object, then, to a procedure formulated on the basis of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism since one could not reasonably reject the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. If one could not reasonably object, then, a duty to obey arises for democratic 
procedures given appropriate epistemic criteria. 
This understanding of “epistemic” does not refer to any substantive features of the 
good. If it referred to substantive features of the good, then, the conception of legitimacy 
would be based on a doctrine about which there is some dispute. Rather, “epistemic” 
refers to the quality of certain kinds of reasons in the justification of political procedures. 
The epistemic content of the fact of reasonable pluralism, then, has to do with the fact of 
disagreement about who knows what the good is. Again, this is not a dispute about there 
being a good, since we may assume there is. It is not a dispute about the fact someone 
knows it since both the majority and minority voters may assume they do. But what it is 
and who knows it is disputed. So no duty to obey would arise for Y on the basis of X 
being correct about what justice is.  
8. Conclusion 
This conclusion is enlightening with respect to the criticisms lodged against 
political liberalism by both Sandel and Misak. Both criticisms have moral and 
epistemological motivations. Both seem to view political liberalism as illegitimately 
privileging itself. Thus, it invites an internal criticism of political liberalism. And both 
seem to view political liberalism as needing to say more about truth. 
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 Democracy begins with the fact of disagreement regardless of the model used to 
interpret the nature of its inputs and outputs. Democratic legitimacy, however, is a moral 
notion; and it cannot avoid introducing the idea of a moral good into its conception of 
legitimacy. So we may conclude the following: (1) aggregative models are an inadequate 
basis for a theory of democratic legitimacy; (2) any theory of legitimacy must include 
epistemic constraints; (3) epistemic constraints do not entail a substantive account of 
justice; (4) the fact of reasonable disagreement (as an epistemic constraint) is a key 
normative concept. The epistemic features of democracy, then, may be understood as 
constraints on the objects that can be pursued by political means. But if Estlund is right, 
this view is no more a form of skepticism that it is a substantive doctrine of justice. It is 
more robust than the former, but more modest than the latter.  
 There is one final point to make. Epistemic Proceduralism seems to generate a 
duty to obey democratic procedures independently of a concept of democratic 
deliberation. Thus, deliberation does not seem necessary for political legitimacy even if it 
is desirable on other grounds. Perhaps this is actually the heart of the critiques of 
liberalisms produced by democrats like Misak and Sandel. If this is so, the criticism will 
be that liberalism puts the cart before the horse. In accounting for political legitimacy as 
determined independently of and prior to deliberation, liberalism (including political 
liberalism) makes the idea of political legitimacy foreign to actual political practice. 
Actual practices of deliberation should inform our view of what is legitimate, rather than 
our abstracted view of legitimacy informing the structure of deliberative practice. In any 
case, it there are apparently two distinctive views (at least) of what constitutes epistemic 
criteria in democratic procedures. In the next and concluding chapter, I will sharpen the 
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differences between the two epistemic views of democratic justification by addressing the 
role and structure of deliberation in democracy in relation to legitimacy from each point 
of view.      
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
 
 
 
1. Deliberation and Legitimacy  
 
 In general, the question “Why deliberate?” is about what motivates or what 
should motivate deliberative acts. To this extent, the question supposes an answer to 
another question, namely about the ends of deliberation. Yet, it is one thing to deliberate 
as an individual, and another to deliberate in and on behalf of groups. Political 
deliberation, then, seems fraught with specific complexities and conditions. Pluralism, 
indeed reasonable pluralism, is one of these. Because of this complexity, the apparent 
fruitlessness of deliberation, and disputes about the appropriate ends of democracy some 
theorists (e.g. Schumpeter and Posner) have essentially eliminated deliberation as part of 
any plausible normative theory of democratic legitimacy. Others (e.g. Cohen 1999) have 
claimed that deliberative democracy, far from being implausible or counter-productive, is 
a fundamental (non-derivative) political ideal. Articulating the structure of this concept 
and its normative status remains difficult.   
In Chapter 3, I noted that deliberation poses a certain kind of problem for the 
Kantian account of democratic legitimacy. Kant’s view makes it seem as if a political 
authority is legitimate whether it is democratic, deliberative or not. That is, he seems to 
claim that there is a duty to obey in any case. This is because the requirements for 
obedience do not stem, in his view, from facts about “external” political procedures but 
instead from moral duties imposed upon political subjects. In this case, the criteria for 
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legitimacy should be understood as established prior to and independent of any political 
act.  
Two kinds of problems arise for this view. First, if legitimacy is derived prior to 
and independent of the concept of deliberation (and any substantive theory of justice), it 
is possible that the concept of the former actually impedes the development of the latter. 
If the criteria for legitimacy can be established independently of deliberation, then, the 
relation between deliberation and legitimate outcomes is distorted. Indeed, in some cases, 
it seems as if the kinds of moral constraints imposed on citizens precludes the 
establishment of conditions under which reason could operate freely in the way Kant 
himself believed it should. Chapter 4 showed how it may be possible to extend this kind 
of criticism to political liberalism, but also how it may be possible to modify political 
liberalism in a way that meets it.  
Another problem might arise even if we grant the possibility of democratic 
deliberation. This problem centers on the public/private distinction; and how public 
deliberation should be framed. In particular, without some further determination of 
democratic ends, one may wonder what kinds or quantities of input are necessary for 
meaningful deliberation. This question does not have to do with the possibility of 
deliberation so much as its content.  
Criticisms about the priority of deliberation in liberal conceptions of democratic 
legitimacy as well as the content of deliberation may both be viewed as criticisms of the 
liberal acceptance criterion and its status in political justification. To remind the reader, 
the liberal acceptance criterion was noted in Kant’s writing and a version of it was 
developed in Chapter 4 in the context of political constructivism:  
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Liberal Acceptance Criterion: A principle or doctrine is admissible into 
political justification if it is acceptable to reasonable citizens (qua reasonable 
citizen), and their reasonable acceptance is all that is required.  
 
The criticism about the priority and role of deliberation in producing legitimate outcomes 
focuses on the criterion’s apparent lack of epistemic criteria. The criticism about the 
inputs of deliberation focuses on the standards that this lack does or does not raise for 
public reason, and the consequences for meaningful democratic deliberation. Each one 
may be represented clearly:  
Criticism 1: The liberal acceptance criterion is a purely procedural criterion. Thus, 
as a non-substantive principle, it cannot establish political ends except on the 
basis of the prior agreement or consent of citizens. The “agreement” of citizens is 
not a sufficient normative standard. Even if we qualify “agreement” as 
“reasonable agreement,” there is nothing about which citizens necessarily agree 
that could form the basis of a normative political consensus. Political liberalism 
must assert either a substantive moral theory in which case it would be internally 
incoherent. Or, it must admit to being a weak normative theory. 
Criticism 2: The liberal acceptance criterion erects a strong distinction between 
the public and private spheres. The distinction requires that citizens forego their 
substantive moral beliefs in the public sphere and adopt the formal language that 
all reasonable persons can accept (e.g. the language of rights as opposed to 
goods). The inadmissibility of the various conceptions of the good impoverishes 
the public sphere, along with the content of democratic deliberation. The 
participation on which democratic legitimacy depends will be lost.  
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If the liberal legitimacy criterion is sufficient as a normative political criterion, each of 
these objections must be met. In particular, it must be shown that it could justify a duty to 
obey. To do so, the criterion must have epistemic features.89  
 In this final chapter, I will define two epistemic views of democratic legitimacy. 
Both views have been introduced already – Epistemic Proceduralism and Pragmatic 
Deliberativism.90 Though, I believe these views are deeply compatible, I will defend the 
former against the latter on a particular point. This defense does not reduce to the claim 
that one view is right and one is wrong simpliciter. Rather, I will show that one of these 
offers a superior justification of the duty to obey democratic outcomes. Thus, it better 
justifies and explains what I have argued all along is an essential feature of the idea of 
political legitimacy (viz., a duty to obey).  
Nevertheless, this view confronts obstacles of its own. Having apparently 
established criteria for legitimacy prior to and independent of deliberation, it must be 
explained how democratic deliberation will be motivated and structured as a feature of 
democratic legitimacy. Otherwise, this approach may be subject to the criticisms that its 
justification of democracy and its motivation to political participation are both 
inadequate. I will understand the idea of deliberation here to be appropriate to a political 
situation defined by the basic problem of reasonable pluralism. To this extent, it is worth 
point out the basic difference between individual and public deliberation.  
It is unclear how deep an analogy we can suppose exists between cases of 
individual deliberation and cases of collective and political deliberation. Because 
                                                 
89 Where it is appropriate, I will distinguish between two interpretations of the liberal acceptance criterion 
(LAC). The non-epistemic reading of the criterion will be rendered, LACne while the epistemic reading will 
be identified as LACe. Where there is no point in distinguishing, simply LAC will be used.  
90 From here until the end, I will refer to the Peircean view developed by Misak and others as “pragmatic 
deliberativism.” This term is adopted from Talisse (2005, 116). 
 127
legitimate political authority grants power to some over others, the outcomes of a 
legitimate political procedure (unlike one’s individual deliberations) must be understood 
as binding on those who dispute the correctness of the outcome. For this reason, 
legitimate outcomes (e.g. laws) can be used as reasons for coercion in cases where 
someone fails to respond appropriately (e.g. obey).91 In general, then, individual 
deliberations have to do with the capacity to control oneself, while political deliberation 
has to do not simply with the capacity to control oneself but with the right to be in a 
position of authority with respect to others or more or less equal power and political 
standing.  
2. Why Deliberate?  
 There is a very natural way to answer the question, “Why deliberate?” It is found 
in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. “If, then, having deliberated well is proper to a 
prudent person, good deliberation will be the type of correctness that accords with what is 
expedient for promoting the end about which prudence is true supposition” (1142b 33-
36). Deliberation, then, is not the “type of correctness” that mathematical reasoning is, 
even if deliberation is a kind of rational calculation. It is, rather, a way of reasoning 
practically – reasoning about how expeditiously or perhaps rightly to achieve ends. Thus, 
                                                 
91 This is not to say that the outcomes of one’s individual deliberations are not also normative of choice. 
One should do what one has good reason to do. However, with respect to political deliberation, the 
outcomes are binding even when one disputes their correctness or acts contrary to them. In cases of 
individual deliberation, deliberative outcomes may indeed be normative even if one fails to do what one has 
better reason to do. I distinguish here between “necessity” and “normativity.” That one should do 
something does not mean that one necessarily will do it. “Normativity” must address the problems of the 
will that would prevent one, for example, from doing what one ought or what one believes one ought 
(under appropriate conditions). To this extent, one’s failures may be classified as akratic. However, the 
failure to act appropriately with respect to political outcomes invites not simply a negative moral 
evaluation, but the justified use of coercive power against a person or group. So the results of democratic 
procedures (if they are legitimate) may be said to command the obedience of the minority even if the 
minority does not believe the outcome is substantively correct. Thus, one might argue that democracy 
requires the minority to do what it believes to be wrong simplicter. Democracy, according to this view, is 
not self-consistent and is morally bankrupt. 
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it is reasoning about what should be done. Consequently, “We deliberate not about ends, 
but about what promotes ends” (1112b 13). So we deliberate in light of the fact that it is 
not evident what should be done given various contingencies. Deliberation, then, is about 
things that could be one way as opposed to another pursuant to ends set by other means; 
and prudence is the correct understanding of the end of deliberation. So the outputs of 
deliberation must be evaluated by standards independent of the deliberative act itself. 
One should deliberate, then, in order to achieve ends determined by other means, 
provided deliberation is the best way to achieve them. 
 Under conditions of moral pluralism, the idea of deliberative democracy seems 
problematic. The problem of pluralism suggests there may be a number of ends that 
should orient political activity. I have tried to rule out some of these as viable. Stability, I 
argued, is a worthy political goal; but since it may be achieved by non-democratic as well 
as democratic means, minimalism does not offer a strong defense of democratic 
legitimacy.92 Legitimacy, then, is a moral and not a positive concept. Consequently, 
moral goods like “justice” seem to better define democratic ends. However, couching 
justice substantively in terms of a particular, comprehensive doctrine invites the question 
(and problem) of which conception of justice affords political legitimacy.  This end 
would for all intents and purposes orient political deliberation. 
Democracy imposes hurdles for this solution. As Rawls characterizes the problem 
of democracy it is that it accommodates a number of reasonable, but “opposing and 
irreconcilable” doctrines.  The fact of reasonable pluralism, on this view, precludes the 
possibility that these ends could be justified by appealing to an authority as determined 
within a comprehensive moral doctrine; or that the purported authority specified within 
                                                 
92 I am referring here only to the empirical concept of “stability,” not to Rawls’. 
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such a doctrine deserves special weight or deference. How, then, does democratic 
deliberation function under conditions of pluralism understood in this way? Many have 
said that it cannot. Suggesting this problem haunts liberal democracies, MacIntyre writes, 
“There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture” (1984, 
6). Thus, I assume he means there is no way in pluralist societies of a certain type to set 
the ends that would make sense of deliberative acts. To do so, they must appeal to a 
particular moral tradition, including perhaps a theological framework. Since liberal 
democracies eschew these models of authority by definition, they are doomed to collapse 
under their own weight – if this has not already happened.  
Sandel (more moderately) adds that the inability to correctly frame moral and 
political argument under conditions of pluralism has led to the establishment of the 
“procedural republic.” But since the earmark of such a republic is the notion that 
“government should not affirm in law any particular vision of the good life,” public, 
democratic life has been impoverished of its own goods (Sandel 1996, 4). Echoing 
MacIntyre, the only way to make sense out of political deliberation would be to do so by 
a substantive understanding of these shared goods.93 The procedural republic, as a 
response to pluralism is, on this view, inadequate to answer the question, “Why 
deliberate?” Asserting no particular good, the procedural republic seems unmotivated to 
deliberate properly.94 From this lack of motivation, we should expect lack of political 
participation. Lack of political participation threatens democratic legitimacy along with 
                                                 
93 This is not to say that Sandel wholly endorses MacIntyre’s view. If nothing else, Sandel’s view is 
narrower in its scope.  
94 I am assuming the complicity of what Sandel calls the procedural republic with the liberal acceptance 
criterion. 
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the moral and epistemic goods that flow from it.95 A viable conception of political 
legitimacy, then, must then motivate political participation of particular kinds – not 
simply voting, but deliberative acts as well.  
Two claims can be distinguished in views like Sandel’s and perhaps MacIntyre’s:  
(1) Making sense of deliberation as a meaningful activity (political or otherwise) 
requires supposing a terminus or good at which it aims. 
(2) Any terminus will necessarily be defined by its role in a substantive (or 
comprehensive to use Rawls’s characterization) conception of the good.  
The first contention seems a necessary part of any understanding of a deliberative 
procedure. It says simply that the procedure must be constructed according to some moral 
values, and consequently epistemic values. The second contention is, however, more 
controversial. Political liberalism rejects (2) but does not necessarily reject (1). One may 
claim that the trouble with this stance is that in accepting (1) but rejecting (2), it is not 
clear what the common good is, and thus where deliberation should aim.96  
The problem for the view that accepts (1) but not (2) lies in how to authoritatively 
define the evaluative standards of deliberation without violating the liberal acceptance 
criterion. Without such standards, deliberative outcomes would have no discernible 
epistemic value; and could not effectively track the truth about what should be done. 
Problems about the motivation to deliberate would arise. On the other hand, the 
deliberative ends could not be established by the same deliberative procedure that tracks 
them. They may, however, be established by some other procedure.  
                                                 
95 Later I will discuss “participation” more technically in terms of “political input.”  
96 As we will see, this criticism can become more complex when we add the claim that political liberalism 
covertly asserts a substantive view of the good. This criticism is not simply logical, but moral as well. 
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This is the point, for instance, of distinguishing between actual and ideal 
deliberative procedures. An ideal deliberative procedure would, as Cohen writes, clarify 
“the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and 
conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal 
citizens” (1999, 72). But in a sense, the notion of an ideal deliberative procedure pushes 
the problem back another step. Even though distinguishing between two kinds of 
procedure may meet a certain logical difficulty in the definition of democratic ends, the 
ideal deliberative procedure must be justified. Otherwise, democratic deliberation would 
be indefinitely regressive. Thus, there must be an epistemic constraint imposed on the 
selection of deliberative ends.  
As noted earlier, Sandel criticizes the philosophical foundations of the procedural 
republic to the extent it assigns the priority of justice on the basis of procedural reasons. 
But this means the assignment would be non-epistemic. Thus, a defense of the liberal 
view must see whether or not the liberal legitimacy criterion can meet the demands of 
epistemic criteria without violating the restriction on the appeal to substantive moral 
theories. Showing that it has epistemic features is central to its justification.  
Deliberativists who interpret the acceptance criterion as LACne have seen an 
advantage in framing political legitimacy in terms of democratic deliberation, not the 
other way around. Since deliberation is truth-oriented, specifically to the truth about what 
should be done, and the discovery of truth requires numerous inputs from a variety of 
sources, it is natural to assume that democracy is a necessary social condition for 
deliberation. Pragmatic Deliberativism adopts this position. To this extent, the pragmatist 
must defend an account of deliberation. She must then show that democracy flows best 
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from it – that democracy comports with deliberative ends better than other possible 
political procedures. Epistemic Proceduralism, on the other hand, must offer a defense of 
the liberal acceptance criterion that demonstrates its epistemic features.  
3. Two Epistemic Conceptions of Democracy 
 The idea of a deliberative democracy, Cohen argues, is not a derivative ideal. It is, 
instead, “a fundamental political ideal,” and is itself normative for democracy (Cohen 
1999, 67). Establishing the notion of a deliberative democracy as a normative ideal 
requires accepting the epistemic requirements of deliberation. In the course of giving 
such an account, we should be able to explain why democrats should deliberate at all; and 
to make some headway in answering the question of how they should deliberate as 
democrats. 
Both Epistemic Proceduralism (EP) and Pragmatic Deliberativism (PD) view 
themselves as “epistemic.” That is, each one understands itself to appropriately recognize 
the epistemic condition on democratic legitimacy. Thus, each one understands 
deliberation as oriented by a procedure independent moral standard. The pragmatic 
deliberativist contends, however, that Epistemic Proceduralism begs the question against 
the non-democrat, jeopardizing itself as a normative theory of democracy. PD bases this 
claim on the fact that EP restricts the selection of and priority of ends on the basis of the 
liberal acceptance criterion. But the liberal acceptance criterion is motivated by a 
presumably un-rejectable moral fact – the fact of reasonable pluralism. If it could be 
reasonably rejected, then, the liberal criterion would be an unsuitable basis for political 
legitimacy.  
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The Pragmatic Deliberativist suggests there is reason to think it could be rejected. 
This is because it presupposes a moral standard whose justification would require the sort 
of substantive account the political liberal rejects, or the sort of procedural account that is 
weak. Thus, it is internally incoherent or weak against non-democratic conceptions of the 
good. The non-democrat after all 
is not moved by Estlund’s [understood here as representative of EP] consideration 
that no philosopher king will be able to win the consent of large populations; the 
consent of the foolish and ignorant is, on the epistemarchist’s view, of course 
unnecessary for political legitimacy. For the epistemarchist, the sole requirement 
for legitimacy is knowledge (Talisse 2005, 103).         
 
So the non-democrat is by definition not concerned to meet the requirements of the 
liberal acceptance criterion. According to EP, certain views will be clearly disallowed in 
setting the agenda based upon the reasonableness (considered normatively) of the 
acceptance criterion. According to the Pragmatic Deliberativist, there may be no non-
question begging reason available to the political liberal.  
Of course, it is not as though Pragmatic Deliberativism admits all moral doctrines 
into political justification. It is a normative theory that is “epistemic” in the sense that it 
disqualifies views that undermine truth-oriented, deliberative acts by the imposition of 
speech or communicative restrictions. Thus, the question for PD is not whether a doctrine 
meets the standard of LAC. Instead, it is whether or not citizens are willing to subject 
their views to the requirements of deliberation, hence to the discovery of what is best to 
believe about what should be done. Citizens who are unwilling to subject their views to 
deliberation undermine it as a political norm. If EP undermines such acts, EP and PD are 
(in this respect) mutually exclusive. PD treats EP as a non-epistemic view. The 
justification of the liberal acceptance criterion requires justifying the normative bearing 
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of the fact of reasonable pluralism. But in order to address PD, it must show that the 
liberal acceptance criterion is, at least in one important way, epistemic without requiring 
the type of consent PD attributes to it. In this vein, consider a possible response by the 
Epistemic Proceduralist.  
Assume for a moment that there is, in fact, a class of citizens who are experts. 
This claim does not entail that experts are in accord with each other, not at least any more 
than are the experts in accord with the non-experts. Thus, at every level of political input 
we may plausibly believe there to be disagreement about the good, hence about what 
should be done. Given the fact about reasonable disagreement over who knows what is 
good, the only decision-making procedure for which citizens might have an obligation to 
obey would be one that incorporated the recognition of this fact. Otherwise, legitimacy 
would be based on a view of the good that can be reasonably contested and perhaps 
rejected. This claim is consistent with the view that one has a duty to obey only if the 
procedure meets some epistemic criteria.  
Pragmatic deliberativism assumes that the problem with Epistemic Proceduralism 
derives from its emphasis upon agreement as opposed to accepting more readily the fact 
of disagreement. About this assumption, Estlund writes, “The problem about knowing the 
knowers, is not that no knowers will be agreed upon, but that empowering any proposed 
knower will leave some people without the reasons they are individually owed” (1993, 
88). The epistemic constraints placed upon democratic procedures are not intended, then, 
to produce agreement about who the knowers are; but to restrict the conditions under 
which a duty to obey democratic outcomes can arise. In particular, it restricts the range of 
citizens to whom reasons are owed — the class of all reasonable citizens when they are 
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reasonable (Estlund 1993, 87). One should be a democrat, it seems, because it is the only 
(or at least the best) way to satisfy this criterion of justice – the only way to give each 
what they are owed without assuming knowledge or agreement about experts, even if 
such experts exist.97 Granted, the liberal acceptance criterion does not say what justice is. 
It says only that whatever it is, it must recognize the epistemic constraint of reasonable 
pluralism as a fact about reason (or reason-giving) as such. An outcome is legitimate if 
there is sufficient reason to choose it. We have sufficient reason to choose it, if a majority 
desires that it be enacted.   
The contention that Epistemic Proceduralism begs the question against the non-
democratic, then, may be met with the following claim: The non-democrat is owed 
reasons only if she is reasonable. She is reasonable only if she accepts the fact of 
reasonable disagreement about who the knowers are. “Acceptance” here cannot be 
understood as a psychological description, but instead as an account of what one could 
not reasonably reject. What cannot be reasonably rejected is the constraint on the 
determination of ends. Still, this could not be a reason for the non-democrat; but 
according to Epistemic Proceduralism it does not seem that the non-democrat (as 
unreasonable) is among those who are owed reasons. In this light, it is not completely 
clear that the epistemic criteria for which Epistemic Proceduralism argues justifies 
democratic authority, even if it does provide some guideline for determining who is a 
democrat and who is not. To this extent, it would not justify a duty to obey democratic 
outputs. The justification of the duty to obey depends upon whether or not the liberal 
legitimacy criterion is justified as a criterion for selecting ends – indeed for prioritizing 
                                                 
97 If there is agreement about who the experts are, presumably one would know enough what the expert 
knows for this agreement to be beside the point.  
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justice as the most basic evaluative criterion for democratic outputs. It is justified if it is 
acceptable to all reasonable citizens, and if (as Estlund writes) it is true.98 The statement 
of this principle shows what is required for the acceptance criterion to be fully justified. 
However, since it is not clear LAC is true, it is not clear that it has been justified.99  
4. Deliberation and Legitimacy 
Seizing on this kind of criticism, Misak seems to believe that the LAC is simply 
LACne. Since it impacts negatively on the possibility and motivations for deliberation, it 
undermines democratic legitimacy. Enlisting Benhabib, she contends that “the Rawlsian 
restriction would rule out as illegitimate the many struggles against oppression which try 
to redefine what is considered private into matters of public concern” (2000, 28). So she 
claims that political liberalism excludes the kinds and quantities of political input that 
would make outcomes legitimate. LACne imposes restrictions that take certain proposals 
about the good off the table a priori. And again, referring to Sandel, she claims that 
taking the religious and moral controversies off the public agenda results in a society – or 
at least a political society – that is vacuous and devoid of the general goods these various 
conceptions or that their inclusion in deliberative practices might afford. Democracy is 
justified as a social choice procedure if it sets the conditions under which such 
deliberation might effectively pursue truth about what should be done. Thus, it must 
observe certain requirements about the kinds and quantities of allowable political 
input.100 Pragmatic Deliberativism, she claims, does not beg the question against the non-
democrat by restricting her input a priori. Rather it binds both democrat and non-
                                                 
98 This is the force of MAC (the Modified Acceptance Criterion) as described in Chapter 4.  
99 In fact, however, there may be reasons to think that reasonableness is a sufficient normative criterion for 
political justification. This reason is discovered in the fact of reasonable pluralism under as an epistemic 
constraint on justification.  
100 I will discuss these requirements in some detail in the final section.  
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democrat to the same epistemic standards. It is not epistemologically plural, even if it is 
morally plural. Securing the conditions under which deliberative acts can occur, then, 
may be understood as one’s lot as a citizen whatever one’s general moral perspective.  
The general problem of democratic legitimacy, as discussed in Chapter 3, is how 
to make reason operant in (and as constitutive of) the public sphere. If the cognitive 
functions of persons cannot operate optimally while under the influence various 
distortions of custom, local political realities, et. al. then something must be said about 
the conditions under which practical reason can operate. Thus, the public use of reason 
seems to aim at achieving sound practical judgments, through eliminating or mitigating 
various cognitive distortions.101 In “What is Enlightenment?” Kant writes that citizens 
should have the “freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters” (1784, 55). 
He adds, “The public use of man’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring 
about enlightenment among men …” (1784, 55). Kant is making a plea for the public use 
of practical reason, and determining the conditions under which it is possible, as a means 
to reaching correct conclusions. On the other hand, if certain critics are correct, the 
formal treatment of practical reason has consequences that are, as Misak claims, 
unrealistic and undesirable.  
The central impediment to deliberation and its legitimating properties, according 
to Misak, is the public/private distinction that seems to follow from the legitimacy 
criterion. As conceived within liberalism, the claim goes, it renders the public square 
relatively empty of citizens. Consider Kant’s effort to articulate this distinction. 
In view of this, he is not and cannot be free as priest, since he is acting on a 
commission imposed from outside. Conversely, as a scholar addressing the real 
public (i.e. the world at large) through his writings, the clergyman making public 
                                                 
101 These distortions may derive from social and political institutions and practices inasmuch as individuals. 
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use of his reason enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak his 
own person” (1784, 57). 
 
Kant suggests the “priest” may check his cross at the public door. However, it is not clear 
whether this is a requirement, or merely a possibility. If it is merely a possibility, it says 
only that when speaking publicly one is not constrained by the traditional trappings of 
one’s vocation, employment, or belief. One may speak freely.102 In itself, this does not 
seem to preclude one from speaking publicly as a priest¸ or other type of civic and 
religious leader. The private sphere can impose obligations upon persons as members of 
an historical community that the public sphere cannot impose upon citizens as members 
of a democratic polity. 
Kant admits that at some point there could be confrontation between public and 
private may producing a kind of ethical conflict in which the clergy or other traditional 
authority must decide for whom she speaks. But I would assume based on the views of 
Misak and Sandel that the interpenetration and possible confrontation between the public 
and private spheres is actually what they are after. Again, referring to Benhabib’s 
writings, Misak claims, “any space where people act together and where freedom can 
appear is public space. Such space needn’t be institutionalized. Any demonstration, secret 
meeting of dissidents, etc., counts as public on this account” (2000, 121).  
However, at least some articulations of the acceptance criterion seem compatible 
with this possibility. In particular, it is not obvious that various views of the good are 
taken off the public agenda a priori. Rather, the restriction of public reason is upon 
traditional forms of authority, not upon persons who have been formed in one way or 
                                                 
102 To speak “freely” is not to speak arbitrarily or without appealing to standards of reason. Rather, the 
existence of the public sphere is predicated, as suggested already, upon the possibility of eliminating 
cognitive distortions, limiting the role of habituation, et. al.  
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another by them. More importantly, the justification for these restrictions is epistemic, 
since it aims to correct for various kinds of cognitive distortion that impede the function 
of reason aimed at correctness.103 This reading of the public/private distinction suggests 
what it claims (or needs to claim) is weaker than many current criticisms suppose. The 
weaker claim is only that the point of the public sphere is to offer the opportunity for one 
to speak “freely” as a rational citizen even when one is a de facto practitioner of a 
historical practice. Whether or not this raises further ethical questions for the practitioner 
is a contingent matter, and will depend upon many features internal to those practices, but 
not upon any features of the public sphere as such. There is, then, no hard and fast line 
between public and private here either.104 Since it seems to grant most of what the 
pragmatic (Misak) or civic republican (Sandel) deliberativist wants, it is more difficult to 
frame a criticism in these terms. Thus, Criticism 1 and Criticism 2 of LAC can be 
handled by the same reason. That is, if the liberal acceptance criterion has epistemic 
features (in the form of constraints) it can handle the claim that deliberation must aim at a 
procedure-independent moral standard. In addition, it can handle the requirements for 
participation imposed by deliberative procedures.  
I have not yet justified LACe directly. I have discussed only the kinds of responses 
that could meet challenges sure to arise regarding the relation of LAC and democratic 
deliberation. In the next section, I will turn to a more direct justification.  
 
 
                                                 
103 This much was suggested in Chapter 3 with specific regard for Kant’s theory.  
104 Estlund seems to claim this, too, when he writes, “Marking off a category of issues that are controversial 
and outside of public reason will not establish that assertions of such views are precluded by public reason, 
since such assertions introduce the public reason that certain putative experts believe them” (1993, 91).  
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5. The Epistemic Role of the Liberal Acceptance Criterion 
 Deliberation pursues a good. Moral pluralism supposes the possibility of 
numerous substantive accounts of the moral good. Thus, deliberation seems to be a 
meaningful activity only if we can determine which good(s) it should pursue. As already 
discussed, the pursuit of a non-moral good (e.g. stability) produces no justification for 
democratic deliberation. This means that deliberation must aim at a moral good (e.g. 
justice). But if deliberation aims at some moral good, it also seems necessarily to require 
epistemic criteria. The problem in this case is the plurality of accounts, including the 
apparently incommensurable priority assignments for justice as a moral good. So if LAC 
can be read as LACe, not simply LACne it must address the problem of this 
incommensurability without reneging on the epistemic requirement. 
Consequently, it must steer between two avenues of criticism: If the political 
liberal avoids asserting substantive conceptions of the good in the name of legitimacy, 
she strips deliberation of its content. In this case, she de-populates the public sphere and 
its goods and eliminates the sense of deliberation in democracy. On the other hand, if she 
asserts a substantive conception of the good, she violates her own criteria for legitimacy 
(Wenar 1995).  
Whatever procedure to which we appeal in setting deliberative ends for the 
purposes of evaluating legitimate outcomes it is necessarily constrained by epistemic 
criteria. Otherwise, the case for deliberation would be weak. This being so, the case for 
democratic legitimacy would be, too. If these claims are on target, then theory of 
legitimacy must articulate its epistemic features. I have suggested there is more than one 
way to approach the problem. 
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A corrected view of political liberalism claims that LAC is formulated on the 
basis of the fact of reasonable pluralism. But it understands LAC as LACe. It could be 
justified in claiming this only if the fact of reasonable pluralism has epistemic features. In 
Chapter 4, I claimed that it does. These epistemic features are evident (as constraints) 
upon recognition that a substantive claim “A is good” cannot be entered into political 
justification unless it can be entered without controversy. This is not because of the 
controversy is over its truth. Rather, the controversy is about who knows what the good 
is. More importantly, the fact of reasonable pluralism could not, as an epistemic 
constraint, be reasonably rejected.105 Thus, only a procedure constrained by this principle 
would produce a duty to obey. The key, however, is that the duty to obey is generated 
under conditions of pluralism – conditions in which there is a variety of reasonable but 
“opposing and irreconcilable” doctrines.  
The epistemic import of the fact of reasonable pluralism has to do with the 
determination of political ends – what they should be formally, but not what they are 
substantively. In short, it operates as a guideline to help identify the correct political 
target under conditions of reasonable pluralism. Identify the correct target would, after 
all, be a part of “getting things right” (Estlund 1993, 80). Thus, the fact of reasonable 
pluralism operates as an epistemic constraint on any claim to base legitimate outcomes on 
a disputed comprehensive view. As suggested earlier, this view does not entail the claim 
that there is no political truth, or that there is no one who knows. So it does not endorse 
the idea that democratic deliberation can be unhinged from epistemic criteria. The role of 
epistemic criteria has to do with setting the correct political ends (under conditions of 
                                                 
105 Admittedly this claim is sustainable only if the political constructivist point of view is sustainable. 
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reasonable pluralism) in order to construct the conditions under which intelligence may 
be applied to cognitive moral problems at hand.  
Is there any way to sort out which epistemic view most nearly hits the mark with 
respect to democratic legitimacy?  I think there is; and it revolves around the justification 
of a duty to obey democratic outcomes which I have understood all along as necessary to 
their legitimacy. According to Misak, her Peircean pragmatist deliberative view of 
democratic legitimacy is “meta-ethical.” That is, “It is an exploration of how morality 
and politics fit into our world-view. It is an argument about why our substantial debates 
in morals and politics have the shape they do” (Misak 2000, 7). However, it seems we 
might agree with everything Misak writes about deliberation – and largely, I do – but still 
not have justified a duty to obey democratic procedures or their outcomes as a category 
of legitimate commands. The political deliberation, it seems, could still have a 
sufficiently good reason to reject outcomes a legitimate when they do not satisfy her 
conception of the good. I believe this is because the meta-ethical analysis blots out the 
kinds of ethical differences under conditions of reasonable pluralism that sustain the 
sense of a duty to obey as part of the idea of legitimacy.106 The problem of establishing a 
duty to obey is not simply the meta-ethical problem of understanding generally how 
political and moral deliberation fits into our lives. Rather, it is the ethical problem of how 
to treat different ends under these conditions.  
Central to the concept of legitimacy is the justification of the duty to obey under 
conditions of moral pluralism. Any failure to justify this duty, then, diminishes the idea 
of legitimacy. Thus, when Rawls writes that democratic societies are marked by a 
                                                 
106 Misak herself notes this kind of criticism raised by Korsgaard that such views “make sense of the 
complexity of morality at the expense of depriving morality itself of sense” (1997, 320). 
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diversity of “opposing and irreconcilable” doctrines, he is not pointing simply to a fact 
about democratic society. He is pointing to a fact about reason under democratic 
conditions. Pluralism is not, then, only a “cultural” problem. It is a problem internal to 
reason – including practices of reason-giving and evaluation. It is the problem of not 
being able to commensurate all goods under a single head as a basis for rational choice. 
The idea of political constructivism restricts the appeal to justice in this regard. The 
justification of a duty to obey, then, should be viewed as an ethical problem, rather than a 
meta-ethical one. Justice, then, is the prior normative ideal for evaluating deliberative 
outcomes if the fact of reasonable pluralism cannot be reasonably rejected. This need not 
mean that it is the only one. There may be a range of deliberative outcomes that are 
possibly correct in a substantive sense. Thus, the principle of justice first determines 
which of these are legitimate.   
The reason to deliberate is to reach outcomes that are substantively better than 
they would be without having deliberated. Surely, any epistemic view must accept this. 
However, the reason for adopting a procedure is not necessarily also the reason that 
makes its outcomes legitimate. One adopts a screwdriver in order to tighten screws. One 
could also stab someone with it. However, the stabbing of a person is legitimate only if 
there are other reasons – reasons that are independent of those for which one initially 
adopted the pointy instrument. Thus, to say that the reason to deliberate is to achieve 
good outcomes says nothing about why the outcomes of deliberation are justified. To do 
so, would make nonsense of the appeal to a procedure independent moral standard. For 
this reason, political liberalism rules out privileging the moral standard of particular 
comprehensive doctrines as legitimating political outcomes. Thus, it faces the problem of 
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constructing such a procedure independent standard without constructing “the truth.” The 
difficulty for an epistemic view of deliberation, then, lies in how to talk about the 
substantive quality of deliberative outcomes without again inviting the charge that it 
illegitimately (and perhaps covertly) privileges a substantive conception of the good, or 
that deliberation is irrelevant to legitimacy. In their views of democratic deliberation, I 
will argue that PD and EP generally converge.  
6. Equality versus Quality  
No deliberative procedure could have good outcomes unless it is one that tries to 
account for all the relevant facts. And the only way to do that is by insisting upon “the 
inclusion of those who are or might be excluded in deliberation” (Misak 2000, 7). If this 
principle is observed as a methodological principle, we will not suppose that the 
“outcomes of a deliberative democratic process are true, but it will suggest that such 
outcomes are legitimate” (2000, 7). The reason for their legitimacy, however, has to do 
not only with the content of deliberation but also with the quality of its outcomes given a 
breadth of input. Since Misak claims this principle is “methodological,” I assume she 
does not mean that legitimacy depends upon the substantive equality of political input. 
Indeed, she means only that a greater quantity of input is epistemically better than less.   
Misak contends that EP – if it adopts the outlook of political liberalism – restricts 
inputs without justification. Consequently, it fails as an epistemic justification of 
democracy. I have suggested that the LACe entails no such restriction. However, an 
epistemic conception may still call for inequalities of input, even if it does in principle 
assert that more input is epistemically better than less. It must be shown, then, why these 
inequalities of input are justified.  
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Whatever the specific differences over the role played by epistemic criteria with 
respect to legitimacy, Pragmatic Deliberativism and Epistemic Proceduralism share 
similar views of democratic deliberation. In particular, they tend to share the view that 
democratic equality may be viewed as a principle with epistemic, not simply moral, 
dimensions. This is because it governs democratic input as conditions under which the 
outcomes could be sound. However, the principle of equality and the conditions for 
producing good decisions stand in tension with each other. The liberal acceptance 
criterion, as discussed in Chapter 4, says that democratic legitimacy supposes the 
possibility of reasons that cannot be rejected by any reasonable citizen. This criterion 
functions as a basis for democratic equality. If the achievement of good decisions 
requires inequality, these inequalities must be justified. That is, we must be able to justify 
these deviations from equality if equality (here considered as the equality of input) is at 
least sometimes mutually exclusive with the quality of political outcomes.  
Some views assume the relevant justification cannot be made. Dahl, for instance, 
makes no appeal to the necessary epistemic features of democratic procedures or the 
quality of their outcomes as relevant to their legitimacy. Instead, he suggests that 
democratic processes are themselves a “rich bundle of substantive goods” (1989, 175).  
One of these goods is equality. This rich bundle points to a theory of legitimate 
outcomes. Outcomes are legitimate if they are produced by procedures in which these 
goods are reflected in some way. An outcome could not be inconsistent with these goods 
without being illegitimate. So, roughly, outcomes that are not the products of procedures 
for which substantive equality of influence is not the norm could not be legitimate.107 
                                                 
107 As I have suggested all along, then, the standard test for the legitimacy of democratic outcomes appeals 
to their consistency with the values expressed in or implied by the procedures.  
 146
Dahl’s view, then, is not epistemic. That is, it does not claim that legitimacy 
depends on the epistemic value of democratic procedures. Rather, it depends upon the 
consistency of the outcomes with certain substantive moral features these procedures 
themselves possess. Since the central good is equality, Dahl’s view of legitimacy and 
those like it outline a broad avenue for debate and deliberation about outcomes relative to 
their tendency to secure or undermine equality as a basic democratic value. There are 
many positions one may take up within this outline. This is particularly evident in debates 
about wealth distribution and political influence. Indeed, some have argued that there can 
be no democratic legitimacy unless there is substantive economic equality or substantive 
equality of political influence (Christiano 1996, Johnson and Knight 1999). Call the latter 
view egalitarianism about political influence.  
  Other positions, however, are formalist. Formalism about political equality, 
according to Estlund, is the view that “accepts equal formal political rights and liberties, 
but rejects the goal of equalizing substantive political influence” (2002, 177). In part, this 
is because there are number of different kinds and levels of political influence – different 
ways of influencing political outcomes with different degrees of importance and different 
kinds of currency. We cannot assume that every form of input should be subject to 
precisely the same constraints – not at least if we are interested in the quality of political 
outcomes.  
The immediate concern about this view is that including the epistemic quality of 
the procedure in a conception of political legitimacy requires the neglect of equality. 
Estlund suggests as much when he writes, “proper attention to the quality of democratic 
procedures and their outcomes requires that we accept substantive inequalities of political 
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input …” (2002, 175). So the pursuit of quality outcomes depends upon the acceptance of 
substantive inequality. This thought raises the specter of a justification that appeals to 
expertise. In this case, EP formulated on the basis of LACe, violates its own 
requirements. 
Estlund claims these inequalities are justified, however, if it is “in the interest of 
increasing input overall” (2002, 175).108 If he is correct, we may reject the claim that 
attention to the quality of political outcomes necessarily entails the neglect of equality or 
that it appeals to experts in any way that violates LACe. An epistemic view holds, then, 
that substantive equality of input is not necessary to produce legitimate outcomes. Indeed, 
it may stymie what is required for meaningful deliberation – that is, political deliberation 
in which the practices and principles involved improve the output.  
 An epistemic view of democratic procedures may be characterized by these 
tenets: 
(1) The substantive quality of political outcomes is relevant or necessary to political 
legitimacy.109  
 
(2) Substantive equality is neither sufficient nor necessary for political quality. 
(3) Substantive inequality is (often) necessary for political quality.110  
The point of the epistemic view is not to disregard equality. The point is to suggest the 
quality of political outcomes cannot be ignored since this, too, may effectively negate the 
legitimacy of democratic procedures. The “equality of input,” however, “may come at the 
cost of quantity,” and “both are important to the quality of the process and its outcomes” 
                                                 
108 This claim assumes we may make a meaningful distinction between substantive equality and the 
concern for equality overall where the latter does not require the former. Wolff (1977) critique the general 
approach of the difference principle as a justificatory principle or as justified.  
109 I believe Estlund takes up the slightly stronger but still moderate position that quality is necessary to 
legitimacy. I will discuss this point in subsequent paragraphs. 
110 By “substantive inequality,” I mean simply the inequalities of wealth, political influence, and the like 
that exists and persists between citizens.  
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(Estlund 2002, 177). So the emphasis on one does not entail or require the neglect of the 
other. I will conclude with a brief argument showing why this is so.  
 A political input, as defined here, represents an opportunity for political 
participation. Voting, then, is a kind of political input. But so is making campaign 
contributions, writing one’s representative, or deliberating in the various forms 
available.111 Voting is a “lower level” input in which we can expect an equality of 
available input represented by the allotment of one vote per eligible voter. Since everyone 
has the same quantity of input, there is a substantive equality of political influence over 
the outcome among participants. Suppose now that we increase the amount of available 
input, and re-distribute it according to whoever has the most education; and that there is 
one citizen with the most where all other citizens have an equal amount.112 If we allow 
the principle, the super-educated citizen may be allotted 3 votes in comparison to every 
other citizen’s single vote. In this case, the super-educated citizen has correspondingly 
more influence over the political outcome. The general worry of egalitarianism is that 
where smaller groups of citizens have more influence, this influence will distort the 
outcomes in their own favor. But the problem from the egalitarian point of view does not 
arise over the substantive quality of the outcome. The complaint is that it unfairly 
privileges the interests of some citizens over others, violating democratic equality. 
 An apparent solution to this problem would be to make the substantive equality of 
influence normative for all democratic procedures. Following the voting model described 
above, this would apparent mean equalizing influence by equalizing the possibilities for 
                                                 
111 Notice, too, the informality of these kinds of inputs.  
112 I am not here asserting or defending any such principle; only using it to illustrate the lines along which 
votes may be re-distributed. In fact, distributing input on the basis of education seems to violate LAC since 
it can be reasonably disputed that the educated are the knowers. 
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input. Thus, if (given a form of input) some have more to contribute thereby potentially 
increasing their influence over the outcome they would be prohibited from doing so. One 
cannot be legitimately guaranteed greater influence over outcomes according to 
principles like wealth, greater education, and the like. But as noted, this view does not 
seem to depend in any way upon the epistemic criteria that I have argued are necessary 
for political legitimacy.  
This is especially evident when considering the demands of deliberation. Voting 
is not the only form of political participation, nor is it the only way in which a participant 
may influence outcomes. To the extent deliberation is regarded as vital to good decisions, 
and good decisions are relevant or necessary to democratic legitimacy, political 
deliberation is also a necessary form of political input. Thus, votes are not the only form 
of political currency. Reasons may be thought of as a type of political currency, too.  
This kind of input, however, is more complex than voting. Reasons are not 
evaluated according to who in particular has them. A reason is a good one, for instance, if 
it is true, or if there is ample evidence supporting it. Since reasons are the inputs of 
deliberation, the egalitarian goal of equalizing the quantity of input in order to equalize 
influence works against the ideal of deliberative democracy. It is not the quantity of 
reasons that matters so much to deliberation. It is their quality; and their quality is an 
epistemic determination. Consequently, we cannot assume as the egalitarian does that the 
inputs of various procedures are enough the same that we could formulate general rules to 
apply to each case with the goal of equalizing substantive influence. The consequence 
would be a stagnation of the quantity of input. Egalitarianism of influence assumes that 
more participation is better than less. Assuming on the participatory model that more 
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input is better, it would be self-defeating to hold to the goal of a substantive equality of 
influence. So while the concern over granting more influence to some according to 
principles like wealth and education is well-placed, the solution to the problem cannot lie 
in aiming at the substantive equality of influence.  
If the deviation from strict, substantive equality makes increases the amount of 
available influence, it is something like a financial market increasing the amount of 
available wealth. The substantive inequalities of influence offset the deviation from 
equality by providing the opportunity for those with less proportional input to acquire 
more of it. Thus, the quality-based reasons for legitimate differentials of influence are 
justified when they result in the increased quantity of input. They could do this only if 
they make more input available. This increased input will have further epistemic benefits 
for political outcomes. In this respect, EP does not ignore problems of the equality of 
influence. But instead of approaching them by placing restrictions on the distribution of 
input, it focuses on the conditions for making more input available. Restrictions aimed at 
an equality of influence would disable democratic deliberation by making political input 
less available.  
7. Utopianism and Practicability 
Ethical theories are evaluated, in part, according to their capacity to satisfy certain 
practical conditions such that they could be workable by persons given what we may 
assume are limitations imposed by nature, lack of information and the like. The 
“practicability condition,” then, imposes certain standards of realism on ethical theories. 
Theories that cannot satisfy the named conditions would be unrealistic, unworkable, and 
so unacceptable. This rule is typically recognized in the form, “ought implies can.” A 
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moral outlook that cannot be practiced in some way cannot be a moral outlook – not for 
us anyway.  
Having arrived at the end of this dissertation, one may object that the thesis is 
overly complex and overly idealistic – that it fails to account sufficiently for the items 
limiting persons as political agents. No complete defense can be articulated here. 
However, there are several points worth considering in this vein. Kant writes, 
In the practical…the power of judgment first begins to show itself to advantage 
when ordinary understanding excludes all sensuous incentives from practical 
laws. Such understanding then becomes even subtle, whether in quibbling with its 
own conscience or with other claims regarding what is to be called right…. And 
the most extraordinary thing is that ordinary understanding in this practical case 
may have just as good a hope of hitting the mark as that which any philosopher 
may promise himself (1785, 16).   
 
Kant places a great deal of weight upon the potential for ordinary (here, philosophically 
untutored) understanding to determine the correct principles according to which one 
should act. He does not advocate the “science” of morals, then, in order to correct 
ordinary understanding. Rather, he does so in order to sharpen it, such that “wisdom’s 
precepts may gain acceptance and permanence” (1785, 16). Practical reason is compelled 
to go beyond itself, only for the sake of its own cultivation and clear understanding of its 
correct moral principles.  
 The brief account of constructivist practical reason in Chapter 4 is meant to 
suggest above all that political theory should be seen in roughly this way. That is, 
political theory should be viewed as contiguous with practical reason in some way. To 
this extent, it is not necessary to view it separately as if it were an object of speculation. 
Most especially, the step into theory is made only on the basis of that of which persons 
are already capable vis a vis reason. To this extent, a view predicated on this 
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understanding of practical reason satisfies the “ought implies can” rule. It is predicated on 
powers persons already possess. Even if such a view is “idealistic” in one sense, it is not 
so in any way that violates it practicability. The justification of such a view may be 
complex, even if it is quite natural in practice.  
8. Conclusion 
I began this dissertation with a brief discussion of the religious fanatic as a 
recognizable instance within which the problem of democratic justification might arise. 
Such a case is an extreme instance of pluralism and its effects. Given pluralism, I have 
tried to outline an idea of democratic legitimacy. The reasons that ultimately justify 
democratic outcomes – that produce a duty to obey – do not require acceptability to the 
fanatic in a psychological sense or from the point of view of her own doctrine. They do 
require, on the other hand, an appeal to epistemic criteria.  
Pluralism, in particular reasonable pluralism, is demanding in the formulation of 
such constraints. This “demandingness” has to do with the apparent incommensurability 
of reasonable doctrines. Yet since the moral ends of democracy are disputed, the idea of 
legitimacy must accommodate the disagreement about these ends. This standard, then, if 
successfully articulated does not simply indicate a form of life or a comprehensive 
doctrine. Reasonable pluralism, after all, is not simply a social or cultural phenomenon. It 
is a fact about reason and its operation. As such, it must be available to any reasonable 
first order doctrine, inasmuch as it is true. If this kind of defense is successful, this fact is 
normative with respect to all democratic procedures including deliberative ones. While it 
offers a political basis for equality, political equality does not require a substantive 
equality of political influence. The reason is that substantive equality would diminish the 
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epistemic value of the outcomes that democratic deliberative procedures are designed – 
when designed rightly – to produce. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the reason for 
adopting a procedure is not also the reason upon which the legitimacy (hence the 
authority) of its outcomes can be established. Thus, the legitimacy of actual deliberative 
outcomes still depends upon some other procedure (perhaps an ideal deliberative 
procedure); and this procedure must meet some epistemic criteria. One may claim that a 
duty to obey is not essential to a concept of political legitimacy. However, in this case, 
one would be hard pressed to say why moral pluralism is a problem for democracy or 
what the sense of a normative theory is anyway.    
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